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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the challenges from European constitutionalism to the classical 
concept of constitutional sovereignty and develops an alternative concept of 
multidimensional sovereignty that is adequate for understanding the architecture of 
political authority in the multilevel European Union constitution. Hereby, the thesis 
addresses two problems that are widely spread in European constitutional theory. First, it 
provides a clear and concise definition and concept of the European constitution. This is 
mainly based on an analysis of the emergence of the concept of the constitution and its 
meanings in the Western European history of (nation) states and by examining whether 
these meanings are applicable to the European context. Secondly, it identifies and 
explains which phenomena of European integration and the European Union polity 
actually challenge the core features of the traditional concept of sovereignty: indivisible 
and unitary sovereignty. The three challenges, that undermine the classical monolithic 
understanding of sovereignty, are multiple levels of authority, multiple sources of 
authority and new, non-hierarchical forms of authority relationships that occur in the 
European Union polity. That is why a revised concept of constitutional sovereignty is 
developed and which is particularly capable of grasping the transformed features of 
sovereignty in Europe: multidimensional sovereignty. This concept includes a 
complementary and multilevel structure of political authority in Europe. Throughout the 
thesis, the analysis and findings will be illustrated by constitutional practice and 
adjudication in Germany and the United Kingdom in order to show that the question of 
constitutional sovereignty has strong practical implications for and is highly influenced 
by constitutional practice in the Member States.  
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Introduction 
 
Across different countries and from different perspectives of inquiry, constitutionalism 
and constitutional theory have always been at the centre of political science. Recent 
political debates about constitutionalism have developed along three major lines of 
controversy that constitute three sub-disciplinary perspectives: the place of 
constitutionalism in the international order (international relations); the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy (normative political theory), and 
constitutionalism in multi-level governance (comparative politics) (Peters/ Armingeon, 
2009: 386). This thesis aims to contribute to the latter in a way that it concerns aspects 
of the interdisciplinary sub-field of European constitutional theory. It is mainly dealing 
with two problems which are the foundation of constitutional theory and the basis for 
many second-order research questions and thus cannot be overestimated. 
The first problem is the lack of an adequate fully elaborated concept of the 
‘constitution,’ especially when this concept should be applied to the supranational 
European polity. Far too often, the constitutional terminology deployed in the discussion 
of the European context is merely assumed instead of clearly defined or elaborated. 
Terminological obscurity and conceptual ambiguity are the consequence and have 
serious implications for the analysis and the understanding of European 
constitutionalism. This problem is aggravated by the fact that a nation state-based 
concept of the ‘constitution’ is often, and more or less explicitly, applied to the 
European political order, without any consideration of its suitability for this particular 
context. Because of this prejudice, many studies suggest that the European constitution 
is a malfunctioning version of a nation state constitution, hence inherently flawed. For 
instance, differentiations between a ‘constitution’ (nation state) and a ‘constitutional 
framework’ (Europe) – which suggest that latter allows for more pluralism than the first 
(Cannizzaro, 2007: 772) – imply rather gradual instead of categorical differences. 
Accordingly, such terminologies tend to measure the European constitution against the 
standard of nation state constitutions and thus do not account for specific and unique 
features of European constitutional law. That is why in the vast literature on European 
constitutionalism and constitutional theory we rarely find a clear and comprehensive 
account of the meanings of the ‘constitution’ and whether and how they can be 
transferred to political orders beyond the nation state such as the European Union. 
  
  7 
The second major problem, which is closely related to the first, is how to account for the 
conceptual challenges that emerge from the European constitutional order to the idea of 
sovereignty. The problem here is that, although it is widely agreed that sovereingty is 
somehow under attack, it is not systematically accounted for which aspects of 
sovereignty exactly are challenged and whether it is still possible to employ the concept 
of sovereignty within the European context, or whether it must be revised or abandoned 
altogether. Many studies of the challenges to sovereignty coming from the European 
constitution fail to identify precisely which are the ‘real’ problems at stake. 
Additionally, we are also faced with a variety of misconceptions about sovereignty – 
leading to the conclusion that there are challenges to it, where in fact there are none. The 
result of all this is a series of analytical confusion and misapprehensions. 
There can be no doubt that the European constitution challenges our traditional 
understanding of the exercise of political power and hence of sovereignty, as those have 
origninally operated within the nation state context. It also challenges the traditional 
normative basis for the exercise of political power – i.e. ideas of legitimacy, understood 
to have emerged from nationhood and popular sovereignty. Within the European legal-
political order, however, there is a rather multi-dimensional architecture of political 
authority, characterised by the co-existence of different sources and multiple levels of 
authority, which are characterised by heterarchical instead of hierarchical relationships. 
Within such a constellation the quest for one single, supreme and ultimate political 
authority, as suggested by the classical concept of sovereignty, is doomed to be 
inconclusive. That is why we need to re-consider the classical concept of sovereignty 
and especially its analytical assumptions with regard to its applicability to the European 
polity. 
This thesis seeks to address the questions arising from the understanding of the 
constitution and the nature of sovereignty in a way that it accounts for the conceptual 
issues as well as their practical implications. This is the reason why it also discusses two 
actual constitutional systems (the German and the British ones) against this particular 
background in order to provide concrete illustrations of the scope and intensity of the 
conceptual challenges and their effect on constitutional practice. 
To begin with, in the first chapter, the thesis offers an account of the ‘constitution’ and 
especially of the ‘European constitution.’ Here it is essential to understand the different 
analytical perspectives on ‘constitutionalism’ understood as either a condition of 
analysis or the object of explanation. It is also necessary to engage with the European 
constitutional narrative and its origins which after all have affected the very process of 
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political theorizing. It is obvious that the so-called ‘constitutionalization thesis’ has 
created ‚facts’ for the continuing process of European integration and the European 
political order. The first chapter will finally provide a comprehensive definition of the 
term ‘European constitution’ by ‘borrowing’ meanings of the ‘constitution’ that have 
emerged in the history of Western European nation states and that can be reasonably 
transferred to the European context. The meanings that can be applied to the European 
framework are that the constitution comprises a set of fundamental laws, principles of 
liberal democracy, a political culture where politics subscribe to the normative primacy 
of (constitutional) law. Territoriality as a constitutional meaning is also found in Europe, 
however, it is no longer the exclusive principle of organising political spaces. Statehood 
as a constitutional meaning, however, is not even necessarily linked to the concept of the 
nation state constitution. It has ‚only’ been a historically contingent association with 
state constitutionalism and thus must not be made a condition for the European 
constitution. Therefore it can be concluded that Europe has a constitution – though it has 
transformed some of its meanings in a specifically European way and does not resemble 
all the historical features of nation state constitutionalism.  
 
In order to address the challenges to the traditional concept of sovereignty that emerge 
from the European constitution, the second chapter will clarify the meaning of 
‘sovereignty’ as it has evolved in the Western European tradition. Here, in the often 
violent struggle of many different authorities competing for political rule, sovereignty 
has evolved as a concept of supreme and ultimate political authority that is exclusive in 
a specific territory. This so-called ‘classical’ or ‘Westphalian’ concept of sovereignty 
has become predominant in Western Europe and entails the following conceptual 
features: sovereignty as a claim about ultimate and supreme authority; sovereignty as a 
relational legal institution; sovereignty operating along different dimensions; and 
sovereignty understood as indivisible and unitary.  
In the debate on how the European constitution challenges the core elements of classical 
sovereignty we are often presented with ‘challenges’ that are in fact misconceptions of 
the sovereignty concept. They are conceptual fallacies based on confused assumptions or 
illogical reasoning but not challenges deriving from the process of European integration. 
In order to distinguish them from the ‘real’ challenges related to European 
constitutionalism, an overview on the most widespread and popular conceptual fallacies 
will be given.  
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In order to show that the sovereignty issue is not merely a theoretical one but highly 
consequential for constitutional practice, the second chapter will also provide two 
exemplary cases of different traditions of classical sovereignty, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Here it will be elaborated how the conceptual core features of constitutional 
sovereignty are practically operating in diverse legal-political environments. It will be 
explained that two very different and influential sovereignty traditions, Germany’s 
constitutional sovereignty and the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty, draw on the same 
notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty – the feature which is essentially under 
attack by European constitutionalism as will be shown in the third chapter.  
 
The third chapter argues that the transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to 
the European level has transformed and challenged classical sovereignty. The questions 
that follow are whether sovereignty has been shifted or divided or even got lost? 
The different answers to these questions are controversial and discussed with particular 
regard to the grounds of validity of European law. Here it is disputed whether European 
law owes its validity to the Member States or whether it is valid by its own means? Is 
the European Union a derivate of the Member States who remain the ‘Masters of the 
Treaties’ or is it an organisation sui generis independent from Member States? The 
question of validity is crucial for the issue of sovereignty since the question about the 
final arbiter directly alludes to the very nature of political authority within the European 
Union and thus the concept of sovereignty. Practically, this becomes manifest in cases of 
conflict between national and European law and the question which law shall take 
primacy: European law or Member State constitutional law? It will be shown that 
classical approaches to sovereignty take opposite stances: while some argue that 
European law takes precedence others argue that national law takes primacy. Both lines 
of argument, however, draw essentially on the same assumption and ground their stances 
in a notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. This assumption is inadequate for the 
European legal-political order since European integration has transcended classical 
sovereignty in many ways. It will be shown that especially through the processes of 
transnationalisation and constitutionalisation European law has emancipated from its 
original international law foundation and developed into a transnational multilevel polity 
that transcends the dichotomous distinction between ‘international’ vs ‘domestic’ law 
and the classical clear-cut distinction between supreme authorities at the international vs 
the national level. Consequently, the classical features of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty have been challenged by European constitutionalism in a way that there are 
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now multiple levels of authority – as opposed to a single level of authority as in classical 
sovereignty. Furthermore, there are now also multiple sources of authority – in contrast 
to a single source of authority as in traditional sovereignty. Finally, we now find new 
non-hierarchical forms of authority relations that transcend strict hierarchy as implied by 
the classical concept of sovereignty.  
All this seems as if we could conclude that sovereignty as a concept was obsolete and no 
longer applicable to the European constitutional order? Quite the contrary - it will be 
argued that sovereignty as a concept is indeed meaningful for European 
constitutionalism and therefore must not be abandoned. The reason is that sovereignty is 
about the configuration of political authority – and in the European Union – like in any 
other national or transnational polity – we do find political authority. Authority and 
sovereignty are thus far from being lost in Europe – but sovereignty in Europe does 
indeed occur in other forms than indivisible and unitary and thereby challenges the 
traditional concept of sovereignty. 
 
At the beginning of the fourth chapter it will be illustrated how those challenges have 
been dealt with in our two exemplary cases, Germany and the United Kingdom. It will 
be explained how the German and the British constitutional courts have adjudicated the 
European challenges to constitutional sovereignty – according to their very different 
traditions and unique approaches towards sovereignty. However, their efforts to 
reconcile the sovereignty challenges, particularly emerging from European law 
supremacy, with their accounts for national constitutional sovereignty have not provided 
a sustainable solution but have been a considerable part of the problem. The German 
FCC has jealously defended national constitutional supremacy and only conditionally 
accepted the supremacy of European law. This account, in one or the other way, is found 
throughout all its judgements and has been based on legal reasoning that re-enforces the 
classical notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Against the odds of widespread 
Euro-scepticism in the United Kingdom, however, the Law Lords have developed a 
pragmatic acceptance of European law supremacy that seems to originate less in a 
jealous defence of parliamentary sovereignty rather than pragmatic and practical 
reasoning which eventually falls short of developing a sound and comprehensive 
account of transformed constitutional sovereignty in the UK. Indeed both courts do not 
meet or address the sovereignty challenges adequately. They rather fail to incorporate 
the new and specific architecture of sovereignty in the European Union, but fall back on 
the classical notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty in one or the other way. 
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Against this background it is obvious that there is a need for a revised concept that 
overcomes the assumptions of indivisible and unitary sovereignty and is practicable in 
constitutional practice and adjudication. That is why in the fourth chapter such concept 
will be introduced: the concept of multidimensional sovereignty. Multidimensional 
hereby means that multiple sources of authority in Europe and the Member States 
constitute a complementary (non-indivisible) authority structure that transcends the 
traditional notion of indivisible sovereignty. Additionally, multidimensional also means 
that multiple levels of authority constitute a multilevel (non-unitary) constitutional 
structure that transcends the classical idea of unitary sovereignty. 
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Chapter 1 
European Constitutionalism and the 
European Constitution 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‚(T)he constitutional narrative has come out as a sort of master or dominant narrative whose 
answers have reached and persuaded the widest circle of influential stakeholders with the 
greatest impact on the social construction of European integration’ (Avbelj, 2008: 1). 
 
For the last decades European constitutionalism has been the subject of a vivid political 
and scholarly debate. Perhaps regrettably, most of the contributions on constitutionalism 
beyond the nation state come from law departments – social scientists have only recently 
joined the debate. In this debate the constitutional language has become mainstream and 
paradigmatic, if not even hegemonic. However, due to the failure of the ‘European 
Constitution’ through the negative vote by the Dutch and French voters in 2005 and the 
current crisis in the Euro zone, the project of a written constitution for Europe has 
disappeared from the political agenda. But for all that, there is still agreement among 
both politicians and scholars that some form of European constitutionalism yet exists – 
despite the absence of a written constitutional document. Albeit this broad consensus, 
however, the concept of the ‘constitution’ in the actual state of affairs in Europe remains 
obscure. In the literature on European constitutionalism, the terminology of the 
‘constitution’ and its specifically European features is – if at all discussed – mostly 
vague and ambiguous. Too often we find that nation state-based conceptualisations are 
implied in the analyses – which almost necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
European constitution resembles a distorted and deficient picture of nation state 
constitutionalism (Peters/ Armingeon, 2009: 385; de la Rasilla del Moral, 2010: 87). 
This conceptual disarray is mainly due to the fact that the following seemingly basic, yet 
vital questions have not been sufficiently discussed by scholars of European 
constitutionalism: 
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• What is a ‘constitution’ and what are its essential meanings?  
• Is it possible to apply the concept of the constitution to the European polity? If so, 
which conceptual elements can be transferred beyond the nation state and which 
cannot?  
• What is a specifically European concept of the ‘constitution’ and what its 
features?  
The consequences of such lack of clarity in European constitutional theory are 
significant. Without a sound conceptual framework it is impossible to provide an 
adequate and precise account of European constitutionalism and the European 
constitution – which in turn almost necessarily leads to inconsistent and distorted 
analyses of European constitutionalism. 
 
The first chapter of my thesis will address this conceptual lack of European 
constitutional theory and provide for a specifically ‘European’ concept of the 
constitution. To this purpose it is first of all essential to understand the debate on 
European constitutionalism and the analytical approaches towards constitutionalism – 
either as a condition of analysis or the object of explanation – that are shaping this 
debate (1). Secondly, it is necessary to relate the constitutional narrative of Europe to its 
origins and how it has affected theorizing and political thought accordingly. Here it 
becomes obvious that although the so-called ‘constitutionalization thesis’ entails some 
analytical problems, it has undoubtedly created facts for the continuing process of 
European integration and the European political order (2). Thirdly, a comprehensive 
definition of the term ‘constitution’ as it has emerged in Western European nation states 
will be elaborated in order to provide a historical and analytical point of reference for 
further theory building beyond the nation state (4). This particular idea of the 
‘constitution’ refers to the following five meanings: the constitution comprising 
fundamental laws (4a) as well as principles of liberal democracy (4b). Furthermore, the 
constitution reflects a political culture where politics subscribe and subordinate to the 
normative primacy of (constitutional) law and at the same time utilise law as an 
instrument to shape and formalise both the political process and its outcomes (4c). 
Additionally, the constitutional concept is linked to statehood and territoriality, whereas 
statehood is a historical contingency but not a necessary condition of analysis (4d). 
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1.1  The debate on European constitutionalism 
 
‚Constitutionalism is one of those concepts, evocative and persuasive in ist connotations yet 
cloudy in ist analytic and descriptive content, which at once enrich and confuse political 
discourse’ (Grey, 1979: 189). 
 
After the failure of the European Constitution in 2005, politicians and scholars have 
been less optimistic about the widely presumed finality of European constitutionalism 
that would eventually culminate into a written constitutional document. However, that 
impasse in the constitution-making process could also be a chance to make the academic 
and political debate more sensible towards the preconditions and prospects of European 
constitutionalism. Fortunately, ‘European constitutionalism’ as a subject of research and 
debate has not disappeared. Indeed, it has remained a scholarly and political paradigm – 
contested only by a minority of scholars and politicians. Against this background, re-
assessing the conditions, limits and prospects of constitutionalism and its European 
occurence is of greatest importance now more than ever. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
understand what ‘constitutionalism’ within its Western European origin means – and 
even more importantly, whether and under what conditions its conceptual assumptions 
can be transferred to the European context. 
In the history of European nation states, constitutionalism has been a way of limiting 
formerly absolute political power on the grounds of law and therefore to legitimise the 
exercise of political power. Thus constitutionalism has been about the legal limitation of 
government and has meant the antithesis to arbitrary rule. However, some scholars 
disagree with this liberal version of constitutionalism and rather point to a republican 
notion of constitutionalism that focuses more on emancipation and empowerment and 
thus the preservation of a political arena through constitutionalism. Either way, both the 
liberal and the republican reading of constitutionalist traditions in Europe provide 
different angles on the same phenomenon: that political power is to be constituted as a 
political order that guarantees rights and freedoms and provides for an arena of political 
discourse and articulation. Every constitutionalist approach draws on this normative 
heritage in a way that it accounts for political communities as systems of collective 
action based on principles of equality, participation, accountability and the rule of law. 
  
  15 
That is why any modern version of constitutionalism(s) in Western Europe entails the 
elements of limited government, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental 
rights. These are established and operationalised by the institution of the constitution – 
regardless of whether a written or unwritten one. Accordingly, the functions of a modern 
constitution are to constitute a political entity, to establish its basic structure, and to 
define the limitations to the exercise of political power. Therefore it establishes 
fundamental norms, so-called meta-norms, determining how secondary norms are 
produced, applied and interpreted. This particular tradition of constitutionalism and the 
role of constitutions are guided by a liberal conception of power and restrictions on 
government. Hence the way of understanding constitutionalism is widely pre-shaped by 
the historical and political experiences in Europe and their normative implications that 
originate in liberal democratic thought. Taking that into consideration, constitutionalism 
has meant a particular European system of classifying forms of government and their 
legitimacy which are grounded in a set of normative assumptions about the meaning and 
purpose of government. Constitutionalism as such system of classification defines the 
characteristics of constitutions and serves as a means to assess the legitimacy of a 
constitutional system. Thus it is necessarily grounded on substantive values of liberal 
democracy. Also, theories of constitutionalism draw on the idea that political power is 
asserted, organised and limited through the means of law. Constitutionalism in line with 
this normative tradition is based on rule of law and uses (constitutional and natural) law 
as a ‘technique’ to ensure the rule of law and to bound political power to a normative 
order. More recently and especially since the mid-20th century constitutionalism has 
also been a theory of comparing constitutions against supranational normative systems. 
Here, constitutionalism legitimises and evaluates constitutions according to those 
supranational norms. Both lines of development in the Western European tradition of 
constitutionalism and its liberal democratic foundation have become hegemonic in 
Europe over the past centuries and have also spread beyond the European geographical 
space. That is why the prevalent way of constitutional thought is about government 
reflecting the liberal conception of democracy (Backer, 2009: 676, 679ff.; Dyevre, 2005: 
170, 173; Wiener, 2007: 1f.; Volk, 2012: 557, 569). 
 
Against the tradition of Western European constitutionalism as the main point of 
reference, what does European constitutionalism mean? Can the features of the 
European legal-political architecture be reasonably described as constitutional? Here we 
need to remember that constitutionalism does not only refer to a constitution as such but 
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to a specific kind of constitution: a legitimate constitution. This normative content 
cannot be applied one-to-one to international contexts if we wish to avoid false 
democratic analogies (Peters/ Armingeon, 2009: 389). However, it is not per 
definitionem impossible to conceptualise constitutional law beyond the nation or the 
state (Peters, 2009: 402). In general, the scholarly work takes two approaches towards 
European constitutionalism. First, it can be used as an explanans, the condition of 
analysis or explanatory framework - the scholar’s ‘analytical glasses’ through which the 
outer world is observed or, in other words, an ‘intellectual prism’ through which the 
environment is filtered. In this perspective, constitutionalism is systemic and constitutive 
for it is embedded in the European tradition of constitutionalism and liberal democracy. 
That means constitutionalism is not only a specific historical tradition of how political 
institutions have evolved, but also a way of thinking about those institutions, their 
normative foundations and operating principles. Understood in this way, 
constitutionalism is not primarily a historical-political reality to be studied, but also a 
political and intellectual discourse of how to conceptualise and imagine that reality in 
scholarly terms. It means a particular pattern of thought about the relationship between 
government and the governed as well as about the means by which the governing 
process is asserted: 
 
‚Constitutionalism demands that the norms which control the production of ordinary legistlation 
reflect democratic principles and be entrenched to protect them against tyrannical tendencies on 
the part of the majority of the day or of other branches of government. Entrenchment will thus 
prevent legal change designed to modify the composition and power of the ordinary law-making 
bodies to the exclusive advantage of the majority of the day and at the expense of minorities and 
later majorities, therby securing both the democrativ nature of the government and the principle 
of separation of power’ (Dyevre, 2005: 173). 
 
Second, constitutionalism can be an explanandum, the object of explanation. That means 
certain phenomena of European constitutionalism and European integration are studied 
by using different approaches, such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravscik 1993) 
or neo-functionalism (Haas 1958). 
 
However, in much of the literature on European constitutionalism it is not always made 
clear which approach towards constitutionalism is employed. Too often the borders 
between normative and empirical analysis are blurred which runs the risk that normative 
assertions are taken as empirical facts. This, for instance, becomes obvious in the debate 
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about the failure of the written European Constitution which to a great extent is 
determined by taking normative side either for or against the establishment of a 
European federation or super-state. That is why normative, analytical and empirical 
claims need to carefully distinguished if we wish to avoid the study of European 
constitutionalism being captured in a normative trap. Furthermore, the question as to 
whether constitutionalism is either the condition or the object of analysis is not always 
easy to answer since it can even be both at the same time – the object of enquiry and an 
intellectual prism through which the object is observed1 (Buchanan, 2009: 26; Dyevre, 
2005: 167f.; Piris, 1999: 559; Weiler, 1999: 228; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 359, 364ff.). 
Here, the literature on the European constitution reveals significant terminological and 
conceptual deficiencies and thus delineates a ‘distorted’ (Dyevre, 2005: 167f.) picture of 
European constitutional reality. For example, the question if Europe has a constitution, 
after all depends on the meanings of the ‘constitution.’ Thus it appears to be a disputed 
question whether Europe has a constitution or not (Preuss, 1999: 420). While this seems 
all too evident, we hardly find elaborated and precise definitions or concepts of the 
‘European constitution.’ Although there has emerged an academic debate that 
reconsiders the concepts of European constitutionalism and offers new approaches 
towards horizontal, poly-centred, heterarchical and multilevel configurations of the 
European polity (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 372), there is still a great deal of 
terminological obscurity, especially concerning the questions about statehood and 
sovereignty in the concept of the European constitution. Here, the notion of sovereign 
nation-statehood is prevailing in many of the studies of European constitutionalism 
(Buchanan, 2009: 22). The implications of such merely nation state-based terminologies 
cause significant analytical inaccuracies when applied to the European framework. That 
is, when a nation state-based constitutional concept, that comprises a monolithic version 
of sovereignty, is applied to the multi-level European context where political authority 
is dispersed, the only possible conclusion must be that the European constitution is not 
yet fully-fledged or a deficient version of nation state constitutions. Just as we probably 
                                                       
1 That is why a certain degree of circularity – the object of study being also the analytical 
premise – can be found in the analyses of European constitutionalism. That means if we 
study European constitutionalism, we assume that European constitutionalism exists – and 
we believe that the assumption is correct since the specific Western European concept of 
constitutionalism shapes the way of thinking about polities even beyond the nation state and 
thus seems positively applicable to the European context. However, this seems acceptable 
as every concept in political theory is both time- and space-dependent in the sense that it 
always implies certain ways of thinking and understanding politics. In other words: this 
problem of analytical circularity is included in any study of politics in general, not in the 
study of European constitutionalism in specific. Consequently, this problem is a matter of 
meta-theory or philosophy of social sciences but not a critical issue in this thesis. 
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fail to explain post-industrial, third sector economies in classical Marxist terms drawing 
on the antagonising forces between the labour and capital-owning class, we certainly fail 
to explain supranational polities in the terms of nation states. From an analytical point of 
view this is insufficient since such negative conclusion is not the result of a thorough 
analysis of the European constitutional architecture, but of a blind transfer of ‘old’ 
conceptual assumptions to ‘new’ cases without any reflection on their suitability for the 
European context. European constitutionalism, however, challenges some assumptions 
of the classical nation state constitutionalism. In particular the idea that a constitution is 
linked to statehood – understood in a way that the state is the exclusive political 
organisation of a society within a spatially defined territory and therefore the exclusive 
subject of exercising political power – is undermined by fragmentations and 
incoherences of political authority within the European Union emerging from a plurality 
of political authorities that result from collective and individual actions of Member 
States and European political actors (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 367f.). Consequently, 
the traditional notion of congruence between political authority and the scope of policies 
and accountability no longer applies. Paradoxically, most of the scholarly work employs 
such classical, mutually exclusive and sovereignty-based constitutionalism as a 
theoretical concept for the analysis of European constitutionalism and therefore leads to 
a ‘clash of two constitutionalisms’ (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 389).  
 
In this thesis, constitutionalism will be used as an explanatory framework – however, at 
the same time this framework is also the object of study since some of its conceptual 
features will be revised against the background of specific European characteristics. 
That means, on the one hand this thesis uses the constitutional terminology as ‘analytical 
glasses’ through which we look at the European polity. Accordingly, it will be looked 
for certain features of the European legal-political order that can be described as 
constitutional. This approach, however, does not mean that constitutionalism as an 
analytical framework is only a technical checklist where ticking all the boxes leads to 
universally conclusive results. It is much more than that as constitutionalism provides a 
normative framework for legitimising political power. It cannot be deprived of this 
normative substance if we wish to utilise constitutionalism’s unique explanatory value 
for polities beyond the nation state. 
On the other hand, too demanding normative criteria (such as demos, lingua franca, 
statehood etc) could preclude the opportunity to gain explanatory power from the 
transfer of constitutionalism to the European level. That is why careful balancing and 
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evaluation as well as conceptual adjustment are required. In other words: ‘the most 
useful way of assessing the prospects of post-national constitutionalism is to undertake a 
reciprocal readjustment of existing constitutional practices beyond the state on the one 
hand, and conventional constitutional expectations on the other’ (Isiksel, 2012: 105). 
That is why in this thesis some of the classical features of nation state constitutions will 
be revised in order to ensure a closer ‘fit’ for the characteristics of the European context. 
This will culminate into a concept that entails higher potential for both horizontal 
generalisation – as it may no longer be conceptually bound to European nation states but 
applicable to other states – and vertical explanation of European constitutionalism. 
Again, it must not be under-estimated that such re-assessment of how constitutionalism 
can help to understand the legal-political architecture of Europe is an essential step of 
analysis. Here, European constitutionalism must not be assumed to be ‘naturally’ similar 
to classical nation state constitutionalism and its normative assumptions, eventually 
culminating in a European super-state or federation, a European demos or identity or a 
written constitutional document. The approach of using constitutionalism both as the 
explanatory framework and object of study admittedly entails a degree of circularity 
which in this case is preferable over abandoning the concept or leaving out a critical step 
of analysis and is justified by its explanatory added value. Part of this added value is that 
we do not have to leave familiar scholarly patterns of thought and enter a ‘post-
constitutional’ or ‘post-national’ intellectual ivory tower that stands isolated from what 
we actually perceive in legal and political reality. This of course assumes that political 
theory should be capable of providing answers to practical problems rather than being 
happily locked into academic ivory towers and disconnected from the real world. Thus a 
mutually responsive relationship between constitutional theory and constitutional reality 
is regarded as essential and worthwhile in this thesis. However, this does not leave 
political theory in a ‘defensive’ position and being forced to catch up with political 
realities. On the contrary, constitutional theory can and must adopt a responsive and 
proactive approach to political reality in order to provide a useful ‘toolbox’ for 
understanding and explaining the outer world. Consequently, constitutionalism can serve 
as a useful and familiar ‘tool’ to study the multilevel architecture of the European and 
national legal orders. It is a useful concept to understand and analyse the integration 
process in the European Union since it ‘captures, more than anything else, what is 
special about the process of European integration’ (Weiler, 1999: 222). 
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1.2  The constitutionalisation thesis 
 
‚It is therefore a fact of European politics that the constitutional posture taken by the Court of 
Justice places now real constraints on the decision-making of the Member States’ (Eleftheriadis, 
1996: 33). 
 
As outlined previously, European constitutionalism has remained a scholarly and 
political paradigm – and its proponents have a powerful ally: the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). In several ‘landmark decisions’ the ECJ has established the so-called 
‘constitutionalisation thesis.’ According to this narrative there has been a ‘constitutional 
moment’ which transformed the Treaties from an international organisation into a 
constitutional entity. The term ‚constitutional moment’ has been prominently introduced 
by Bruce Ackerman in his history of American constitutionalism ‚We the people’ 
(Ackermann, 1991). Here, the terminology refers to a moment of ‚profound ruptures’ 
(Simon, 1992: 503) which is fundamentally different from ‚normal’ evolutionary 
constitutional change. Constitutional moments were part of ‚second-track’ politics 
pursuing democracy by higher-law making, not part of ‚normal’ politics pursuing the 
democratic majoritarian will (Simon, 1992: 505). Accordingly, ‚the people’ are of 
dualist nature: acting in their ‚normal’ representational mode under ‚normal’ 
circumstances, and acting in their mode as sovereign founders in extraordinary, 
constitutional politics/ constitutional moments (Simon, 1992: 506). Regardless of the 
more general problem of how to empirically and analytically distinguish ‚normal’ from 
‚constitutional’ politics and whether it is a distinction of degree or of catgory, there is a 
more specific problem of applying this meaning of ‚constitutional moment’ to the 
process of European constitutionalisation. First of all, the judges of the ECJ can hardly 
be described as a people or the sovereign in Europe. Second, as will be shown later, the 
process of constitutionalisation was driven by numerous, more quiet innovations of the 
legal order, instead of somehow revolutionary situations of crisis that challenged the 
foundations of the prevailing political community. Constitutionalisation in Europe has 
rather been an evolutionary process of legal innovation, mainly driven by private 
litigation and a combination of various actors involved, but not by a broad public 
consens for legal-political change necessitated by situations of overall crisis. That is why 
the terminology of ‚constitutional moment(s)’ within the process of European 
constitutionalisation seems inaccurate since it has not been a revolutionary but 
evolutionary, innovative process initiated by specific case law-adjudication that over 
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time has generated significant consequences for the legal-political architecture in 
Europe. That is why, despite its widespread use in the literature, the term ‚constitutional 
moment’ will not be used in this thesis. The evolution of the European constitution will 
be rather described in terms of ‚constitutionalisation’ and ‚transnationalisation’ of 
European law which will be elaborated in chapter 3.2. 
As a consequence from the widely acknowledged ’constitutionalisation thesis’ the 
assertion that Europe is governed by some sort of constitution has become ‘axiomatic, 
beyond discussion, above the debate’ (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 358). However, within 
the last sixty years European constitutionalism has become far more than just a judicial 
hypothesis – it rather seems to have created a ‘fact’ in a way that the European political 
community has subscribed to constitutionalism in order ‘to be governed by 
constitutional rules and principles’ and ‘in conformity with the meta-norms’ (Stone 
Sweet, 2009: 626, 628). 
 
The European Communities have been founded as an international organisation 
governed by classical international law. So the European legal order has indeed started 
as an international organisation in the traditional sense – though it had some unique 
features – and not as a constitutional order. The ‘constitutionalisation thesis’, however, 
claims that in critical areas European law is no longer treaty law governed by public 
international law, but a constitutional charter governed by constitutional law. This was 
due to constitutional developments which mainly refers to certain doctrinal 
developments in European law provoked by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, especially 
through ‘landmark’ case law from 1963 onwards and its dialogue with national courts. 
The process of constitutionalisation had been particularly progressed when the ECJ 
rendered individuals – like in national constitutional law – and not only the contracting 
Member States – like in classical international law – as subjects of European law. 
Constitutionalisation therefore means that an intergovernmental organisation governed 
by international law has been transformed into a system of governance founded on 
higher-law constitutionalism (Stone Sweet, 2004: 65). In other words, it denotes a 
‘process by which the Rome Treaty evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding 
upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially 
enforceable rights and obligations on legal persons and entities, public and private, 
within EC territory.’ Subsequently, it has become the ‘dominant orthodoxy of 
Community law’ (Joerges, 1996: 110) that European law is a supranational product of 
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ECJ jurisprudence (Avbelj, 2008b: 3; Stone Sweet, 2004: 65; Eleftheriadis, 1998: 34; 
Weiler, 1999: 221; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 356). 
 
The presumed cornerstones of this constitutionalisation process are several legal 
principles and features established by the case law of the ECJ. This constitutionalisation 
is supposed to have begun with certain landmark decisions of the ECJ in the 1960s, 
especially Costa vs ENEL and Van Gend en Loos2 and has been driven almost 
exclusively by the relationship between private litigants, national judges and the ECJ. 
The process has proceeded in two phases: between 1962-1979 the ECJ established the 
core principles of supremacy and direct effect. These moves were made by the ECJ 
without explicit authorization by treaty law and against the opposition of member states. 
In Costa vs ENEL the ECJ dealt with Community treaty law as if it was constitutional 
law. This can be understood as a ‘legal fiction’ of constitutionalism without a 
constitution, and logically authorized the shift from constitution-making to 
constitutionalisation. During the second phase from the 1980s onwards, the ECJ 
provided the national courts with enhanced means of guaranteeing the effectiveness of 
EC law, such as the doctrines of indirect effect (Von Colson 1984) and governmental 
liability (Francovich 1991)3. Additionally, there were further principles and legal 
features established by the ECJ jurisprudence assisting the transformation of 
international law into European constitutional law, such as the doctrines of implied 
powers and preemtion and the evolution of fundamental rights protection (Avbelj, 
2008b: 6f.; Cohen, 2007: 109, 126f.; Lindahl, 2007: 492; Stone Sweet/ Brunell, 1998: 
66f.; Weiler, 1999: 222, 295). 
Unlike the first phase until the late 1970s, the narrative changed during the second phase 
in a way that European law and its principles were no longer regarded as sui generis and 
just different from international law but as inherently constitutional. Suddenly the 
constitutional language ‘spread like fire’ as the ‘constitutional narrative emerged from 
the battlefield between the supranational and international law narratives.’ The reasons 
why that happened are controversial though. It may have happened because it was in the 
interest of certain groups benefitting from integration, or because it was ‘natural’ as 
Europeans have always been prone to think of polities in terms of constitutionalism and 
                                                       
2 However, only a few others see the European Union having a ‘constitutional moment’ much 
later at the advent of the Convention – however this constitutional moment was not initiated 
by the people but by democratic and functional failures of the polity (Bohman, 2004: 316). 
3 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen - 14/83 [1984] ECR 1891; 
Francovich and Bonifaci v Republic of Italy (Cases C-6 and 9/90) [1991] ECR I-5375. 
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thus stick to this intellectual prism, or because there was an ‘epistemological gap’ that 
could not yet describe this new polity emerging beyond traditional categories of 
constitutional nation states. Regardless of which reasons may have been decisive, 
however, the constitution-making process of the European Union has continued over the 
decades, not only by formal enactments, but – perhaps more importantly – by judicial 
interpretations and informal practices. In its case law the ECJ assumed a working 
partnership between the national courts and the European court in order to construct a 
constitutional rule-of-law Community. Hereby, national judges can be regarded as 
agents of the community order. Therefore, the effectiveness of European law has always 
essentially depended on national judges and their willingness to refer to the ECJ and 
settle disputes in conformity with European law (Avbelj, 2008b: 9ff.; Stone Sweet/ 
Brunell, 1998: 66; Yeh/ Chang, 2009: 89). 
 
The constitutionalisation thesis, however, has generated some controversial aspects. The 
first concerns analytical problems related to the origin of the constitutional narrative. 
This questions – where the constitutionalisation thesis has originated from and why 
exactly it has emerged – seems of rather minor concern in the literature. And though 
answering it seems not urgent with regard to the focus of this thesis, it is yet worth 
taking a quick glance, for it is at least highly unlikely that the constitutionalisation thesis 
evolved just by accident or by ECJ judges running wild. The literature offers a few 
explanations of which some are more convincing than others. Most prominently, Avbelj 
(2008b) suggests that the constitutionalisation thesis was grounded in a comparative 
constitutional law method. He argues that the constitutionalisation thesis originates in an 
external environment: the ideologically dominant role model of the USA in post-WWII 
non-communist Europe. The success story of the USA were a logical model for 
constitutional borrowing and American constitutional law became the source of 
inspiration and the paradigm of constitutionalism. Especially Eric Stein (1981), an 
influential scholar from Michigan, initiated the constitutionalisation thesis which was 
then taken over by Joseph Weiler, whose works ‘The transformation of Europe’ and 
‘The constitution for Europe’ have become the holy bible of the constitutional narrative. 
That is why it seems plausible that the constitutional thesis emerged from a comparative 
constitutionalism method. However, the analytical problem with this comparative 
method and particularly the constitutional borrowing from the federal polity USA is that 
it cannot account for legal pluralism and primacy rules. Especially for the latter, it can 
only ‘lend’ strict supremacy and strict hierarchy of legal norms as found in nation state 
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legal orders. Borrowing from these nation state rules that seem too monolithic and 
unsuitable for the pluralistic European context can be seen as the reason why national 
constitutional courts have disputed and rejected European law as the highest law of the 
land that trumps national constitutional law. Here it seems that European 
constitutionalism has borrowed from an inadequate nation state-based constitutional 
theory – instead of lacking any theoretical foundation at all. Accordingly, the 
constitutional conflicts in the European Union as well as the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’ can be seen to have their roots in the constitutional narrative borrowing from 
inadequate sources (Avbelj, 2008b: 3f., 13ff., 23). 
The second problematic aspect is of epistemological nature. Any European phenomena 
are observed through the ‘prism’ of constitutionalism – therefore constitutionalism 
always ‘hums silently in the background’ of the constitutionalisation thesis. This is the 
reason why the existence of a constitutional operating system in Europe is often taken 
for granted and beyond discussion. Part of this problem is not only the 
constitutionalisation thesis as such – that the international law treaties have been 
constitutionalised – but also that the relationships between the Union and the Member 
States are seen as analogous to constitutional federal states. That fact that this 
‘constitutional premise’ is hardly questioned illustrates that the history of 
constitutionalism in Europe is not only a political-legal discourse but an intellectual 
history and a discourse of conceptualisation. European constitutionalism is operating as 
the condition of the debate – but as such it is too rarely subject of inquiry (Avbelj, 
2008b: 6; Weiler 1999: 222f.).  
The third and most disputed aspect is the ambiguous terminology of the ‘constitution.’ 
Broadly speaking, there are two classical ways to understand this term. In a wider sense, 
it means an instrument creating an entity by laying down powers and competences. In a 
narrower sense, it refers to an instrument that creates a new legal system that does not 
derive its validity from any other legal system. However, the constitutionalisation thesis 
comes in both the wider and the narrower sense. While the wider is evidently 
corroborated in European law, the narrower is ‘not at present a realistic proposition’ 
(Hartley, 1999: 179f.) since it is not based on any ‘evidence that it is accepted by any of 
the governments of the Member States or by any of their courts (…) And without 
acceptance by the Member States, the theory will not work’ (Hartley, 1999: 180f.). The 
narrower sense is problematic for the European legal order insofar as such constitution 
could not be created by a treaty for it would owe its validity to international law. It could 
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also not be established by Member States legislation, as then it would owe its existence 
to Member States (constitutional) law.  
However, in the discourse of European law, the constitutionalisation thesis has been a 
great success, no matter what is its standing in legal theory (Weiler/ Haltern, 1996: 421). 
Regardless of the plausibility or soundness of the constitutionalization thesis – be it one 
of the ‘great perceived truisms or myths’ (Weiler, 1999: 221), a legal fiction or 
hypothesis or a self-fulfilling prophecy – and regardless if it is truly revolutionary to 
transform international law into constitutional law, it cannot be denied, however, that 
there are other features distinguishing European law from classical international law: 
those are its hermeneutics, its compliance system rendering European law as 
transnational higher law, and the removal of traditional state responsibility (Weiler/ 
Haltern, 1996: 420f.). Therefore it can be concluded that the constitutionalization thesis 
has created constitutional ‘facts’ in the European Union that have been adopted by 
political and legal actors throughout the Union and can hardly be ignored by political 
theory, even if they may be considered to rest upon mere constructs. The disputable 
standing of the constitutionalisation thesis in political theory indicates that its most 
important concept – the constitution – needs to be re-assessed for its ‘employability’ in a 
European context. It is obvious that an ambiguous terminology creates problems for 
such assessment. That is why the elaboration of a (European) terminology of the 
constitution is an important step of analysis that will be dealt with in the following 
sections (3 and 4). 
 
 
1.3  What is a constitution? 
As suggested above, the question ‘what is a constitution?’ is not as trivial as it seems. In 
the vast literature on European constitutionalism there is hardly any concise and 
elaborated definition or conceptualisation of the (European) constitution. Much of the 
works is shaped by understanding a constitution as a written document – then 
concluding that the European Union has no such constitution, whilst admitting at the 
same time that there are functions, principles and institutional features etc on the 
European level that strongly resemble constitutional settings. The notion of a 
constitution as a formal document alone is clearly limited and not useful for analysing 
constitutional features – not only on the European level as the unwritten constitution of 
the United Kingdom suggests. Other works draw, more or less explicitly, on a 
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constitutional terminology that has been developed in the nation state context and 
introduces ‘add-ons’ for the European polity. However, some of these approaches hardly 
differentiate between national and supranational characteristics of constitutional 
arrangements and often struggle with identifying the principles that operate at the 
national but not at the supranational level. Such approaches therefore run the risk not to 
account for the distinctive features of both national and European constitutionalism. This 
‘trap for comparative analysis’ by applying ‘old’ concepts to ‘new’ cases is caused by 
the fact that concepts have a history – they have been developed in certain historical, 
cultural and social settings and alongside certain intellectual traditions. Consequently, 
transferring concepts to new phenomena always embeds the danger of applying 
assumptions that are not adequate for this new context. That does not make such 
applications impossible, but certainly requires a careful reflection about limits and 
prospects of conceptual transfer (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 355). 
However, as will be shown in the following, the concept of the constitution as developed 
in national contexts does not have to be entirely abandoned and replaced by a ‘post-
national’, ‘post-constitutional’, ‘post-whatever’ concept of the constitution. That would 
also mean to abandon constitutionalism as a way of thinking about the exercise of 
political power and the operation of political order. Such encounter firstly seems hardly 
possible for scholars embedded in this tradition as it would mean too free oneself from 
any familiar way of thinking about politics. Secondly, it may not be necessary as it may 
suffice to revise a few elements of the concept in order to retain explanatory value. 
Therefore it is adequate first to examine the core features and common ideas of the 
constitutional terminology that emerged in national contexts. Then in a second step, it 
must be assessed which of these principles can be reasonably transferred to the 
European setting.  
 
In the literature, there are plenty of ways to categorise the species of liberal-democratic 
constitutions of nation states. Hereby, the term ‘constitution’ is genuinely ambiguous as 
it comprises both a norm and a political condition. Both meanings are implied when the 
term is used (Moellers, 2010: 170). Generally, the term ‘constitution’ comprises three 
levels of meaning that are distinctive, but not always separate (Moellers, 2010: 170. 
First, a theoretical level that reflects the term with regard to history and legitimacy. 
Second, a normative level that entails the constitution as an element of the legal system. 
Since the late 18th century constitutionalism has alluded to the idea of government of 
laws and not of men. The normative sense of the constitution means to realise this ideal. 
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Accordingly, the protection of fundamental rights and the separation of powers are core 
elements of a normative constitution, legitimacy and government control, are the 
essence of normative constitutionalism (Giegerich, 2009: 44f.). Third, the term 
constitution addresses a descriptive level that uses the term to analyse a specific set of 
institutions:  
 
‚In a descriptive sense, a constitution is a body of legal rules regulating the exercise of political 
authority. Whenever political authority, and not only naked, arbitrary power, is exercised, this is 
done on the basis of a constitution in the descriptive sense. The rules of a constitution in a 
descriptive sense circumscribe in more or less detail the authority’s powers and oblige ist 
subjects to obey ist orders’ (Giegerich, 2009: 42f.). 
 
Giegerich (2009) argues that on the international level there was no constitution even in 
this descriptive sense because there was no autonomous international political authority. 
The only authority on the international level was the community of states as a sum of 
individual states each possessing veto power. Accordingly, international law could only 
be described as a functional equivalent for national legal provisions regarding the 
organisation and allocation of powers, but having no constitutive functions for the 
establishment of authority. Therefore international law would only share with national 
constitutions its character of meta rules (Giegerich, 2009: 42f.). However, this 
generalisation about international law does not seem to fully grasp the architecture of 
political authority neither in international organisations nor within the European Union. 
The claim that political authority must be constituted independently and autonomously 
from other authorities in order to have constitutional character seems of secondary 
importance for the operation of a constitutional system. As will be shown later, the 
decisive question may not be if political authority was established autonomously but if it 
currently operates independently. Maybe it is possible that legal systems can emancipate 
from their original founding bases and acquire constitutional quality through a process 
of doctrinal development and legal innovation. Consequently, it seems generally 
possible that international law can be constitutional in the descriptive sense. 
 
The most prominent formal classifications are formal vs material constitution (Fabbrini, 
2008: 459) as it is often found in law textbooks.‘Although it is evident that the EU does 
not have a formal constitution, it is also indisputable that it has a material constitution.’ 
European constitutionalisation has rather been based on inter-state treaties, unlike 
constitutionalisation based on a formal constitutionalisation as found in its Member 
 28 
States. The EU’s material constitution consists of legal principles that have been 
established by the ECJ since the 1960s and which have been recognised by its Member 
States (Fabbrini, 2008: 459ff.). That means the European constitution does not only 
consist of the Treaties. These are only the ‘skeleton’ whilst the ‘flesh’ of the constitution 
has been nourished by the jurisprudence of the ECJ (Ward, 1996: 163). Furthermore, 
there are plenty of other differentiations such as the legal-institutional dimension of a 
constitution vs the popular and social (Walker, 2008: 136f.) or the minimalist vs richer 
sense of a constitution (Dyevre, 2005: 169). The constitution in a ‘minimalist’ or ‘thin’ 
sense regulates the organisation of the state and establishes its institutional structure. 
However, beyond this mere functional ‘thin’ sense the constitution in a ‘thick’ or ‘rich’ 
sense means a stable, higher law that is superior to ordinary law and justiciable, 
including human rights and the commonly shared normative values of the political 
community (Pernice, 2010: 5f). 
In sum, the term constitution is often associated with fundamental rules and core values 
of society. According to Stone Sweet (2009), a constitution is ‘a body of meta-norms, 
those higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how all other lower-order legal 
norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and inter-preted’ (Stone Sweet, 2009: 626). 
It is furthermore associated with the terms ‚state’ and ‚written document’ (Dyevre, 2005: 
168). However, the latter two are historically but not conceptually linked with the 
constitution. As shown by the British case, constitutions can be unwritten, the formal 
document, however, – apart from its integrative or symbolic effects – seems less 
important than the ‘material’ constitution which can be unwritten (Streinz, 2008: 169). It 
can be argued as Moellers (2010) that written constitutional provisions serve as a 
measurement against the constitutional reality and as a symbolic document (Moellers, 
2010: 190). However, it can be argued against this that constitutional provisions are 
often very vague and open to re-interpretation, thus their symbolic and normative 
standard for reality is rather indeterminate and can vary over time. 
Overall the conceptualisations of nation state constitutions share some elements to more 
or less extent. However, these elements are not fully separate and often overlap. 
Furthermore, these features of a constitution are common denominators on a rather 
nominal level. When it comes to the precise ‘fine-tuning’, these common denominators 
are interpreted in very different ways. Consequently, the views on those features of the 
constitution in the literature are located in a continuum rather than being poles between 
‘yes’ and ‘no.’ Dissenting opinions are often a matter of degree rather than category. 
Accordingly, there is disagreement in the literature about which elements reach the 
  
  29 
constitutional ‚threshold level.’ Those commonly shared elements of the constitution are 
the following: 
 
• Fundamental laws: The constitution is a meta-norm, a lex superior, it contains 
leges fundamentales or can be seen as a Grundnorm. These fundamental laws 
include a basic set of rules to establish the institutional setting and organisation of 
power exercise (organisational element) and to constitute power (constitutive 
element).  
• Principles of liberal democracy: The constitution reflects a set of basic values, in 
Western European nation states the values of liberal democracy.  
• The subjection of politics to law: The institution of a constitution reflects the 
commitment of political power to the normative force of law. The constitution has 
an element of legal formalisation of politics. That means that certain rules, 
practices and procedures are codified and standardized (not necessarily or 
exclusively in a written document). A constitution has a legal form, but draws on 
pre-legal foundations such as the (political) culture of legitimacy and legality of 
power and the – more or less deriving from this culture – voluntary subordination 
of politics to the primacy of law (’Praemisse der Rechtsbindung von Politik’). In 
this way, law is both an instrument and a foundation of politics.  
• Statehood and territoriality: The constitution is linked to statehood and 
territoriality. 
 
 
 
1.4  What is a European constitution? 
 
‚For sure, the precise constitutional status of he EU is heavily contested, in particular the 
qualities in which and the degree to which the constitutionalism of the EU resembles that of the 
state’ (Walker, 2002: 23). 
 
The question whether European law is constitutional displaying all the above features or 
‘just’ primary law with some constitutional features whilst lacking the quality of a fully-
fledged constitution, is discussed controversially among scholars. While some hold that 
‘the constitutional character of the European primary law is not seriously questioned any 
 30 
more’ (Pernice, 2008b: 13) others claim that diagnosing European integration with 
constitutionalization is anything but undisputed4 (Mayer, 2003b: 13). The main reason 
for the controversial assessments of the European legal foundations are different ideas of 
what makes a ‘full’ or ‘complete’ constitution and what makes a constitution ‘imperfect’ 
or ‘deficient.’ Some scholars regard the provision of constitutional functions sufficient 
for classifying European law as constitutional; others, however, draw on cultural and 
normative features such as a lingua franca, a written document and a European state as 
necessary conditions (Dyevre, 2005: 166). However, the question about the nature and 
concept of a European constitution is not a merely a matter of academic or theoretical 
debate. After all, it means a question about the relationship between national and 
European law and a question about the nature of political authority in an era of 
globalisation and internationalisation (Mayer, 2004: 9). That is why the controversy 
about the European constitution is also a very practical controversy about the meaning 
of the constitution and whether it can exist beyond the state. Especially the approaches 
arguing against European law being constitutional at all demonstrate how constitutional 
theory and the study of constitutional law beyond the state is still captured within the 
boundaries of ‘classical’ nation state concepts. However, it seems generally imaginable 
to transfer the constitutional concept to polities beyond the nation state as ‘there is no 
reason not to conceptualise the term in a wider sense and apply it to the basic legal 
instrument for other political communities too’ (Pernice, 2008b: 7). As has been 
mentioned before, constitutionalism and the concept of the ‘constitution’ can indeed be 
applied beyond the nation state to the European context. This is not only because 
European constitutionalism has been understood as an intellectual discourse or a 
normative interpretation of politics, but also because the concept of the constitution and 
its meanings provide an adequate and useful analytical perspective to describe, 
understand and explain European political authority. Although the written ‘capital C’-
constitution failed, the European Union indeed has a constitution and had it long before 
the constitutional language became highly fashionable. Many of the scholars calling for 
a written constitution for Europe ‘neglect the current constitutional dynamics already 
existing in the EU.’ A European constitution has emerged by evolution and already 
exists which is indicated by a great amount of ECJ case law using the term constitution 
with regard to the Treaties (Martinico, 2011: 70, 75).  
                                                       
4 ‘Nun ist die verfassungstheoretische Einordnung der europäischen Integration alles andere 
als unstreitig’. 
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The EU is the first example of a supranational constitution in world history. The features 
of its constitutionalism are that in a wide range of policies the national competence has 
been entirely pre-empted by supranational competence. Furthermore, the Treaties take 
supremacy even over national constitutions and not just lower-order norms; and lastly, 
the Treaty provisions apply to all legal persons including private citizens and are 
enforced by some form of European judicial review (Stone, 1994: 474). The ‘sin’ of the 
Constitutional Treaty was the symbolic and terminological abandonment of the 
European constitutional heritage that is based on evolutionary dynamics and pluralism 
without a clear model of unity or finality, and replaced it by a more nation state-like, 
unitary model of constitutionalism, although substantially it did not change much of 
what has been yet in operation (Cannizzaro, 2007: 787). The European Constitution 
failed not due to its substance but due to its symbolism and its resemblance of a super-
state (Sieberson, 2007: 4). The European Union has many procedural and structural 
components that mirror those of a national government and that are necessary to pursue 
the ambitious policy agenda its Member States have set up. However, the Constitution’s 
super-state-like symbolism was ‘unnecessary and ill-advised’ (Sieberson, 2007: 4). 
However, it has been elaborated that ‘the existence of a constitution is not a question of 
names, but rather of substance’ (Fremuth, 2011: 404). According to Pernice, the primary 
law of the European Union has constitutional character as the notion of a European 
constitution does not necessarily imply a European state or superstate. Also, political 
reality needs to be taken into consideration – and this reality is that the constitutional 
character of the EC/ EU has been acknowledged by several national supreme courts and 
by the ECJ. According to the latter, the constitutional character of European primary law 
derives from its specific sources and the nature of the European legal system rather than 
from the ECJ’s jurisprudence. (Pernice, 2009: 368f.; Pernice, 2002: 511). Recently there 
has been consensus that the EU has constitutional character of sorts that qualifies as a 
material constitution as it possesses a fully developed legal order with its doctrines 
respectively and a complex governance architecture consisting of several institutions 
(Walker, 2002: 23). That means several meanings of the ‘constitution’ are reflected in 
the organisation and exercise of political power and authority on the European level. In 
the following those meanings of the constitution will be elaborated with regard to their 
characteristics in the European context. As will be shown, some of the meanings are not 
a necessary analytical condition – not even in the nation state context where they have 
emerged from, but merely a historical coincidence. Against this background, the 
terminology and concept of a European constitution will be revised. 
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1.4.1  Fundamental laws 
 
There are two prominent ways of theorizing ‘fundamental laws.’ First, in the sense of a 
basic norm according to Kelsen; second in the sense of leges fundamentales in the sense 
of a higher law establishing and protecting the basic rules of the game.  
 
Basic norm 
The concept of a (constitutional) basic norm was laid out by Hans Kelsen in his 
positivist pure law theory (‘Reine Rechtslehre’ 1934/ 1960) This theory assumes a basic 
norm (Grundnorm), whose validity is presupposed and that is on top of a hierarchy of 
laws and therefore validates all secondary order norms. According to this hierarchy of 
norms each norm derives its validity from the norm on the higher level. That means, 
validity can only be based on validity on the higher level. Accordingly, efficacy of 
norms is the condition – not the reason – of validity. The Kelsenian concept has strong 
implications for the resolution of norm conflicts as it presupposes the notion of lex 
superior5. Here, any inconsistency between a higher and a lower norm renders the latter 
invalid, as lower norms derive their validity from higher level norms and thus must be 
invalid if they are inconsistent. Accordingly, the rule of lex posterior6 can only be 
applied to the resolution of norm conflicts on the same level of hierarchy. 
The basic norm authorises the creation of constitutional norms that regulate the 
production of general norms. However, the basic norm is not the same as the 
constitution. It is important to distinguish the presupposed basic norm from the 
constitution – the latter regulates the creation of general norms and legislation and it 
may also stipulate the contents of norms and how conflicts between norms are 
reconciled. The basic norm, however, governs which legal organs are authorised to 
create constitutional norms and how the constitution is to be amended. Its logical 
function is therefore to validate the constitution (Weyland, 2002: 8ff.). This 
retrospective approach, however, causes a significant analytical problem: the basic norm 
is analytically derived from a currently existing constitution – hence the validating basic 
                                                       
5 ‘Lex superior derogat legi inferiori’: a law higher in the hierarchy repeals the lower one. 
6 ‘Lex posterior derogat legi priori’: a later law repeals a prior one. 
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norm is recognised by its result, the constitution. Therefore, it seems questionable 
whether such ex post-analysis has distinctive and practical explanatory value. 
Kelsen’s theory of a basic norm has also strong implications for the relationship between 
national and international/ European law as it rejects a dualist conception of national and 
international law. There can be only one basic norm – either of the European system or 
each Member State – that validates both European and national constitutional norms 
(Weyland, 2002: 23). Accordingly, there cannot be different legal systems founded by 
different basic norms. This monistic view does not derive from actual contents of 
international or national law, but from the logical assumption that two conflicting norms 
cannot be simultaneously valid. This is because validity in Kelsen’s theory is equated 
with binding force. The problem regarding the relationship between national and 
European law is that they – if conceived of as deriving from separate legal systems – 
would be ‘simultaneous’ and thus there would be no mechanism for resolving any 
conflicts. Thus Kelsen concludes that norms cannot be simultaneously valid unless they 
belong to the same system (monism) and therefore conflicts between them can be 
resolved. Consequently, any model that views international law as separate and 
independent from national law is incompatible with this theory of a basic norm 
(Weyland, 2002: 26ff.). 
 
The Kelsenian monist approach, however, does not seem convincing for several reasons. 
First, in logical terms it reduces and simplifies international custom to a general theory 
of law and normative order. The international law principle of government efficacy 
stipulates that states and governments – assuming they have a de facto control over a 
state territory – treat each other as prima facie legitimate. Kelsen equates this principle 
of international law with a general, monist model of normative order. In a reductionist 
sense he concluded from this particular custom of international law that there is only one 
presupposed basic norm – a basic norm of international law ‘embracing every state’s 
law within the underlying normative framework of international law.’ That means, 
Kelsen sees a ‘unity of international and state law’ where every state law derives from 
an international basic norm (MacCormick, 1996: 558). 
Second, Kelsen’s conception seems unsound in practical terms. Especially the German 
and the British constitutions and their provisions incorporating international law set an 
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example. While Article 257 of the German Basic Law incorporates the general 
supremacy of international treaties into national law, in Britain the supremacy principle 
has been incorporated by Parliament and thereby the courts are bound to this by custom 
of the courts. Unlike the German constitution, it does not give primacy to international 
law in general (Weyland, 2002: 28). So it can be concluded that the Kelsenian basic 
norm conception is inconsistent constitutional law practice. 
Third, it furthermore seems neither plausible nor comprehensible that all legal orders 
should be based on the same basic norm. Such notion appears to be rather a theoretical 
reductionism that fundamentally ignores historical, regional and political evolutions of 
legal systems and hence falls short of their distinctive features, but delineates a rather 
under-complex picture of their horizontal and vertical interactions. As pointed out by 
Eleftheriadis (1996), the positivist methodology of presupposing a basic norm seeks to 
reason an established legal system, but is particularly difficult to apply to the 
development of a new legal order. Putting the Treaties as the highest source of law and 
hence suggesting a new basic norm, as adopted by the ECJ, seems to over-stretch the 
explanatory means of the basic norm theory. The interpretation method of existing legal 
systems cannot be applied to the emergence of new legal systems. In rather drastic 
words: ‘If (...) the question is the recognition of a new legal order, then the tools of legal 
positivism are useless’ (Eleftheriadis, 1996: 39). 
Oddly enough though, the European constitutional discourse has been dominated by a 
‘strange combination of Kelsen and Schmitt’ for many years. Especially as there 
prevails an enduring quest for the European basic norm as the source of the authority of 
the European constitution. However, this Kelsenian ‘holy grail’ of the basic norm is 
understood in Schmittian terms as it is regarded as the ultimate source of authority that 
governs cases of conflicts and extremity (Weiler, 2001: 9). A European basic norm, 
however, would mean that the Member States are no longer independent, that their 
sovereignty had been just replaced by a European authority. Albeit, there seems no 
legitimate basis for such radical claim as the ongoing process of European (legal) 
integration depicts a much more differentiated and intricate picture that calls for a 
slightly more complex approach. Therefore any theory of constitutionalisation in the 
European Union stipulating a change of an existing basic norm or the creation of a new 
European basic norm seems at least a bit over-ambitious. The EU does not have any 
constitution in the sense of an ultimate, monolithic source of authority such as a basic 
                                                       
7 Article 25 [International law and federal law] The general rules of international law shall be 
an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create 
rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. 
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norm of international law. European law owes its existence to the founding treaties, 
those to international law and the legal orders of the Member States. Therefore, the 
European legal system is not self-sustaining, but (in its origin at least) (inter-) dependent 
(because of the voluntary recognition by Member State courts) with other legal systems. 
Thus the Treaties cannot be regarded as a constitution in the sense of a Grundnorm 
(Hartley, 2001: 226, 232f.). Hence the Kelsenian monist approach of a basic norm 
governing the relations between national and international law has analytical and logical 
shortcomings and thus is inadequate to analyse the architecture of the European 
constitutional order8. 
 
A more satisfactory approach to frame the relations between legal systems is a 
pluralistic approach that explicitly rejects any monist aspirations. A pluralist conception 
acknowledges that each legal order regards its ultimate grounds of validity as 
systemically distinct from those of other legal systems. Yet there can be interactions 
between legal systems. Such interaction is anticipated by legal orders that recognise the 
internal validity of international law ipso vigore. Such interactions have also been 
encompassed in the configuration of European law – as it is a legal order constituted by 
both the common actions of Member States under the Founding Treaties and the 
provisions of their legal orders incorporating international into domestic law. European 
law overrides domestic provisions in cases of conflict, except for special elements of 
national constitutional law. Such pluralistic conception does not ‘elevate the logic of 
norm-derivation above the social realities of actually-held grounds for acceptance and 
implementation of legal norms’ like the monist conception, but explicitly acknowledges 
those grounds. Accordingly, the best way to conceptualise European and Member State 
law is to recognise them as co-ordinately valid legal systems. Each comprises of three 
levels of norms (intergovernmental, supranational and national norms) and presupposes 
the validity of the other (MacCormick, 1996: 561). Such an approach seems much more 
sound than assuming a monist conceptualisation of the relation between national and 
international law by tracing back the European constitution to a universal basic norm of 
international law. 
 
                                                       
8 see also Pernice 2007: 16ff. 
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Leges fundamentales 
The notion of leges fundamentales refers to the constitution as higher law that cannot be 
changed easily. Constitutional norms as meta-norms govern the production and contents 
of lower-order norms, their application and interpretation – they fix the rules of the 
game (Stone, 1994: 443f.). Thereby, the constitution reflects fundamental rules of the 
political process that shall persist over time. It sets out the rules, principles and 
understandings about how a political community is governed. It contains a broad 
statement of the fundamental rules of public power, but not detailed provisions about 
every single political procedure. The constitution in this sense ‘is a term that 
distinguishes issues in terms of their importance’ for the fundamental balance of public 
power (Waldron, 1990: 67f.). This superior constitutional law has both an organizational 
and a constitutive dimension. The first concerns the competences, functions of and 
relationships between political institutions. The latter refers to the establishment of 
institutions that are created by specified procedures. Constitutions do not only fulfil 
certain functions such as outlining the institutions of the state, their competences and 
relationships, but also install mechanisms of power entrenchment. They set out 
operating principles of the state, regulate the relationship between the state and 
individuals and often list a catalogue of fundamental rights. In sum, they establish the 
basic organisation of the state, its political institutions and public power exercise as well 
as their limits – constitutions create the fundamental laws of the state. They further 
determine the validity of general and abstract legal rules. Such set of rules is self-
sustaining in the way that all other norms derive their validity from them; it is also 
constitutive as they are the foundation for generating other norms and cannot be 
identified by reference to other rules. Constitutional norms are therefore lex superior as 
they are generated by a specific constitutional law-making procedure and also regulate 
the content of valid norms. Modern constitutions establish and identify power 
relationships whilst entrenching and rendering them transparent. The constitution 
understood as a set of fundamental rules creates a legal entity or polity and defines the 
competences and relations of its institutions (Hartley, 2001: 226; Dyevre, 2005: 171f.; 
Piris, 1999: 558; Somek, 2007: 1129). In other words:  
 
‚The constitution serves as the ultimate source of the legitimacy and the ultimate standard of the 
validity of each and every act of government. Its prominent position is guaranteed by giving it 
superiority over the laws enacted by the legislature. The higher rank of the constitution is 
emphasised and ist binding force vis-à-vis the legislature is secured by provisions which make 
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constitutional amendments particularly difficult. For any charter to qualify as a constitution in 
the normative sense, its provisions must be effectively implemented, and this cannot be done 
without at least some jurisdiction of courts in constitutional matters. Thus, the compatibility with 
the constitution of the acts of the executive and the lower courts must be subject to (higher) 
court control, though not necessarily to acts of primary legislation’ (Giegerich, 2009: 45). 
 
To summarize all the above, the aspect of a constitution as certain leges fundamentales 
comprises of two aspects: First, fundamental rules about the creation and constitution of 
public power (constitutive element); and second, rules about organizing and establishing 
the relationships between political institutions in which public power is vested 
(organisational element). That means that the constitution is to establish, legitimise, 
organise and limit public power by and for the sake of those who are its subjects, 
including that – with regard to the self-organisation of people inhabiting a certain 
territory – it sets out political institutions, decision-making procedures and the 
conditions and rules under which the rulers are nominated and elected. It also provides 
these institutions with specific and limited competences and establishes the objectives 
that shall be accomplished by exercising their functions. Lastly, it usually defines the 
status of the people affected by this political order by determining their fundamental 
rights and access to the political process (Pernice, 2002b: 4). 
 
Taking a look at European law it can be concluded that the European Treaties in 
conjunction with the constitutions of the Member States already fulfil all these 
functions. The European Union consequently had a constitution even long before the 
post-Nice process and even before the Member State governments started using the term 
‘constitution’ with regard to Europe (Pernice, 2002b: 4; Pernice, 2010: 2). However, 
only drawing on ‘constitutional functions’ of EU law as a justification for identifying a 
European constitution does only reflect a very ‘modest’ concept of the constitution. 
Such functional concept only refers to structurally similar services provided by different 
institutions; however, providing the same function does not necessarily mean that the 
institution is the same – constitutional function is not the same as constitution (Moellers, 
2010: 180). That is why in order to identify what particular set of laws can be classified 
as a constitution, the following two elements must be embodied: first, the laws must rule 
the exercise of political power, and second, they must entail a fundamental basis of 
society within the polity (Bremner, 2010: 84). The primary law of the European Union 
clearly meets the first requirement as both constitutive and organisational constitutional 
functions are fulfilled. The Treaties in their current form can be seen as a constitutional 
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charter as they display this minimal organisational content of a constitution. This was 
also established by the ECJ in 19869 (Yeh/ Chang, 2009: 93f.). Similar to nation state 
constitutions, the Treaties serve the following functions: (a) They determine the 
governing institutions, their powers and their system of checks and balances, their 
relations with each other and with the Member States. (b) They lay down decision-
making procedures, engaging a directly elected parliament. (c) They create links 
between European institutions and individuals. (d) They are the point of reference for 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ that has developed various constitutional principles and 
fundamental rights (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 749). Additionally, international 
organisations, regimes or other regional cooperative frameworks are – like traditional 
nation states – well capable of delivering constitutional or quasi-constitutional functions 
in the second sense of fundamental laws as they promote power constraints and judicial 
review and rights protection and thus reflect a normative consensus of a political 
community. Especially human rights regimes illustrate this capacity as they have 
penetrated and complemented domestic legal orders in many ways (Yeh/ Chang, 2009: 
93f.). 
In its institutional dimension the constitution draws on the idea of a (political) entity 
with an own legal order, institutions and specific objectives that qualify it as 
constitutional (Walker, 2008: 136f.). This constitutional entity is not necessarily bound 
to the nation state – it can be national, supranational or an international regime. 
Constitutions as such meta norms can very well ‘travel beyond the nation state’ (Stone, 
1994: 470). Hence, the argument, that the European Union cannot provide for 
constitutional fundamental laws because it is not a state, is therefore not convincing. 
However, the European Union lacks some of the elements characterising ‚complete’ 
systems of governance and states. It lacks the means and resources in various terms. 
Legally, the implementation and control of Community law is in the hands of national 
administrations and courts. Furthermore, in a quantitative way the EU lacks the human 
resources as it has much less staff than usual administrative entities, and it also lacks 
financial resources as its budget is only a small share of the national GDPs. Furthermore, 
it is not capable of levying taxes and lacks administrative and technical resources. Last 
but not least the European Union lacks means of coercion such as police and army. 
Therefore, the EU is highly dependent on the Member States and their legislative, 
executive, administrative and judicial authorities and resources (Piris, 1999: 565f.). 
Despite all this, the argument that due to the mere lack of resources the EU legal-
                                                       
9 Les Verts, 294/83 (1986) ECR 1986-4. 
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political order cannot qualify as constitutional is not convincing. The absence of 
sufficient means and resources can also be found on the federal level in federal systems, 
yet the constitutional sovereignty of these state entities is not questioned by this fact. 
Also, the use of lower level means and resources is a continuum rather than two distant 
poles of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ and there seems no systematic assessment of finding the point in 
the continuum that distinguishes a sufficient amount of means and resources from an 
insufficient one. The constitutional quality of a polity is not merely determined by the 
ownership of means on resources, but by its capacity to utilise means and resources 
deriving from other levels and ultimately its capacity to ensure effective government. 
 
 
 
1.4.2  Normative principles of liberal democracy 
 
‚The distinctive feature of the constitution as compared to any other law, thus, is its fundamental 
character to establish the original and basic legal relationship between such institutions and the 
individuals who, in the case of a democratic constitution, are considered both the authors and 
the addressees of such authority’ (Pernice, 2009: 365). 
 
Constitutions in Europe have evolved in a specific historical setting and alongside the 
traditions of liberal constitutionalism in Western European countries - hence they reflect 
the ‘path dependencies’ of liberal democracy. That is why the current understanding of 
constitutionalism and the concept of the constitution is very much influenced by 19th 
century constitutionalism and the liberal conception of the nation state. ‘Liberal’ here 
means that individual citizens are only interested in politics as a means or instrument to 
realise their individual interests. Thus the conceptual scope of liberal constitutionalism is 
limited to the politics of interests and understands the political only in terms of 
realisation, representation, lobbying, conflict of interest, not in terms of other dynamics 
such as emotions, religion, media influence, collective dynamics etc (Volk, 2012: 562). 
Liberalism as an ideology is committed to the liberty and rights of individuals. The 
underlying principle of justice is that individual liberty and the pursuit of its realisation 
are inherently just. Accordingly, the notions of limited government and the protection of 
individual rights, rule by consent and rule of law are at the core of liberal 
constitutionalism. However, according to Frohnen (2011), none of the principles are in 
fact liberal, except for that only individual rights are recognised as rights maximising 
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individual autonomy and equality. However, while the old (negative) reading of 
liberalism is dedicated to limit state interference to a minimum and the protection of 
basic security and individual liberty, the newer (positive) version of liberalism envisages 
democratic governance with a state not just protecting individual liberty and security but 
actively ensuring economic and social welfare as the basis for the realisation of 
individual liberty (Frohnen, 2011: 529f.). The principles of liberal democracy that are 
most important with regard to constitutionalism are: 
 
• the separation of powers,  
• judicial review and  
• the protection of individual rights.  
All these can be found in the European legal structure and institutional setting – 
although they occur in different forms than in nation state constitutions. In the literature, 
however, this mere difference has often been  a reason to conclude that the principles 
framed on the European level cannot qualify as constitutional. In other words: because 
their characteristics would simply differ in many ways from ‘classical’ nation state 
constitutions, they could not qualify as fully-fledged principles. Especially the principle 
of separation of powers in the European polity has been under attack. As a matter of 
fact, there can be no doubt that the branches of power in the European Union are 
organised in a different way than in nation states. For example, the European main 
legislative organs, the Council and the Commission, consist of members of national 
executives. Also, the European Parliament has not evolved as a classical legislative and 
representative body and still cannot be compared to national parliaments in many ways. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that such different organisation of powers in the 
European Union could not meet the substantial standards of separation of powers. First 
and foremost, separation of powers means both formally and substantially separated 
powers – it does not require the organisational form of separation in Europe to be 
identical with the nation state level. Different political systems have different ways of 
‘operationalising’ the separation of powers, even and especially across nation states. 
This is most obvious when comparing the separation of powers in the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom. Whilst there is a strong separation of powers in the 
first, a strong fusion of powers can be found in the latter. However, this does not mean 
that separation of powers, as required by the rule of law, is not existant in the United 
Kingdom – here, it is organised in a different way and accompanied by other power-
balancing mechanisms. 
  
  41 
The European Union’s institutional framework is founded on the representation of 
interests rather than the separation of powers in the ‘conventional’ sense. Each 
institution represents a certain interest in policy-making. The European Parliament 
represents the interests of citizens in the Union, the European Council and the Council 
the interest of Member States, the Commission the general interest of the Union and the 
ECJ ensures the application and interpretation of law (Crowe, 2008: 177f.). Therefore, a 
different way of ‘operationalising’ separation of powers in the European Union alone 
does not mean that there is no separation of powers at all. Other institutional and legal 
factors, such as the competences of each institution and their interactions, must be 
considered in the assessment of the substantial quality of the principle of separation of 
powers. The claim for more congruence between the European system and nation states, 
however, indicates that the categories of European studies are still somehow ‘trapped’ in 
the patterns of thought that have emerged within nation state contexts. Furthermore, 
grounding such claim for more ‘classical’ organisation of powers on seemingly higher 
levels of acceptance among citizens (Piris, 1999: 573), is a mere normative claim for 
increasing legitimacy of political power. From a normative point of view this claim 
might be agreed with or not, on the conceptual level, however, legitimacy it is not 
necessary for effective exercise of political power or for government efficacy. Political 
regimes can very well persist without the acceptance of their subjects. Legitimacy as a 
precondition for constitutionality is a normative claim, but no functional or analytical 
requirement for the establishment of political power. Nevertheless, even if legitimacy is 
assumed to be a constitutional feature, then it does not preclude international 
organizations from being constitutionalised. The two most important aims of governance 
– security and social welfare – can mostly be achieved through international institutional 
settings better than without them – though they do not always guarantee good 
governance. From the perspective of democratic theory, the legitimacy dilemma of 
international institutions is often framed as a zero-sum game between system 
effectiveness and citizen participation. However, this contradiction is misleading since 
international institutions are in fact capable of purporting input legitimacy (Zuern, 2000: 
184) and even more capable to generate output legitimacy. The widely claimed lack of 
legitimacy on the European level seems generated by a confusion of analytical and 
normative claims that are deriving from classical nation state-based democratic theory. 
Whether those can be applied one-to-one to the European political system is 
questionable inasmuch as the results of such analysis are pre-determined and 
predictable. On a conceptual level, it is not necessary that the institutional-legal setting 
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of the European Union mirrors traditional organisational forms of power exercise. 
Whilst organisational patterns may be different, the substance can encompass the same 
principles of constitutionalism and liberal democracy. 
 
 
1.4.3  The normative primacy of law and legal formalisation 
 
‚Law and politics always overlap without ever becoming identical’ (MacCormick, 1996: 557). 
 
Politics and law are in a tense relationship, especially with regard to constitutional law 
and constitutional politics. In continental Europe, until the late 19th century 
constitutional law was conceived of as un-political and merely technical, administrative 
law. However, since the works of Carl Schmitt (1928/ 1970) and Rudolf Smend (1928) – 
the two most influential constitutional lawyers at the beginning of the 20th century and 
founding fathers of the two main schools of constitutional thought in German speaking 
countries – it has been widely accepted that constitutions and constitutional law entail a 
high degree of politics. The overlap of politics and law occurs in two ways: the first is a 
political-cultural condition that ensures the normative primacy of law over politics. The 
second is the legal formalisation of politics which means that law serves as a technique 
to organise the political process - this formalisation, however, does not necessarily 
require codification in a written form. 
The normative primacy of law over politics means that political power (voluntarily) 
subjects and subordinates itself to the normative power of law – in a way that it accepts 
that some legal provisions are a form of higher law that is above politics. This is a pre-
legal condition that cannot be ensured by law itself but depends on a certain political and 
civic culture purporting law as a means of entrenching politics. Thus the constitution’s 
authority rests on extra-legal conditions and therefore reflects and realises basic 
structures and values of the society that it aspires to govern (Pernice, 2010: 6). As a 
consequence the efficacy of the constitution requires some degree of normative and 
functional compatibility between the content of the constitution and the values of the 
affected community. All that sounds all too self-evident in a Western European tradition 
of constitutional democracies – however, this political-cultural condition is far from 
being ‘natural’ and cannot be taken for granted. As an illustration, it may be worth 
taking a look at a political culture and ideology that explicitly denies the normative 
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primacy of law over politics: the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the normative 
foundation of political systems under Soviet rule until 1989. According to this ideology, 
law is a ‘bourgeois’ residual that is only needed as a corrective in capitalist societies that 
have not yet been enlightened by the universal truths of history. Politics, if exercised by 
the true and rightful class (the proletarian class) and its ‘avant-garde’ party (a visionary 
elite of the proletarian class) and guided by the universal laws of history, are ‘naturally’ 
right and cannot go wrong by definition. Politics understood in this way are not erratic 
and hence do not need any entrenchment. From this point of view, law or constitutional 
law – as a restriction to politics and a mechanism of curtailing political power exercise – 
is an unnecessary and illegitimate constraint to politics. This demonstrates that the 
Western European tradition of regarding politics as potentially erratic and in need of 
correctives must not be universalised and assumed. It rather needs to be framed as a 
specific analytical condition of constitutional theory and constitutional law: the 
normative primacy of law. 
Pre- or extra-legal foundations of constitutions evolving from civic and political culture 
are particularly responsible for ensuring the authority of constitutional law. That is why 
‘law itself is never value-free, for law is an emanation of human power and humans 
characteristically exercise power in the pursuit of principles and values’ (Waldron, 1990: 
34). Especially in Western Europe that cultural environment is traditionally linked with 
the nation state. Here, law and the nation state have been bound together by mutual 
deferral of authority – law required the nation state (the people) while nation states are 
brought into existence by means of law. That is why constitutions comprise an element 
of a fictional social contract and the idea of self-authorisation of a people (Pernice, 
2010: 7). However, it is a fiction because empirically we hardly find a people that has 
self-authorised its constitution or adopted a constitution by referendum. This is rather a 
normative attribution to a polity and serves to generate ex-post legitimacy. That is why 
any complaint that Europe currently does not have a ‘democratic’ or normative 
constitution in the sense of a formal document that has been the product of a subjective 
act of approval by the people or their representatives (Curtin, 2006: 67), belongs to the 
spheres of normative theory, but not to the analytical preconditions of constitutionalism 
in or beyond the nation state. Law has been prevalently thought to manifest in the 
political context of the state. A state exists within a defined territory and an effective 
government structure, grounded in claims to legitimacy, exercising power over people, 
things and resources in that territory. Accordingly, law is conceived of as law of a state 
or law governing the international relations of such states. However, it does not seem 
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conceptually sound that the constitutional entity and its pre-legal foundations can only 
evolve in nation states – that seems a rather historical concurrence than a logical 
conjunction. A constitutional, non-state entity seems imaginable on a regional or 
international level too. If the legitimising grounds for law are no longer seen as only 
vested in a nation, but in a broader sense of an entity of people that are not necessarily 
bound together by ethnical, religious or cultural similarities, then such constitutional 
entity is possible to travel beyond the nation state – for instance to the European level. In 
a certain way, post-national or inter-national constitutionalism draw on the same logic as 
classical constitutionalism. Like the latter, it presumes an entity that is called into 
existence at the same time: the transnational/ post-national/ international community. 
However, regardless at what constitutional entity we look – national or transnational – 
law and politics are always in a process of mutual constitution and containment. They 
are in a paradoxical relation. And this specific notion of constitutionalism and its 
constitutive pre-legal foundations can be continued from national to international law 
(Buchanan, 2009: 27f.; MacCormick, 1996: 557). 
 
The second way of overlapping law and politics is the legal formalisation of politics in 
order to organise the political process in stable and predictable patterns. That is why a 
constitution is more than a formalistic concept since – despite being a legal instrument – 
it also has political impacts. In that sense, the constitution is a ‘reciprocal connection of 
politics and law’ as it means a connection of law-making with politics on the one hand 
and the legalisation of political processes on the other hand. Here again constitutional 
law and politics are mutually constitutive – in practice most obvious in the assertion of 
precedence and balancing tests by constitutional courts (Bremner, 2010: 83; Moellers, 
2010: 170; Peters, 2009: 407; Chalmers, 2000: 183ff.; Stone Sweet, 2004: 9ff.). A 
constitution is a legal instrument and has a legal form – though this legal form can be 
unwritten. As such instrument the constitution is a special set of norms that is different 
from others regarding their subject and status within the legal order. In terms of their 
subject constitutions govern the creation and exercise of political power, in terms of 
their status they take precedence over all other norms. Its characteristics as a 
superstructure of a normative order that regulates the exercise of public power is the 
positivistic dimension of a constitution. Within constitutional orders, it is also intended 
to yield normative effects such as the increase of social welfare and the creation of a 
common identity. Here, one of the greatest achievements is that political power is not 
exercised despotically but according to the constitutional set of rules. Therefore 
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constitutions protect certain fundamental rules from daily shifts in politics and formalise 
how a society adapts to social change by balancing continuity and change (Bremner, 
2010: 84; Grimm, 2005: 193ff.). 
However, the formalised constitution of politics is not tantamount to codification in 
form of a written document. Albeit in continental Europe and especially North America 
constitutions are mostly associated with written documents, in the United Kingdom 
scholars seem yet more familiar with the idea that a constitution is not necessarily 
written. Formalisation rather means the establishment of legal norms that persist over a 
certain amount of time and thus provide for stable and predictable patterns shaping the 
political process. In what particular form this establishment takes place is a secondary 
question; it may be by written codification or through custom or convention. Legal 
norms are distinguished from other social norms by their higher degree of clarity. In that 
sense, law is the ‘fetishization of normative clarity’, as it explicitly formalises rights and 
obligations (Stone, 1994: 444). Certain forms or subsets of legal norms – for instance 
basic institutional principles or national objectives – set out what is considered to be the 
constitution. However, that does not necessarily mean that these constitutional 
provisions are written down and summarised in a document titled ‘Constitution.’ Again, 
legal formalisation does not mean codification as there are other types of formalisation 
that are capable of establishing constitutional law, such as constitutional conventions in 
the United Kingdom. The crucial point of formalisation is generating relatively stable 
‘rules of the game’ that establish constitutional practice and constitutional law. The 
latter is not necessarily congruent with a written capital ‘C’-constitution – consequently 
the existence of such a document is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of a 
constitution. Establishing constitutional norms can be achieved by writing down a norm 
into a law codex or by legal practices such as precedent and convention. 
 
Furthermore, constitutions do not necessarily have the character of a founding 
declaration, as widely implied by scholars of American and European constitutionalism. 
They are much more than just ‘originary narratives’ (Buchanan, 2009: 26) of a unified 
people gathering together to create a new political system. The paradox in this 
foundational act of a unified people is that ‚the people’ as such entity cannot exist until 
the constitution is established. That is why the oftenly invoked ‘constitutional-
foundational moment’ is a fiction as it presumes a pre-existing order that at the same 
time is brought into existence. Therefore constitutional law is not only a reflection of a 
prior order but also implicated in the establishment of that order. Consequently, the 
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political order – presumed and called into existence by the constitution – is the source of 
sovereignty (Buchanan, 2009: 27). However, constitutions are more than just a reflection 
or reinforcement of political processes. They are also societal constitutions and a 
normative reflection of a society’s self-organisation. Accordingly, they need to be 
acceptable – or at least compatible – in practice which after all presupposes some trust in 
the institutions on which political order can be based. On the European level, this trust 
has been generated by the outcomes and functioning of European institutions, not by a 
foundational act declared to be the ‘Constitution’ (Ladeur, 2008: 153f.). That being said, 
it is essential that constitutional theory also accounts for the non-legal, political 
foundations of legitimate constitutional authority, not only for the Ises and Oughts set 
out in the constitution itself. These pre-legal foundations of legal authority are rooted in 
political and civic culture but are not limited to an existing people or a founding entity as 
some scholars suggest. The people can be called into existence by the constitution’s 
integrative capacity. This is because constitutions go beyond normative-regulatory 
functions as they guarantee fundamental consensus and can even help to shape a 
society’s identity. If constitutions are legally binding, the normative-regulatory functions 
are automatically produced. In contrast, integration of an entity (a nation, a people, a 
demos, a polity etc) can be promoted by a constitution, but is not controlled by it. The 
criteria for a constitution’s integrative power must be sought in extra-legal spheres of 
society. One criterion is a constitution’s symbolic power of embodying a society’s 
fundamental system of values. Also, integration depends on how a constitution is 
perceived (and whether it is perceived as ‘good’) and thus its potential for people to 
identify with its substance. Furthermore, a constitution must exert authority in real world 
politics, mostly associated with an authoritative instance such as a constitutional court. 
A foundational moment, however, is not necessary for integration. 
 
 
1.4.4 Statehood and territoriality 
 
‚European constitutionalism has to bear in mind the historical process of the rise and 
transformation of the nation state. There is no ‚repeat play’ in history. Historically, constitutions 
are related to a state and thus focused on the relationship between individuals and the state and 
the organisation principles of state power’ (Ladeur, 2008: 155). 
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Among constitutional scholars it is controversial as to whether a political system that 
lacks statehood and other classical attributes of a nation state constitutionalism can 
actually have a constitution. It is disputed whether attributes of classical 
constitutionalism, especially statehood and sovereignty, are necessary conditions of 
constitutionalism beyond the state, or whether those attributes are dispensable. 
According to Walker, the social dimension of the constitution draws on the 
constructivist idea of a society governing itself through an integrative constitution. In 
this sense, it is closely associated with the modern state. That is why in Western Europe 
constitutionality has been hardly thought without reference to statehood. For the nation 
state has belonged to the Western European universe for centuries, it is often treated as a 
‘natural’ condition. However, this conceptual assumption is far from ‚natural’ or 
inevitable. In the following it will be rather shown that the term constitution is not 
logically connected with the traditional state (Boli, 2001: 54; Streinz, 2008: 169; 
Walker, 2008: 137). 
 
 
Statehood 
 
‚For the past two centuries or so, the territorially consolidated, centralised, sovereign state has 
been the dominant paradigm in western political thought and western mainstream political 
science’ (Axtmann, 2004: 259). 
 
Statehood, especially in the concurrence of Western European nation states and 
constitutionalism, has been the prevailing form of political order since the Westphalian 
Peace in 1648. Before the Westphalian Treaties, political authority in Europe was shared 
between multiple secular and religious institutions. Their jurisdictions were often 
overlapping and contentious. This was replaced by the so-called Westphalian order that 
centralised authority in the modern state and was legitimised by theories of sovereignty 
claiming the supremacy of the state government over all other sources of authority 
within a specified territory. The idea of state sovereignty as laid down in the Treaties of 
Westphalia aimed at autonomy from external influences, most importantly at that time: 
religious authorities. The struggle between religious and territorial authority was thus 
solved in favour of the state and sovereignty became premised on state territory. Ever 
since for centuries, the sovereign nation state has been the basic structure of political 
power and the point of reference of political and legal thought. Later, in the 19th 
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century, the idea of national self-determination suggested to think of nation and state to 
be identical in the nation-state; sovereignty accordingly resided in the nation as a 
homogeneous entity. Nation can be defined a social and political group sharing a 
common history and destiny and which has certain institutions rooting the common 
heritage in social and political culture (Walby, 2003: 534). However, nation and states 
may have been ideologically forged together, but they are neither rooted in nor coincide 
with each other. This is illustrated by the fact that there are many states, but comparably 
few nation states to be found. The latter is the product of a specific Western European 
history that has always been in a process of transformation. In Western Europe and 
North America, nation states have been the dominant form of societal organisation of 
self-government for more than 200 years – thus people and scholars conceive of nation 
states as the most ‘natural’ and familiar concept of analysing power and authority. Both 
nation and states are far older phenomena, but for the last two centuries they have been 
merged into the nation state which became the ‘normal’ way of linking state and society 
with each other. As state activity expanded, the nation state became the point of 
reference for political mobilisation. Especially liberalism aimed at obtaining conditions 
in society that enabled citizens to exercise their freedoms with minimal interference by 
the state. Thus the idea of popular sovereignty as the self-rule of people as citizens 
emerged, based on a dual notion of people: one the one hand as individuals and on the 
other hand as citizens. Democratic rule is exercised by the sovereign nation state on the 
basis of popular sovereignty within its territory. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the notion of the constitution is related to the 
framework of the nation state. Historically, the concept of the constitution evolved in the 
context of the Western European state as the form of polity vested with exclusive public 
power. The state is a ‘territorially organised political community, within which power is 
exercised over the territory with respect to the economic resources available in it, and to 
the use of force in inter-personal relations’ (MacCormick, 1995: 95). In states, political 
organisation is institutionalised in at least two ways: first, through an independent legal 
system governing bodies are designed to prevail beyond the lifetime of their incumbents, 
and second, highly developed ideas, ideologies, doctrines and constitutions build a 
legitimacy base for those in power. Here, the concept of authority distinguishes states 
from other types of polities. In the Westphalian Treaties, the principle cuius regio, eius 
religio diminished the two major sources of power and authority, the Holy Roman 
Emperor and the papacy, in the newly formed states. Also, the treaties established the 
principle of legal equality among states and thus the foundations for international law. In 
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sum, the Westphalian Treaties established exclusive legal authority of states within their 
realm and legal equality between them. Here, the foundations for our modern 
understanding of states were set out: territoriality, the distinction between public and 
private realms, the institutionalisation of political institutions, tasks and obligations of 
public power, and legitimate authority. As a consequence, statehood has gained a 
conceptual ‘sanctity’ that it has not enjoyed in previous eras. Thus the world of modern 
Europe was the world of states. These states were considered to be sovereign in their 
essence and thus in a state of nature towards each other. Due to the prevalence of 
territorial states as main actors in the international arena, inter-state wars, sovereign 
states governing their territory autonomously, leadership of certain states in geopolitics 
and the absence of strong institutions of regional or global governance, the current world 
order has been shaped in a Westphalian fashion for centuries. Today, our view on world 
order and political systems is still dominated by that conception of statehood – mutually 
independent states asserting the inalienable sovereignty of a nation or people. 
With particular regard to constitutional theory, the match between nations and states and 
sovereignty can be seen as ‘the true source of evils’ (MacCormick, 1996: 553f.). From 
this historical tradition followed that the idea of a constitution being inherently bound to 
the nation state is deeply entrenched in national constitutional laws. Historically, the 
essential quality of statehood is the exclusive jurisdiction over a specified territory and a 
group of people as well as the possession of undivided supreme power. Accordingly, 
constitutionalism has long been understood as an institutional device to constrain this 
power of the state, to limit government. And within this idea the nation state yet remains 
the main point of reference. Accordingly, the idea of the constitution became strictly 
associated with sovereign nation states and focuses on the role of the state – which 
implicitly denies the possibility of constitutionalism beyond the national borders. This is 
because, historically, sovereignty has served as a legal fictional concept in order to 
transform absolute monarchical regimes into parliamentary or popular democracies. 
Hereby, sovereignty alludes to a fictional personality of a nation and the constitution is 
the founding legal expression of that sovereign people’s will and power. For this 
‘inseparability’ of constitution and statehood, talking about a European constitution 
therefore has been quite a provocation for a long time (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 748; 
Axtmann, 2004: 259ff.; Buchanan, 2009: 22; Dyevre, 2005: 169; Falk, 2002: 321; 
Holsti, 2004: 30f., 42f., 71, 83; Pernice, 2009: 364f.; Preuss, 1999: 419; Reis, 2004: 
251f.; Robinson, 1998: 562; Walby, 2003: 530; Weiler, 1998: 50; Yeh/ Chang, 2009: 
101). 
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The question whether statehood is an essential element of constitutionalism or a 
historical coincidence and thus disposable, has been answered by legal and political 
theory in contrasting ways (Pernice, 2010: 8). Here the close link – be it ideological, 
historical, conceptual etc – between a formal constitution and statehood can be used for 
or against the idea of a formal European constitution (Wilkinson, 2005: 297). Grimm 
(2005) for instance argues that a constitution promotes integration. And although the 
European legal order is analogous to nation state constitutions in many ways as the 
Treaties serve normative-regulatory functions, they do not provide integration functions 
- thus European primary law cannot be a constitution (Grimm, 2005: 193ff.). When 
assuming – as suggested by the so-called inseparability thesis – that the constitution and 
the state are inseparable, then the EU by definition cannot have a constitution unless it 
turns into a sovereign state. This inseparability thesis is historically sound but not 
necessary in a conceptual way. Constitutions do not necessarily presume a state and can 
exist in non-state frameworks such as the European Union. The notion that only (nation) 
states can have constitutions is regarded as obsolete among many legal and 
constitutional theorists. And having a constitution does not transform the EU into a state 
(Mayer, 2003b: 13f.). This is because the link between constitutionalism and nation 
statehood is only historical, not logical. The state is not a natural phenomenon but a 
form of societal self-organisation (Pernice, 2004: 12). There is no necessary correlation 
between the constitution and the nation state. Even with regard to nation states, 
especially the very different notions of ‘the state’ in Germany and the UK, the mere 
identification of constitution with nation state seems not sufficient (Moellers, 2010: 
179). Nation states are neither given by god nor naturalistic but the product of a 
particular European history which has been exported to every corner of the globe with 
varied outcomes. Nevertheless, this model of organising political power is dependent on 
both space and time. Consequently, the argument that a constitution dotes on statehood 
results from a particular European history, but is not compelling from a conceptual point 
of view. Accordingly, political systems without statehood can have a constitution. The 
argument that the constitutional charter of the European Union is not comparable to a 
state (Piris, 1999: 569) and therefore cannot be a fully-fledged constitution is circular. It 
draws on the inseparability thesis and therefore ‘naturally’ comes to such conclusion. 
However, as was mentioned before, the inseparability of constitution and nation state 
has been historically and geographically sound for Western European democracies for a 
certain time, but is not a conceptual necessity. Linking the question about a European 
constitution with the question about a state rather seems entirely misleading. According 
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to Pernice (1999) it is indeed the ‘genius’ of the European political architecture that it 
transcends the classical nation state. Functionally, the primary European law serves as a 
constitution, without a demos and without a state. That is why the dispute whether 
Europe needs a constitution or not is not just inappropriate but also potentially 
undermining and delegitimising the legal achievements in Europe. Pernice therefore 
suggests a more functional concept of the constitution instead of an absolute that is only 
referring to the nation state, because the state is now only one of many forms of societal 
self-organisation. Thus the concept of the constitution must not be linked exclusively to 
statehood but other forms of polities beyond the nation state (Pernice, 1999: 2f.). 
However, to add even more complexity to this matter, in the Western European 
tradition, not only state and constitutionalism but also state and polity have been 
referential to each other. Here the concept of the state has served an ontological function 
– ‘it is the entity that is presupposed for the purpose of gaining access to modern 
political reality’ (Loughlin, 2009: 6). Against this background a paradigm shift to 
‘polity’ instead of ‘state’ seems quite challenging. However, it could provide an 
adequate angle of access to modern political reality beyond the state. As defined by 
Holsti (2004), a polity has the following constitutive features: a territory, people 
inhabitant to that territory, a way of life or a body of beliefs and practices by which 
members unite and distinguishes themselves from others, and a structure of authoritative 
decision making. This concept of polity seems co-terminous with the modern state as it 
has evolved in European history. The constitution of a state as a nation state draws on a 
theory of the state being homogeneously and uniformly constituted and this theory has 
been prevailing in Western European state formation history. Here, the modern state can 
be characterised by the following six features as suggested by Parekh (2002): first, a 
state is territorially distinct and possesses a single source of sovereignty and legally 
unlimited authority; second, it rests on a set of constitutional principles and identity; 
third, citizens of a state shall enjoy equal rights; fourth, citizenship is a unitary, 
unmediated and homogenous relationship between the individual and the state and thus 
abstracts from certain cultural, ethnic etc aspects; fifth, members of the state constitute a 
single people; and sixth, if the state is federal, all units shall enjoy the same rights and 
powers. This conceptualisation of the state as a civic association escapes the logic of the 
nation – understood in ethnic terms – but not the logic of statehood. However and as 
argued before, the fusion of polity and statehood is no conceptual necessity but a 
historical coincidence in Europe. Just like constitutionalism, the state has been only a 
historical point of reference for polities and accordingly, polity and state have been 
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merged in the phenomenon of the modern European nation state. However, the concept 
of polity can be thought distinctive from the classical concept of the state. Therefore, the 
European Union legal-political order can be described as a polity, despite or because of 
its lack of statehood (Anderson in Anderson 2002: 27; Holsti, 2004: 73; Parekh in 
Anderson, 2002: 39ff.). 
 
Closely related to the claim about lacking statehood is the claim that also the lack of 
‘cultural’ preconditions – such as a European demos, a lingua franca or a European 
identity – would hinder fully-fledged European constitutionalism. Like the claim for 
statehood, these cultural preconditions are historical characteristics of European 
countries, but not a logical precondition for political orders, especially not beyond the 
nation state. On the contrary, constitutionalism has ‘escaped its territorial bounds’ and is 
no longer bound to the framework of a nation. A constitution is a legal order that 
constitutes, organises and limits public power and government functions. By that a 
constitution does not just protect individual liberty but also serves a normative function 
to generate a common identity and unity in a sense of a common public order among its 
subjects. Thus neither a nation state nor a demos is presupposed by the concept of the 
constitution. Historically, the result of constitutive and integrative processes was the 
state. Consequently, in the era of globalisation and regional integration both the concept 
of the state and the constitution have been challenged and must now be thought in a 
more open way. Understood in a functional sense, the constitution does not presuppose a 
(nation) state as its point of reference; thus thinking of constitutions without statehood is 
very well possible (Pernice, 1999: 2; Pernice, 2007: 14). 
Furthermore, transnational constitutionalism beyond the nation state has been more 
about normative neutrality and the accommodation of difference rather than about a 
common system of values – thus any demos in the transnational constitutional sphere is 
unnecessary (Bremner, 2010: 85). A homogeneous demos or a lingua franca are not 
necessary conditions of a (European) constitution as citizenship, especially in a 
transnational community, should be based on equality before the law – not equality in 
ethnicity, religion, moral values etc – and constitutional tolerance for national and 
cultural diversity amongst the European citizens (Pernice, 1999: 6). As a consequence, 
the fact that the EU is not a state and has no demos does not mean that it cannot have a 
constitution. European primary law and the case law of the ECJ provide for the basic 
functions of a constitution as they constitute, legitimise, organise and limit public power. 
The EU qualifies as a form of societal self-organisation inasmuch as states do, because 
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the EU is based on the authority of its Member States who represent their citizens. The 
EU and its Member States are complementary elements of political self-organisation of 
societies which is reflected in its multilevel constitutional configuration (Pernice, 2004: 
12f.). 
Transnational European constitutionalism therefore challenges conceptions of 
constitutionalism that are grounded in the nation state. Here the main difference between 
national and transnational conceptions of constitutionalism lies within their assumptions 
about the source of ultimate constitutional authority. The functioning of the European 
constitution is characterised by its openness and processes breaking the frames of 
classical statehood. That means the Weberian conception of the state as the (only) 
monopoly of legitimate force is no longer compatible with cross-border and multi-level 
dispersal of authority and political decision making. The abstract ideas about European 
constitutionalism supersede historical contexts of nation-building and constitutionalism 
that emerged among states mainly in the 19th century. Those ideas about 
constitutionalism do not consider the transformed conditions of the functionality of legal 
systems, especially the tendencies of fragmentation of social systems and the evolution 
of constitutional law in the last decades (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 748; Anderson in 
Anderson 2002: 25; Backer, 2009: 728; Dyevre, 2005: 174; Ladeur, 2008: 149, 158; 
Ladeur, 2009: 1365; Ward, 1996: 174). 
 
However, there are claims for European statehood as a condition for constitutionalism 
that seem mostly based on normative grounds. In many cases we can observe that ‘the 
question whether or not Europe has a constitution always deals with whether it should 
have a constitution’ (Moellers, 2010: 184). For example, Mancini (2000) postulates that 
the peoples of Europe need to establish institutions that ‘only statehood can provide’ if 
they wish to preserve their ways of life by the means of European integration. This 
would be because only a European state could maintain democracy and political rights 
of European citizens by presupposing democracy and its institutions and values. Though 
even Mancini himself admits that such European state would not be sufficiently 
democratic itself – it was rather ‘doomed never to be truly democratic.’ According to 
Mancini, this democratic deficit could only be addressed on the European level, not at 
the national, and a federal Europe would be a solution. Furthermore Mancini suggests 
that only a European state could balance the socio-economic effects of globalisation, 
which are marginalisation of vulnerable groups and high unemployment, and hence 
reinforce the social contract between state and society by balancing the loyalty crisis 
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caused by socio-economic distortions of market globalisation. Accordingly, the 
European polity fulfilling functions of a state should have the form of a federal state 
consisting of nation states as statehood and nationhood on the European level were not 
concomitant (Mancini, 2000: 63ff.). The assumption behind this argument is that only 
statehood could guarantee the achievement of policy goals and that this form of polity 
would enjoy higher acceptance by citizens. As elaborated before, there are not 
compelling grounds for this assumption – thus normative claims like this must not be 
conflated with analytical conditions and treated very carefully. 
 
The European Union has begun its history as an international organisation. However, 
ever since this ‘primitive’ origin it has come a long way, that is why the arguments for 
describing the EU as a merely intergovernmental body – utilised by the Member States 
to pursue their domestic goals (as suggested by the integration theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, Moravscik 1993) – are not convincing since the EU enjoys 
supreme legal powers in certain policy areas, possesses institutional coherence as well as 
legal supremacy over Member States law, and enforcement procedures. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States is not to be framed as a zero-sum 
game as in some cases and despite the transfer of sovereign powers it enables the 
Member States to achieve their domestic policy goals more successfully than in a purely 
national context. Unlike a state, however, the EU has no sovereign power in the classical 
sense and it is complemented by other political entities. Its structure of authority is 
polycentric and its legitimacy is not only based on the people’s consent but 
supplemented by the principle of efficiency. That is why normative standards of 
democracy in a nation state cannot be applied one-to-one to the European polity. Thus 
the concept of polity must be adjusted to the evolution of transnational political spaces. 
There are now other polities than just states or nation states. The emergence of states as 
the main form of polities in Western Europe has been neither inevitable nor uniform nor 
irreversible. Furthermore, due to globalisation the state, society and the demos as the 
subjects of sovereignty are no longer congruent. Polity thus must be defined as ‘an entity 
which has authority over a specific social group, territory or set of institutions; some 
degree of internal coherence and centralized control; some rules and the ability to 
enforce sanctions against those members who break its rules; the ability to command 
deference from other polities in specific arenas over which it claims jurisdiction; and 
which has authority over a broad and significant range of social institutions and 
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domains’ (Walby, 2003: 534) (Mancini, 2000: 53; Preuss, 1999: 419; Sheehan, 2006: 2; 
Thaa, 2001: 503; Walby, 2003: 534ff.; ). 
 
As a conclusion, this section has shown that the linkage between statehood and the 
constitution has been a product of a particular European history of nation states. This 
historical coincidence, however, cannot be made an analytical condition and blindly 
transferred to any other polity, especially not to the European polity beyond the nation 
state. Thus the European multilevel legal order cannot be framed in terms of classical, 
nation state-based concepts of constitutionalism and constitutional law. According to 
MacCormick, there is rather an ‘urgency for legal theory to get beyond the straitjacket of 
an assumption (…) that law belongs either paradigmatically or only within the 
framework of a sovereign state or sovereign federal union.’ However, law is not 
necessarily bound to the state, it has ‘other equally important theatres’ (MacCormick, 
1997: 331). Hence statehood is no analytical feature of constitutionality – neither at the 
national nor the European level. The supranational features of the European architecture 
may have made the EU akin to a traditional nation state. Those state-like features are its 
legal personality, legal capacity which means private law personality (participating in 
private legal matters), certain privileges and immunities such as the inviolability of EU 
premises, its permanent character, institutions performing its tasks, resources and 
budget, internal activities such as the Four Freedoms, and external activities and actions. 
Besides those features that are strictly necessary for states, the EU possesses further 
features that resemble states, but are no sufficient features of statehood These are 
citizenship and citizenship rights, democracy at the Union level, a parliament and a 
common currency (Sieberson, 2007: 16ff.). According to Piris, the following essential 
criteria would have to be met before the European Union’s primary law could be 
transformed into a state constitution: A clear-cut division between the EU and Member 
State powers, the organisation of a European government, full sovereignty in foreign 
policy for the EU, and the adoption of a European ‘Constitution’ by the people (Piris, 
1999: 570). With regard to the constitutional concept this provides a framework that is 
transferrable and applicable to the European context as this new case resembles 
structural features of constitutionalism. Accordingly, the assumption that the EU is a 
constitutional organisation is justified (Fremuth, 2011: 404). What is not justified, 
however, is the assumption of statehood as a necessary condition of constitutionalism. In 
other words: ‘The historical development of the constitution as means to limit state 
power cannot make the state precondition of the constitution nor its exclusive object’ 
 56 
(Pernice, 2010: 9). Furthermore, it may be questionable if a state-like configuration of 
the European Union would be something normatively desirable or functionally superior 
– nevertheless, this normative question is distinct from the conceptual question. 
Conceptually, statehood is no condition of the constitution. From this follows, that – if 
understood as the basic legal order of a community or polity – the concept of the 
constitution can be applied to polities other than the nation state (Pernice, 1999: 3). 
 
 
Territoriality 
 
‚Territoriality defines ‚political community’ by area, on the assumption that people who share 
contiguous physical space also interact socially and share common benefits, problems and 
interests. But this means that strangers with nothing in common except a location inside 
particular borders are allocated to the same ‚community.’ Conversely, non-territoriality defined 
communities, based on shared functions or interests irrespective of geographical location, and 
those who do interact but across the borders, are disadvantaged or excluded. Territoriality can 
be crudely inefficient in delimiting communities’ (Anderson in Anderson, 2002: 27f.). 
 
Territoriality is a mode of social organisation and a spatial reference for political power 
– it is a principle of organising political space, that means, the ‘reach of public authority 
is coterminous with certain spatial boundaries’ (Caporaso, 2002: 10). Territoriality links 
authoritative rule with the geographical reach of politics – in its modern manifestations 
this is particularly found in the Westphalian nation state and constituencies. 
Territoriality therefore is a historically unique and relatively new phenomenon and 
essential attribute of statehood. As the modern state is abstracted from society, it forms 
an autonomous realm of its own. In that way territory has been the material basis for the 
modern state: while the members within the territorial boundaries may have multiple 
social, religious or cultural identities, the territorial identity is overarching and dominant. 
As the European multilevel polity has emerged beyond the nation state, the concept of 
(nation) statehood is no longer applicable.  
However, Europe has transcended the the concept of statehood as the main reference for 
political power exercise, though with well-established borders it certainly has not given 
up the concept of territoriality. Territory as the material base for the polity prevails, 
though in the multilevel system, polity and territory are no longer co-terminous. Polities 
do not have the exclusive monopoly over all social relations in a territory, thus it is a 
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false epistemology to identify a polity with a territorial unit. Polities rather overlap and 
co-exist in a territory. For theorizing about multi-level transnational polities such as the 
European Union that means the state level as the point of reference cannot just be 
replaced by a supranational level – this would reproduce the fallacy of equating territory 
and polity just on a different level. In a multilevel polity there cannot be only a single 
level of governance as such multilevel architecture is constituted by several levels of 
governance. Multiple levels of power exercise that cover different territorial spaces are a 
constitutive feature of the European Union. Accordingly, the EU cannot be defined as 
either a super-state or dependent on the Member States who remain the Masters of the 
Treaties. It is rather a multilevel, transnational, hybrid organisation that transcends either 
of the two logics. Europe is a pooling of sovereignties within a heterarchical network of 
overlapping elements of international, national, transnational and supranational order 
and decision making processes. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union is 
a community of states and peoples that have pooled elements of their sovereignty by the 
means of innovative international treaties. Here, territoriality is no longer the exclusive 
point of reference for governance and legal architectures (Anderson in Anderson, 2002: 
28f.; Crowe, 2008: 164; Ladeur, 2008: 163ff.; Parekh in Anderson, 2002: 40; Walby, 
2003: 540). 
In conclusion that means, that while the concept of (nation) statehood is not applicable 
in the multilevel European architecture, the concept of territoriality still is. However, as 
a spatial principle of organising political power it is no longer the only principle to 
configure political spaces. Although on its external borders, Europe is still spatially 
separated from the rest of the world, internally there are now also functional spaces such 
as certain policy regimes that are not spatially organised. Authority in the European 
Union is no longer territorially exclusive. It is increasingly bound to functional rather 
than territorial borders. Thus territoriality as a principle of organising political spaces is 
no longer exclusive but competing with other principles (Walker in Walker, 2003: 22f.; 
Jackson, 1999: 452).  
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Conclusion 
 
‚The European order , as it presently stands, is not the product of a theoretical mind. It is rather 
the practical consequence of the historical balance of power in the European arena and of ist 
dynamic evolution’ (Cannizzaro, 2007: 785). 
 
In this chapter it has been shown that the debate on European constitutionalism is multi-
faceted and inspired by the rich constitutional traditions in Western European nation 
states where constitutionalism has served to limit and entrench formerly absolute 
political power. Today, and especially in the European context, the term 
‘constitutionalism’ is used in different meanings. Firstly, it can be used as an explanans, 
an explanatory framework or the scholar’s analytical glasses through which the 
European polity is observed. Secondly, constitutionalism is also the explanandum, the 
object of inquiry. In this thesis constitutionalism is used in both ways: it has served as an 
explanatory framework in order to analyse the European political and legal order. 
However, at the same time this analytical framework has also been the object of study. 
Hereby it has been shown that the constitutionalisation thesis as introduced by the 
European Court of Justice in the early 1960s has created legal and political facts that 
have been absorbed, in one or the other way, by practitioners as well as the academic 
community. Against this European background, the meanings of the ‘constitution’ have 
been examined with regard to their applicability to the European context. However, 
instead of being a mere ‘checkbox’ approach introducing constitutionalism to the 
European Union framework means appealing to the major rational function of 
constitutionalism as a comprehensible foundation and limitation of public power 
(Roeben, 2004: 345). As a result it has been elaborated that the constitutional meanings 
of fundamental laws, principles of liberal democracy and the subjection of politics to 
law are well-established at the European level. Territoriality as a spatial principle of 
organising political power can also be found, however, it is no longer the exclusive 
principle of organising political spaces; other principles such as functional spaces are 
competing with spatial organisation. Polity and territoriality in Europe are not congruent 
as the polity comprises multiple levels of governance with different functional and 
spatial scopes. Lastly, statehood as a constitutional meaning has not been established in 
the European polity. However, even in the nation state context in Western Europe 
statehood has been a historical contingency rather than a necessary or sufficient 
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condition of constitutionalism. That is why statehood is only a contingent meaning of 
nation state constitutionalism that cannot be treated as an analytical feature of European 
constitutionalism. Such coincidental history must not be made an analytical assumption 
of a constitutional concept applied to a polity beyond the nation state that in fact 
transcends this particular contingency. If constitutionalism is regarded as a limitation to 
government and as the antithesis to arbitrary rule, it can transcend its historical point of 
reference (the nation state) and be applied to polities beyond the nation state (Wiener, 
2007: 3). 
Taking all this into consideration, in this chapter it has been shown that the European 
constitution is to be found in the primary law of the European Union, the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, partly in the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights as recognised by the EU primary law, and finally the constitutional orders of the 
Member States as the interactions between Member State legal actors and European 
institutions create a multi-level constitution. ‘What the EU lacks is any explicit 
statement of the principles that are supposed to underlie existing arrangements and 
which could provide criteria against which the present situation and proposals for 
change could be critically evaluated’ (Harden, 1994: 613). But EU law is highly multi-
dimensional and the European and national legal orders are closely intertwined. EU law 
has benefitted from that in a way that it gained the domestic sources of legitimacy 
(Bellamy, 2006: 186; Yeh/ Chang, 2009: 93). The attempt to introduce a written 
constitution, including all the symbols of nation state constitutionalism, in this rather 
flexible European common law tradition beyond the nation state, was an ‘unnecessary 
and retrograde step’ (Bellamy, 2006: 186). The Reform Treaty is not substantially 
different from the failed attempt, but excludes the formal constitutional symbolism – 
however, the European constitution remains regardless of its new form of codification. 
In other words:  
 
‚The provisions of the Treaties mentioned have constitutional character. The Treaties establish a 
new legal entity, create institutions, confer powers to them, define the legal status, rights and 
duties of the citiyens as well as the powers and duties of the Member States and their institutions 
in the system, lay down the form and legal value of action, the procedures of decision-making 
and judicial control etc. The primary law is superior to the secondary law made by the 
European institutions and has primacy over national law. Even if Member States of national 
Constitutional Courts still insist in being the ‚Masters of the Treaties,’ also the Member States 
and their governments are subjects of the law, including European law. The Treaties are 
amendable only according to special procedures and, thus, form a stable legal framework of the 
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European Union. With the Lisbon Treaty important parts of the doctrine of the ECJ have 
become part of the Treaties, so that it is undoubtable that this constitution is also written. In 
short: The Treaties fulfil the elaborated features of a constitution’ (Pernice, 2010: 13). 
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Chapter 2 
The Centrality of Sovereignty in 
Constitutionalism 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‚(S)overeignty should be understood as something contingent upon the entire system of concepts 
which is constitutive of our political reality as well as of our understanding of it, and that this 
system in its turn is contingent upon the concept of sovereignty’ (Bartelson, 1995: 239). 
 
After having established what the meanings of the term ‘constitution’ are and what 
exactly the ‚European constitution’ means, it will be analysed in the following how the 
European constitution challenges one central concept of constitutional theory and 
practice: sovereignty. The concept of constitutional sovereignty has played a central role 
in political, legal and academic debates on the relationship between Europe and its 
Member States, particularly on the relationship between European (constitutional) law 
and Member State (constitutional) law. Traditionally and resulting from the debate on 
federalism, sovereignty has been linked to statehood in a way that it is perceived a 
feature of sovereign power. However, this does not mean that sovereignty is necessarily 
and conceptually bound to statehood (Nuernberger, 2010: 9). The concept of sovereignty 
has been the subject of a political and scholarly debate in the same way as the conditions 
of political rule have changed over the course of history. Today’s predominant 
‘classical’ understanding of sovereignty has been closely related to the Westphalian 
Order in European state history and the developments in international treaty law. Unlike 
feudal political rule that was constituted by personal relationships, Westphalian 
statehood has been characterised by a supreme political authority within a specified 
territory that excluded external actors from interference. These specific historical 
developments and circumstances under which sovereignty had evolved are still reflected 
in present conceptualisations – Westphalia had become the prevailing model of 
statehood in Europe and has spread its paradigm even beyond. Nevertheless, the concept 
of sovereignty and its notion of political authority also had to respond to changing 
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environments and new developments in the historical and political arena. And in today’s 
era of globalisation we can observe that many of the Westphalian features of nation state 
sovereignty and international relations are challenged in manifold ways. As will be 
shown later on, the classical concept of sovereignty as a feature of Member State 
constitutionality has been challenged as the European Union has evolved by transfers of 
sovereign rights by the Member States. Before deciding whether sovereignty is a 
concept that can still be applied to Europe, or whether it needs to be revised, or indeed 
be abandoned altogether, it is necessary to fully understand the classical concept of 
sovereignty and its underlying assumptions about political authority. In other words: in 
order to grasp what European legal-political developments exactly have challenged 
classical sovereignty it is necessary to understand the concept of constitutional 
sovereignty, its history, its meanings and its fallacies and its specific characteristics 
within Member States’ constitutional traditions. Here, constitutional sovereignty does 
not operate as a uniform principle but occurs in different shapes and forms. That is why 
it is required to extrapolate the conceptual features of constitutional sovereignty that are 
at the core of different sovereignty traditions – before it can be analysed how they are 
challenged by the European constitution. 
This chapter is designed to provide for the first step of analysis and to complement the 
scholarly debate as it clarifies the meaning of sovereignty as it has evolved in the 
Western European history of Westphalian statehood (1). Here, in the often violent 
struggle of many different authorities competing for political rule, sovereignty has 
evolved as a concept of supreme and ultimate political authority that is exclusive in a 
specific territory. This so-called ‘classical’ or ‘Westphalian’ concept of sovereignty has 
become predominant in Western Europe and although it has evolved alongside different 
constitutional traditions in European nation states, it comprises the following conceptual 
features that are common to all all of them (2). Those are sovereignty as a claim about 
ultimate and supreme authority within jurisdictional boundaries (2a); sovereignty as a 
relational legal institution (2b); sovereignty operating in different dimensions (2c); and 
sovereignty understood as indivisible and unitary (2d). In the debate on how the 
European constitution challenges the core elements of classical sovereignty we often 
find misconceptions of the sovereignty concept. In order to illustrate that they are 
conceptual fallacies based on confused assumptions or illogical reasoning but not 
actually related to the challenges of European constitutionalism, an overview on the 
most widespread and popular conceptual fallacies will be given (3). These 
misconceptions include that other sources of authority are conflated with political 
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authority (3a); the misleading language of ‘shared’ sovereignty (3b); confusing authority 
with power and control (3c); reducing sovereignty to a legal status (3d); diffusing 
different concepts of popular sovereignty (3e); and framing sovereignty as a zero-sum 
game (3f). Finally, this chapter will provide two examples of different traditions of 
classical sovereignty, Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to give a detailed 
account on how the common core features of constitutional sovereignty are practically 
operating in diverse legal-political environments (4). Here it will be shown that two very 
different and influential sovereignty traditions, Germany’s constitutional sovereignty 
(4a) and the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty (4b), draw on the same notion of 
indivisible and unitary sovereignty – the feature which is essentially under attack by 
European constitutionalism as will be shown later. 
 
 
2.1  What does sovereignty mean? 
 
‚What is sovereignty? If there are questions political science ought to be able to answer, this is 
certainly one. Yet modern political science often testifies to its own inability when it tries to 
come to terms with the concept and reality of sovereingty; it is as if we cannot do to our 
contemporaneity what Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau did to theirs. (...) Yet our textbooks in 
political science have become increasingly silent on the topic of sovereignty’ (Bartelson, 1995: 
1, 4). 
 
Broadly speaking, sovereignty means supreme and final authority and that there is no 
higher source of jurisdiction in a specified realm. Sovereignty hence alludes to the final 
and ultimate source of political authority. Thus sovereign authority is not limited by or 
subjected to a higher or another authority within its own territory. Sovereignty’s claim to 
supreme authority and control within a territory therefore signifies the internal 
coherence, unity and independence of a territorially based political community. 
Understood in the sense of a concept and claim about the ultimate source and exercise of 
political power, sovereignty is not just an empirical fact or description. The idea of 
sovereignty emerged when there was an increasing interdependence and complexity in 
the relationship between the political society and its government. Thus in Europe, the 
concept of sovereignty is closely linked to the history of states. Historically, sovereignty 
is a recent concept and refers to the right of a state to organise its internal affairs as it 
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pleases and to be free from external interference. However, the state is a necessary but 
no sufficient condition of the sovereignty concept. (Boli, 2001: 54; Camilleri/ Falk, 
1992: 11; Morris, 1998: 172; Spruyt, 1994: 34; MacCormick, 1999: 129; Cohen, 2012: 
26; Hinsley, 1986: 1f., 26; Schiemann, 2007: 475; Hinsley, 1986: 18). 
Some prominent scholars even suggest to relate the concept of sovereignty to language 
and speech acts, as they regard sovereignty to be ‘the discursive form in which a claim 
concerning the existence and character of a supreme ordering power’ is formulated. 
However, it could be argued that all conceptual or normative claims must be understood 
as a linguistic concept as in our culture such claims are usually expressed through 
speech, language and discursive interactions. Taking this into consideration, language 
and speech lose their distinctive explanatory power for understanding sovereignty. That 
is why in this thesis aspects of language, speech and discursive practice will not be taken 
as explanatory credential for the sovereignty concept. However, there can be no doubt 
that sovereignty refers to political practices and institutions as it provides a ‘continuing 
source and vehicle of ultimate authority’ for a particular political and juridical order. As 
such, it is a legal institution that refers to the political dimension of authority and 
legitimacy. Sovereignty is thus a genuinely political concept as it represents the 
autonomy of the political. That means, by identifying the ultimate source of political 
power, it distinguishes it from other sources of authority and thus creates a distinct 
sphere of the political where a group of people and its mode of governance are related to 
each other (Fassbender in Walker, 2003: 115; Walker in Walker, 2003: 6; Loughlin in 
Walker, 2003: 56). 
 
The ‘classical’ conceptualisation of sovereignty is closely related to the developments in 
the Westphalian Order and international treaty law in Europe. The origin and the history 
of sovereignty is therefore closely related to the emergence of (nation) states and their 
‘Westphalian order’ in Western Europe that allegedly emerged through the Westphalian 
Treaties after the Thirty Years War in 1648. According to this order of sovereign states, 
norms that are valid under a state constitution and are applied in a national territory and 
its residents exclude norms emanating from other legal orders – there can only be one 
highest political authority claiming jurisdiction over a specified territory. Accordingly, 
the basic idea behind the Westphalian model is ‘a system of territorially organized states 
operating in an anarchic environment’ (Caporaso, 2002: 2). Since sovereignty has been a 
doctrine of the unity of states and of the unity of their governmental functions, it has 
played an important role in modernization and the development of territorial nation 
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states replacing fragmentary feudal forms of ancient kingdoms and empires 
(MacCormick, 1999: 130). Roman law hereby was highly influential on this particular 
theory of the state, as it – in contrast to feudal ideas of political power exercise – draws 
on the idea that a only a state understood as summa potestas – containing elements of 
both highest authority and coercive force – could establish a comprehensive legal 
system. This idea of summa potestas was then merged into the concept of sovereignty in 
a way that sovereignty is not only a claim about political authority but requires an 
element of political power or enforcement to establish and sustain this claim. 
The following principles set out by the Treaties of Westphalia have been essential for 
establishing the classical concept of sovereign statehood:  
 
• The principle cuius regio, eius religio (the right of the state to choose its own 
religion),  
• The right of non-interference by other states,  
• Sovereign authority of a state in its foreign policy,  
• The right to determine domestic policies with full jurisdiction and freedom from 
external influences,  
• And the principle of territoriality.  
Especially territoriality was emphasized by Westphalia, as it became a critical institution 
in defining the realm of sovereign authority. Unlike before, sovereignty was no longer 
defined by a hierarchy of personal relationships as in feudalism, but according to the 
principle of territoriality. Before sovereignty became the norm of a community of 
territorially distinct states, political rule was comprised of a joint structure of multiple 
sources of authority, such as religious and political authorities. In the Middle Ages and 
the feudal system, the defining logic of organisation for systems of rule and jurisdiction 
was neither territoriality nor exclusivity – on the contrary, feudal rule positively lacked 
clear hierarchy, exclusiveness and perfection of effective rule over a territory, but was a 
system of overlapping and, in many cases conflicting, authorities. Within the pluralistic 
system of medieval feudal rule sovereignty was used to describe any mundane authority 
and its decision-making authority. Accordingly, the medieval concept of sovereignty 
was not indivisible and unitary but a synonym for several sovereignty rights and 
competences. Westphalia, however, consolidated political authority within a specific 
territory that excluded external actors from this domestic authority structure. This refers 
to de jure independence of a state, meaning that a state is legally-constitutionally 
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separate from other states. The feudal system of overlapping jurisdictions was therefore 
replaced by a system of sovereign states. By the Westphalian Treaties, dispersed 
medieval authority was superseded by centralised modern authority whose spatial 
domain was now marked by territorial borders. Thus the sovereign state was the core 
institution at the transformation from medieval to modern. Sovereignty was now 
regarded as a legal status of a polity, not its ruler as a person. With this continuous and 
permanent character sovereignty provided the state with security and longevity. 
However, the idea of popular sovereignty – sovereignty being vested in a state’s people 
rather than in a ruler impersonating that state – did not develop until the late 18th 
century. Sovereignty in the 17th century was understood as a legal status and as an equal 
legal status. Hinsley (1986) argues that the idea of establishing a political authority – 
one that is distinct from seniority, moral and psychological authority but relies on 
coercion – was irrelevant in stateless societies. Accordingly, ‘the rise of state forms is a 
necessary condition of the notion of sovereignty, of the idea that there is a final and 
absolute political authority in the community.’ (Hinsley, 1986: 17). Historically, this 
observation is sound as the concept of sovereignty is linked to the emergence of nation 
states as the main form of political authority in Europe. However, from a conceptual 
point of view this historical concurrence of sovereignty and statehood does not seem a 
necessary condition as we can observe the emergence of supranational political authority 
beyond the nation state that seems explicable in terms of sovereignty but not statehood 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2000: 95; Camilleri/ Falk, 1992: 15f.; Dyevre, 2005: 174; Holsti, 
2004: 121f.; Jackson, 1999: 436ff.; Morris, 1998: 172; Rudolph, 2005: 4; Sorensen, 
1999: 591; Spruyt, 1994: 35ff.; Nürnberger, 2010: 2; Fowler/ Bunck, 1996: 393). 
 
There is considerable scholarly debate whether the so-called ‘Westphalian order’ was 
actually established by the Westphalian Treaties in 1648 or whether the alleged 
decisiveness of these treaties has been yet another ‘myth.’ The arguments here vary to a 
great extent. Some authors argue that Westphalia concluded a process that has begun 
much earlier. Bueno de Mesquita (2000) argues that the modern territorial state has its 
origin in the Concordat of Worms, which has been laid down 500 years earlier than the 
Treaties of Westphalia, and has been the result of strategic maneuvering for control 
between the Catholic Church and European kings. In the Concordat of Worms 1122, 
following the Investiture Struggle over the appointment of bishops, it was settled that the 
king has a property right over the incomes from the bishop domains. This ‘gave impetus 
to the end of feudalism and was essential to the rise of the modern, territorially based 
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state system. According to this view, Westphalia marks a critical point along the way, 
but the modern state system was set in motion five centuries earlier’ (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2000: 93f.; 97ff.). Other authors reason that the Westphalian Treaties are a 
product of modernity as they did not conclude a transformation process but initiated it. 
According to Osiander, ‘the accepted IR narrative about Westphalia is a myth’ 
(Osiander, 2001: 251). The so-called ‘Westphalia’ was actually a product of the 19th 
and 20th century fixation on the concept of sovereignty. The Treaties of Westphalia did 
not establish ‘Westphalia’ but a system of mutual relations among independent political 
entities that was not based on the idea of sovereignty. Hence the establishment of the 
territorial state with a monopoly of legitimate violence had not been established until the 
mid-19th century (Caporaso, 2002: 2; Croxton, 1999; Osiander, 2001: 270ff.). However, 
in this chapter it shall not be investigated which claim is based on stronger historical 
evidence. Broadly speaking, the point when the process of transformation towards 
Westphalia has started can be located somewhere between the conciliar movement of the 
15th century and the Concert of Europe in the 1820s. Regardless of when exactly the 
point of change in history can be found, it is more decisive here that the ‘Westphalian 
order’ has been the prevailing model of statehood in Europe and has become a 
paradigm. So the Treaties of Westphalia have constituted the central principle of modern 
statehood as it has become the symbol for a new form of statehood in Europe. From now 
on Europe no longer was the Respublica Cristiana, but a plurality of secular, territorial 
states possessing independent and supreme governing authority. The new sovereign state 
replaced medieval dispersed authority by centralised authority. The borders between the 
supreme and independent authorities were marked by territorial borders within which 
they assert exclusive jurisdiction (Caporaso, 2002: 1; Jackson, 1999: 438f.). 
 
 
2.2  The concept of sovereignty 
 
‚Sovereignty is a concept by which men have sought to buttress older forms of legitimation and 
accountability or on which they have hoped to base new versions of these means by which power 
is converted into authority. Its function in the history of politics has been either to strengthen the 
claims of power or to strengthen the ways by which political power may be called to account’ 
(Hinsley, 1986: 25). 
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As mentioned previously, sovereignty refers to the institution of highest public authority 
within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains. As a concept, sovereignty has always 
been historically, culturally and politically contingent upon the specific environment 
where it evolved. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the legislative branch has 
traditionally wielded ultimate political authority (parliamentary sovereignty) whilst in 
Germany, due to its experience with massive human rights violations by a criminal Nazi 
regime, sovereignty lies not within any branch of government but within the constitution 
whose prevalence is supervised by a special constitutional court. Because of its 
contingent nature in different state traditions sovereignty has always been both a central 
and an ambiguous concept. Central hereby means that it was always used as a reference 
for other concepts and terminologies – such as the state – in order to give them meaning. 
Ambiguous means, the meaning of sovereignty has always been time-dependent and 
thus ‘periodically renovated to respond to new historical circumstances’ (Jackson, 1999: 
433). This ambiguity accounts for why the conceptual essence of sovereignty has so 
rarely been conclusively defined. However, there are conceptual features of classical 
sovereignty that are widely agreed upon in the vast literature on sovereignty:  
 
• Sovereignty is a claim about ultimate and supreme authority within jurisdictional 
boundaries,  
• Sovereignty is a relational legal institution,  
• Sovereignty is unfolding in different dimensions,  
• Sovereignty is indivisible and unitary.  
 
 
 
2.2.1  Sovereignty as a claim about ultimate and supreme 
authority within jurisdictional boundaries 
 
As mentioned before, sovereignty is a claim about ultimate and supreme authority 
within a specified realm. Authority is thus an essential element in the concept of 
sovereignty. It means the right to rule – however, with regard to sovereignty this means 
also the recognised right to rule. Hence sovereignty claims to a certain extent acceptance 
or legitimacy of the right to rule, although this does not mean that this kind of legitimacy 
implies active support by a citizenry. It rather refers to a relation of command and 
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obedience in form of factual compliance. ‘Thus the distinctive characteristic of authority 
is the presumptive right to rule, which is a structural relation joining both rulers and 
ruled’ (Caporaso, 2002: 8f.). Authority hence entails some degree of legitimacy and an 
obligation to comply. If authority – as part of the definition of sovereignty – is defined 
as final and absolute, it logically follows that no other authority can possess the same 
property. However, sovereignty means more than just physical control over a territory 
since it also refers to authority. The latter implies a notion of appropriateness, 
authorisation and thus legitimacy of such physical control. Authority is not the same as 
power – an entity having authority may lack the resources to enforce it and thus lack 
effective power. However, political authority implies that it has a certain degree of 
effectiveness, otherwise it would not be justified or legitimate. Therefore justified 
political authority requires political power in the sense of the capacity to exercise control 
or influence. In other words: The concept of sovereignty links auctoritas (authority) and 
potestas (power) in a dual relationship. Whilst authority refers to the moral right to rule, 
power means the real fact of power or force. Accordingly, effective sovereignty requires 
the practical power to exercise those legal powers and a certain degree of autonomy and 
capacity to achieve goals through the exercise of authority. However, as de facto 
authority requires a certain degree of acceptance among the population, it must be 
carefully distinguished from power – authority can be founded on power, but it cannot 
rely on coercion alone. It can rest on pure or partial voluntarism and is thus also 
grounded in non-coercive command. That means, although the claim to authority may be 
justified by certain grounds such as divine right, public support etc, however, the 
authoritative command itself does not need to be justified. Lastly, authority is never 
absolute and is never without limit – that means, defiance of certain commands is 
entailed in the concept without evening it out. These limits are of moral and legal nature 
and must be validated and recognised by the constitutional order of public authority. 
Even with these limits, however, sovereignty remains intact as these limits are an 
expression of the authority to regulate all other sources of authority and to deprive the 
sovereign authority of certain jurisdictional powers. As sovereignty is about legitimate 
exercise of power it is necessarily about restricted power (Agnew, 2005: 443; Lake, 
2003: 304f.; Morris, 1998: 176, 196ff., 205ff.; Onuf, 1991: 430; Engle, 2008: 36f.; 
Marquardt, 1994: 632). 
 
As mentioned earlier, sovereignty is a claim about ultimate jurisdictional authority. As 
such it is neither the same as nor related to the state since in European history the 
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institutionalisation of sovereignty developed later than states . Furthermore, political 
authority is also not confined to or defined by strict and fixed territorial boundaries, 
authority is not necessarily territorial. Authority means a normative power to make 
relevant decisions affecting the duties of others. (Supreme) law, understood as the 
institutionalisation of normative order, arises by establishing standing forms of authority 
vested in certain political bodies. The institutionalised authority to make rules and 
decisions accounts for what distinguishes law from morality. Accordingly, ‘law as 
institutional normative order cannot function as such without relying on some measure 
of political power’ in order to assure enforcement and effect of law. Reversely, political 
power is in need of legal-institutional authority in order to constitute and organise 
political power exercise. Political power and the normativity of law are in a reciprocal 
relation. Consequently, it is the organisation of political power, the state as the 
legitimate monopoly of coercive power within territory, that equips law with 
coerciveness. It is not the law equipping the state with coerciveness (MacCormick, 
1995: 96). That means, law is bound to political power, but does not presuppose that this 
political power is territorially organised. Even with regard to coerciveness it is 
imaginable that legitimate political power can be organised in other ways than spatial 
territory. The sovereign, territorial state has rather been a historical coincidence due to 
the interaction between states and this specific kind of rule. State sovereignty refers to 
the historical linkage between sovereignty – understood as legitimate and exclusive 
political authority – and a set of political institutions in a defined territory called ‘state.’ 
That is why sovereignty as a set of rules is not the same as the positive, substantial 
contents of sovereign statehood since the latter is a historically contingent, institutional 
shell for the ‚sovereignty substance.’ As early as 1919 Laski observed that sovereignty’s 
‘association with the modern state is no more than the expression of a particular 
environment which is already passing away’ (Laski, 1919: 201). Sovereignty is not a 
compelling constituent condition of the state. Therefore, the association of sovereignty 
and the state is a product of history, not a logical necessity. Territorial statehood has 
been a successful strategy for establishing exclusive jurisdiction in European history. 
Here, states have been privileged with unique legal status that has been continuing until 
today: the uncontested possession of sovereignty (Holsti, 2004: 28). However, 
sovereignty is not necessarily territorial as political authority can be vested in polities 
that are not organised in a classical territorial way. Effective sovereignty is not defined 
by geographical space. However, linked by historical contingency sovereignty is a facet 
of the modern state in Europe expressing three basic features: internal coherence, 
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external independence, supremacy of the law. As the substance of the concept of 
sovereignty was built up by such various references and multiple meanings the concept 
became ambiguous. Thus the sovereignty concept is a social construct that has emerged 
in a specific geographical and historical context and is subject to changing 
interpretations. It is rather a variable than a constant and its meaning changes over time 
and space. However, the current transformations of and challenges to prevalent 
conceptualisations of sovereignty are not yet sufficiently discussed or reflected in the 
literature (Agnew, 2005: 437ff.; Barkin/ Cronin, 1994: 107ff.; Bartelson, 1995: 13; 
Caporaso, 2002: 10; Loughlin in Walker, 2003: 57; Paul, 1999: 222; Sorensen, 1999: 
595; Werner/ de Wilde, 2001: 295).  
 
 
2.2.2  Sovereignty as a relational legal institution 
 
Sovereignty is a relational concept of a legal institution, established by constitutional 
law, that emerges from its specific status in regulating the political relationship between 
public authority and the people affected by it. That means sovereignty lies in the 
relationship between rulers and the ruled, not in the government or the people itself. 
Sovereignty is only vested in the relationships involved in the exercise of political 
power; thus it represents both the autonomy and the absolute authority of the political 
sphere (Loughlin, 2009: 5). Sovereignty refers to the relations among authority 
structures as the sovereign authority is the final arbiter who has the ultimate right to 
make the final decision. Hence sovereignty links competence (authority) and capacity 
(power). Thus sovereignty creates a genuinely political sphere. Public power in this 
sense is not personal but official and formed by institutionalisation of authority. 
Accordingly, public power does not reside in a person but in an office. Sovereignty is an 
expression of public power and therefore governmental power is official and public. 
Public power understood in this way is a product of a political relationship and must be 
differentiated from private power – the former is generated by the relationship between 
public authority and individuals while the latter emerges from ownership and resources. 
Consequently, such political relationships do not derive from property relationships (as 
suggested by various versions of Marxism) for political powers cannot be reduced to 
mere economics. Considering sovereignty to be the same as authority or a ‘bargaining 
resource’ is a misleading way to think about sovereignty. Sovereignty is a legal status 
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and may or may not be used to authorise certain policies but it is not a resource for 
exchange or trade – thus any kind of ‘economic sovereignty’ concept runs the risk of 
conflating sovereignty and authority. 
However, relational sovereignty is not co-terminous with divisional sovereignty. On the 
contrary, limitations to political power exercise such as the separation of powers among 
different branches or the institutionalisation of fundamental rights are an expression of 
sovereignty but do not amount to a division of sovereignty. The expression and effect of 
sovereign authority depends on an institutional framework such as public law. That 
means, the sovereign will takes the form of law and through the institutional channels 
that are recognised by law. That is why sovereignty amounts to the sovereignty of law as 
prescribed by the political culture of normative primacy of law over politics. That is why 
sovereignty in this respective cultural tradition is always a legal institution. As such 
sovereignty is both the source and the vehicle of the juridical order as suggested by 
Walker (2003). Consequently, a tension between law and politics is inherent to the 
concept of sovereignty: law is both the foundation of politics and the medium through 
which the foundation of a polity is given legal expression. This tension, however, does 
not undermine the idea of sovereignty but is a key essential of the claim to sovereignty. 
As an institution sovereignty defines a set of rules and refers to practices and principles. 
Therefore sovereignty is a historical and artificial product of politics. As a legal 
institution sovereignty takes the form of a constitutional arrangement that consolidates a 
political order of polities – mostly states – that are independent both internally and 
externally (Jackson, 1999: 432; Krasner, 2001b: 233; Walker in Walker, 2003: 8). 
Considering all this, it is hard to imagine how politics could ever move beyond 
sovereignty or be post-sovereign at all (Loughlin in Walker, 2003: 57ff., 80; Jackson, 
1999: 453). The crucial issue is rather different as ‘(i)t is not the existence but the nature 
of sovereignty that is transformed by the workings of graduated sovereignty’ (Agnew, 
2005: 442). 
 
 
2.2.3  The different dimensions of sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty is the assumption that a government is independent from external 
authorities and supreme within its jurisdictional realm. It is thus a negative concept as it 
refers to the absence of competing political authorities. Generally, sovereignty is 
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operationalised with regard to an internal and external dimension. Internally, sovereignty 
alludes to paramount supreme authority within a specified territory. It is the ultimate 
source of law and defines the limits of a legal realm. That means jurisdiction only exists 
within defined boundaries. Internally, sovereignty therefore refers to supremacy, 
claiming unified, indivisible, comprehensive, and direct authority within a realm. 
Externally, sovereignty means that a state has self-governing authority and constitutional 
independence. It cannot be legally subject to external authority. For the international 
arena it follows that sovereignty is mainly a ‘right of membership’ in a ‘very exclusive 
political club’ of sovereign states (Jackson, 1999: 449), regardless of aspects of 
government effectiveness or legitimacy. In this external dimension sovereignty can be 
reduced to public international law. However, if sovereignty is strictly thought of as 
ultimate, unitary and unchallengeable legal authority that is free from any sort of 
influence, there could not be many equally sovereign states in the international arena 
without restraining each other’s sovereignty as any interaction would impose limits on 
their sovereignty. That is why external sovereignty has to be understood in a way that 
the restrictions imposed on states by international law do not infringe the rights and the 
sovereignty of states but are rather an expression of it. (Cohen, 2012: 26f.; Holsti, 2004: 
113; Eleftheriadis, 1998: 268; Fowler/ Bunck, 1996: 383; Jackson, 1999: 433; Axtmann, 
2004: 263; Sheehan, 2006: 4). 
However, conceptualising sovereignty in both an internal and external dimension that 
more or less represent ‘flip sides of the same coin’ (Lake, 2003: 304f.) has not remained 
uncontested. Particularly internal sovereignty as internal supremacy seems hard to 
operationalise for it seems unclear whether it would be based on categorical or gradual 
differentiations. If the first, then almost no state is sovereign; if the latter, then how 
much of supremacy is required to qualify as sovereign? What would be the decisive 
criterion or criteria? And would this manifest in daily matters or in times of crisis? 
Maybe in some cases ‘absolute’ domestic political supremacy means just ‘little more 
than occupying the recognised seat of government’ (Fowler/ Bunck, 1996: 390) while in 
others it means a lot more than that. Also, external sovereignty means that a state is not 
subject to superior political power or legal authority regarding its territory. From this 
follows that external sovereignty might be present even when internal sovereignty is 
absent (MacCormick, 1999: 129). Consequently, the internal-external dimension of 
sovereignty does not appear to be the most adequate. 
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Walker (1998) suggests that the legal institution of sovereignty should be understood by 
its internal efficacy rather than by external terms since the traditional examination of 
sovereignty among its internal constitutional and its external international law dimension 
had limited explanatory power. This was because the sources of internal sovereignty and 
external sovereignty are quite differently located in the legal-political architecture (of 
states). For instance, external sovereignty is mostly exercised by the executive branch 
which is the government, whilst internal sovereignty may rest somewhere else. 
Furthermore, external sovereignty could be seen as a product of negotiation between 
states while internal sovereignty requires a lot more capacity to bring the legal order into 
operation (Walker, 1998: 358f.). 
Another conceptualisation is offered by Krasner (1999) who differentiates four 
dimensions of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, 
domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. The four meanings of the 
concept of sovereignty employ a distinction between authority and control.10 According 
to Krasner, international legal sovereignty means formally juridical independent states 
that mutually recognise each other; Westphalian sovereignty means that external actors 
are excluded from the jurisdiction in a given territory. Since both international legal and 
Westphalian sovereignty have never been absolute norms and have always been 
challenged or contested, they can be best described as ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Krasner, 
1999: 24). Domestic sovereignty means the effectiveness of formally organised political 
authority within a state; and interdependence sovereignty means the ability of public 
authorities to regulate transnational activities such as cross-border capital flows etc. 
Both international legal and Westphalian sovereignty refer to authority and legitimacy, 
but not to control. Domestic sovereignty refers to both authority and control; whilst 
interdependence sovereignty is about control but not authority. Krasner indicates that 
these different ways of authority ‘do not necessarily covary.’ This becomes most 
obvious when taking a look at the European Union polity. Here, the international legal 
sovereignty of the Member States led to a treaty that recognises external authority (of 
the Union) within the territory of the states. Also autonomy, the core of Westphalian 
sovereignty, has been challenged and replaced or supplemented by alternative principles 
such as supranational judicial review, international loans arrangements, human rights 
charters, international organisations etc. (Krasner, 1999: 3ff.; Krasner 2001b: 231ff.). 
                                                       
10 Authority here means a mutually recognised right of an actor to take action in specific 
activities. If that authority is effective, coercion would be unnecessary and in that case 
authority would be the same as control. However, control can be exercised without mutual 
recognition of authority but mere force. 
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As this thesis is concerned with the challenges to constitutional sovereignty as ultimate 
authority, the dimensions focusing on control are less relevant here. With regard to the 
European Union polity, the transformations of so-called Westphalian sovereignty – 
alluding to the ‘internal’ dimension of sovereignty – are in the focus of analysis. Some 
authors argue that such transformations, initiated through international treaties and 
delegating powers to other entities, would not mean a demise of state sovereignty but 
quite the contrary. States would rather enhance their capacity to pursue national policy 
goals since they could now address them more successfully in a more suitable, 
international arena, especially when transnational issues are concerned (Sofaer/ Heller, 
2001: 32). However, this argument conflates the ex-ante question of authority with the 
ex-post question of effective policy-making. Here, it is of interest how the European 
polity is challenging and transforming sovereignty as ultimate authority that entitles 
certain institutions to policy-making etc. The evaluation of such policies according to 
efficacy, effectiveness or legitimacy are secondary to the question about what authority 
can be named as the final decision-maker. That is why in this thesis, the focus is on the 
challenges to constitutional or Westphalian sovereignty as the European polity and its 
multi-level configuration transcend the state as the boundary of political authority 
(Walker, 1998: 358f.).  
 
 
2.2.4  Indivisible and unitary sovereignty 
 
Throughout Western European state history, sovereignty has been thought of as absolute 
or indivisible and unitary. Though the modern state has been abstract from its citizens’ 
beliefs, ethnicity, religion etc, it has united several sources of authority within a common 
system of political authority. Hence the authority of a state is not just a sum of 
prerogatives and discrete rights – it is a system of unitary and ultimate sovereignty. 
Before the Westphalian order, there were plural systems of authority deriving from 
different sources. The modern state, however, replaced these plural systems of authority 
by establishing indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Sovereignty in that way is 
understood as  
 
‚the unitary, supreme and legally unlimited power to take collectively binding decisions 
concerning all areas of communual life. Sovereignty is deemed to be inalienable in the sense 
that if a state parts with its sovereignty, it ceases to be a state. States cannot therefore share or 
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pool their sovereignty without compromising their independence’ (Parekh in Anderson, 2002: 
41f.). 
 
In this classical understanding, sovereignty can be defined as an absolute territorial 
organisation of political authority that is only of either-or quality. Sovereignty has been 
assumed to be an absolute principle. Hereby, hierarchy is the essential structural 
principle of sovereignty, which means that sovereignty requires a political hierarchy 
with the sovereign at the apex. According to this principle, sovereignty is either existant 
or not, it is a dichotomous concept – a state is either sovereign or not, but cannot be 
partially sovereign. Sovereign power means the ‘highest authority having general and 
final effects at law. Sovereignty is the supreme power of the state and is unconditional. 
This supreme power is absolute, independent, and without control. It is a total power, 
perpetual, indivisible and unlimited over life and death issues’ (Engle, 2008: 35). 
Accordingly, sovereignty understood as an absolutist concept, that expresses the 
autonomy of the political sphere could not be divided without being destroyed (Agnew, 
2005: 439; Loughlin, 2009: 23; Lake, 2003: 305f.). 
Particularly ever since Jean Bodin’s (1577/ 1992) work on sovereignty, indivisibility has 
been an integral part of the sovereignty concept. Indivisibility means that there is only 
one, independent source of highest authority in a political order that is either present or 
absent. In other words: ‘sovereignty over a specified territory cannot reside in two 
different bodies at the same time. Indivisibility distinguishes sovereign authority from 
other forms of political power’ (Bartelson, 2011: 85). According to this dichotomous 
notion of indivisibility, sovereignty is either existent or not, it is either 0 or 1, but cannot 
be located in a continuum somewhere ‘in between’ the two opposite poles. Such concept 
does not allow for much variation to be observed and hence seems hardly adaptable to 
concepts of political exchange and sovereignty practices. No matter if sovereignty may 
be concentrated in one entity (unitary) or dispersed across different institutions, the 
assumption that sovereignty is indivisible prevails. In the history of the concept of 
sovereignty, the idea of monolithic sovereignty, of indivisible and unconstrained 
political authority has become hegemonic. The indivisibility thesis entails two claims: 
first, that sovereignty is unique, and second, that it is united. The first means that there is 
only one supreme source of authority within a given realm. The second means that this 
supreme authority lies within one person or institution. Ultimate indivisible authority 
means that it ‘is the highest element of a continuous chain of direct governance’ that is 
hierarchically structured, that it is final in the sense that it cannot be appealed, and that it 
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is supreme in a way that it can regulate all other sources of authority. These are at the 
core of sovereignty. The classical conception of sovereignty, going back to Hobbes and 
Rousseau, furthers this idea by adding the elements of absoluteness (unconstrained), 
inalienability (cannot be delegated) and indivisibility (cannot be divided) (Bartelson, 
1995: 28; Caporaso, 2002: 5; James, 1986: 39ff.; Kostakopoulou, 2002: 143; Morris, 
1998: 177ff., 198ff.). 
The notion of unitary sovereignty was also introduced by Bodin and means that 
sovereignty is vested in one single institution. Ultimate authority thus must reside in one 
place and cannot be divided or dispersed. This unitary conception of sovereignty has 
prevailed in European history. Even when countries democratised, the sovereignty that 
has resided in the absolute monarch was transferred to other institutions such as the 
parliament or the people. Unitary sovereignty cannot be split, final authority has to be 
vested in one institution acting as the ‘final arbiter.’ The idea that sovereignty has to be 
indivisible and monopolised by one single entity traces back to the ideas of absolute 
monarchy in the 16th and 17th century. The underlying assumption in this conception, 
however, is an agency-based understanding of sovereignty that by definition has to be 
unitary. Such agency-based approach is not analytically exhaustive. It is rather necessary 
to further take into consideration, not only as marginal conditions, the prevalent norms, 
practices and assumptions behind the establishment of political authority as they enable 
any plausible claim to political authority to become effective. The claim to ultimate 
political authority, however, can still disperse this power among several agencies or 
organisations – those may then act together as the institution where sovereignty is vested 
within, for instance the three different entities of the House of Commons, the House of 
Lords and the Queen, constitute the sovereign Crown in Parliament in the UK. 
Sovereignty, according to the understanding purported by Jean Bodin, is unitary and 
vested in one institution only. It cannot be shared, as in medieval conceptions, diluted or 
fluctuate between the poles ‘unitary’ and ‘plural.’ It is not a condition or a status but an 
attribute of a distinct polity in a defined realm (Holsti, 2004: 42; Keohane, 2002: 746f.; 
Walker, 1998: 359f.). 
 
So far in all the previous sections it has been shown that the classical concept of 
sovereignty understands it as a claim to ultimate and supreme authority within specified 
jurisdictional boundaries. The Westphalian concept of sovereignty helped early modern 
theorists to conceptualise both the unity and the continuity of a political entity (the state) 
that had eluded medieval conceptualisations (Bartelson, 2011: 87). Conceptualising 
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sovereignty as indivisible helped to provide for an answer to the question which form a 
political community should have in order to be internally united and free from external 
interference (rather than the question about how to best govern this political community 
as in medieval thought). Additionally, it is a relational institution as it refers to the 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled – thus it is not only a claim about authority 
but legitimate authority. However, legitimate authority here does not necessarily allude 
to a specific and elaborate democratic theory but to a relationship of authority that 
displays order and factual compliance. Sovereignty is furthermore a legal institution as it 
evolves in the tense field between law and politics where the institution of law is used to 
regulate politics with regard to both its foundations and limits. As such, sovereignty 
unfolds in different dimensions – here the literature offers different ways to 
conceptualise these dimensions. However, only those dimensions entailing authority are 
conceptually challenged by the architecture of the European polity: Westphalian or 
constitutional sovereignty that refers to a claim for ultimate and exclusive political 
authority within specific jurisdictional borders. 
Finally, sovereignty has been thought as indivisible and unitary. Incorporating 
indivisibility into the concept of sovereignty allowed to abstract it from the person of the 
ruler (king, prince etc) and develop a notion of de-personalised sovereignty as the basis 
of a modern concept of the state (Bartelson, 2011: 89f.). As will be argued later, 
especially those two features of classical sovereignty are transcended by the European 
legal-political order. However, in the debate on challenges to constitutional sovereignty 
emerging from Europe, we often find inaccurate accounts that are actually not related to 
European constitutionalism or integration, but arise from plain misconceptions or 
illogical assumptions about the concept of sovereignty. However, if we want to 
understand the ‘real’ European challenges to sovereignty, it is necessary to distinguish 
them from mere conceptual fallacies. That is why the most widespread and popular 
fallacies shall be outlined in the following. 
 
 
2.3  Conceptual fallacies of sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty has always been a ubiquitous and multi-faceted phenomenon. Maybe that is 
the reason why many practitioners and scholars have sometimes tended to read too many 
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things into it, to overload sovereignty with normative assertions or to intrinsically link it 
with other concepts. These misconceptions have created analytical problems also for the 
debate on European challenges sovereignty as some of the conceptual fallacies are 
transferred and even multiplied at the European level. However, if we want to 
understand and account for the actual European challenges to sovereignty, we need to 
isolate them from conceptual inaccuracies or normative overloads, that have proven to 
persist over decades, in order to extrapolate the essence of the sovereignty concept that 
is at stake in Europe. 
 
 
2.3.1  Other sources of authority conflated with political 
authority 
 
Some authors argue that multiple sources of authority would question sovereignty. 
According to Morris, we seemingly live in world of states without (classical) 
sovereignty, where there are multiple sources of political authority of which none is 
supreme. From that he concludes that the concept of sovereignty is ‘of little use in 
understanding the nature and jurisdiction of modern states’ (Morris, 1998: 226) and that 
states ‘are not and need not be sovereign’ (Morris, 1998: 222). Morris uses the example 
of the US American system to make his case against sovereignty, as there were multiple 
sources of authority such as the constitution, natural law, the Christian Bible etc. 
(Morris, 1998: 217f.). Here, he makes a fundamental mistake to conflate authority with 
positive political authority. Of course there are various sources of authority prescribing 
people’s lifestyle and moral or ethical codizes. Depending on the political culture these 
sources may also inspire or legitimise options for political decision-making and policy-
making. However, the options must be validated through the political process and by a 
competent political institution that is authorised to make ultimately binding political 
decisions. Sovereignty is thus not mainly concerned with the location of power, it does 
neither prescribe the institutions exercising power nor the purposes of power. It is rather 
about ‘the relationship of political power to other forms of authority.’ Sovereignty 
assumes firstly, that political power is distinct from other forms of organisations in 
society such as families, religion etc, and secondly, that public authority is preeminent 
and autonomous, meaning the highest authority within a specified realm and externally 
independent. Even if other authorities have strong influence on politics, they remain 
 80 
incapable of formally validating political and policy decisions. Only established, 
supreme political authority can be sovereign authority and hence is not rivalled by other 
authorities. It is misleading to equate sources of authority with sources of political 
authority that are competent to make binding decisions (Sheehan, 2006: 2). 
 
 
2.3.2  The language of ‘shared’ sovereignty 
 
Another conceptual fallacy has emerged from the attempts to account for the 
transformations of sovereignty by globalisation, human rights regimes and European 
integration. Here it is argued that the phenomenon of multiple sources of authority 
would account for ‘shared’ sovereignty. For instance, Agnew (2005) acknowledges that 
sovereignty was nowhere fully-fledged or absolute. No state was free from internal and 
external restrictions and influences from other external authorities. However, describing 
sovereignty as being no longer absolute and indivisible but as being ‘shared sovereignty’ 
(Agnew, 2005: 440f.) seems rather misleading. This language implies that the allocation 
or dispersal of sovereign powers among different ‘share-holders’ means the same as the 
actual loss of indivisible sovereignty. However, dispersed or separated powers is not 
equivalent with an erosion of classical indivisible sovereignty. Shared competence or 
transferred jurisdiction does not necessarily mean shared or transferred ultimate political 
authority (Loughlin in Walker, 2003: 81). The dispersal of powers means one particular 
(amongst others) organisational form of exercising supreme political authority. 
However, this does not mean that final political authority is undermined as such – the 
concept of sovereignty allows for separation and distribution of powers without being 
challenged as such. 
The fallacy of ‘shared’ sovereignty also extends to the literature on European 
constitutionalism. Here it is often argued that the European Union architecture could be 
regarded as a new mode of sovereignty exercised by the Member States – one that is no 
longer autonomous, but joint in common decision-making process. But this view 
contains two major problems that seem paradoxical. First, the notion of shared 
sovereignty has been clearly rejected by the FCC’s Maastricht judgment and furthered 
by the Lisbon rulings (Kwiecien, 2005: 1491). Second, conceptually sovereignty is 
associated with an ultimate source of legal authority. However, this is no longer given 
when Member States do not have direct control over power exercise or are subject to 
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majority decision-making procedures (de Witte, 1995: 146ff.). That means, that just 
adding the attribute ‘shared’ to the idea of sovereignty is neither conceptually nor 
practically sound. It seems that sovereignty either must remain absolute and a thus a 
‘final arbiter’ needs to be elected among the competing actors at the European and 
Member States level, or that the concept needs to be revised since the challenges are too 
serious and profound to be accommodated by simply adding the attribute ‘shared.’ That 
is why the language of ‘shared’ sovereignty is entirely misleading for any analysis of 
European constitutionalism. 
 
 
2.3.3  Confusing authority with power and control 
 
‚Those who believed in the usefulness of measuring sovereignty by orperationalizing it in 
empirical terms of levels of political and legal independence and economic autarchy will have a 
hard time to point out periods in modern history where sovereignty was as real as the myths 
about the state system have it. It was not there in 1648, it is not there today, it has never been 
there in between’ (Werner/ de Wilde, 2001: 303). 
 
The so-called ‘descriptive fallacy’ of sovereignty alludes to the erroneous assumption 
that the term sovereignty equates actual political power or capacity with exercising full 
internal control. It is an ‘illusion’ that sovereignty should be a ‘measurable percentage of 
effective power or independence’ (Werner/ de Wilde, 2001: 285). Sovereignty is based 
on the assumption that a state has the monopoly of legitimate power within a specified 
territory – equating that assumption with the empirical claim that it would effectively 
control both territory and the population is an ‘empirical simplification.’ Sovereignty 
does not draw on a certain state of affairs but is a claim to supreme authority and a form 
of legitimising power exercise. If sovereignty was conceived of as a comprehensive, 
supreme, unqualified and exclusive power, then no state could ever be sovereign. 
However, sovereignty is not a variable or a sociological condition but an 
institutionalised legal status. The relation between the legal (normative) and political 
(empirical) aspects of sovereignty are more complex than a reduction to empirical 
aspects of government effectiveness. Sovereignty amounts to the claim about highest 
authority, not about the actual effectiveness of that authority, which is indeed often 
constrained both internally and externally. The essence of sovereignty is authority, not 
effectiveness. The argument that transnational politics have entered a ‘post-sovereign’ 
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era where sovereignty is irrelevant assumes that sovereignty equates the actual capacity 
of a polity to assert full internal control and external independence. This assumption is 
misleading as it conflates actual control with a claim to authority and would lead to the 
conclusion that no state or polity has ever been sovereign. Here, sovereignty as a claim 
to legitimate power is mixed with the operation of power. Absolute political authority 
and control over a territory and its population has always been a legal fiction of 
sovereignty – as soon as a state is confirmed as a sovereign state by the international 
community it will be treated as such, regardless of whether it actually exercises full 
control and authority within its borders. Furthermore, conflating sovereignty and control 
precludes an analysis of how control has developed, how it is exercised and whether 
there are varying degrees in its effectiveness etc, and how other factors such as 
international organisations modify this capacity to control (Boli, 2001: 58ff.; Fowler/ 
Bunck, 1996: 387; Halliday, 1994: 84; Holsti, 2004: 135f.; Walker in Walker, 2003: 6f.; 
Werner/ de Wilde, 2001: 290ff.).  
 
 
2.3.4  Reducing sovereignty to a legal status 
 
Reducing sovereignty to a mere status of (international) law does not acknowledge the 
political dimension of sovereignty which encompasses the actual capacity of political 
actors to make authoritative decisions. It falls short of this critical element of political 
decision-making capacity, whithout which the legal status would be declaratory only and 
thus ineffective, and reduces sovereignty to a formal status in international law. Here it 
is often argued that the Member States of the EU have delegated authority to European 
institutions, but retain their sovereignty as they always have the possibility to take back 
those delegated powers. However, this diminishes sovereignty to a mere theoretical legal 
formalism that does not recognise the political implications of the transfer of 
competences to the European level since the transaction costs of withdrawing those 
competences and taking them back to the national level make that possibility highly 
unlikely. This conceptualisation shields political reality in a way that it cannot 
differentiate political sovereignty – including actual political capacity – other than being 
either 1 or 0 and thus reduces it to an over-simplified and empty legal formalism. 
Although inconsistencies between political reality and legal sovereignty do not 
necessarily mean the latter being obsolete, they should correspond with each other in 
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order to retain explanatory value. As mentioned before, sovereignty is conventionally 
understood as ultimate political authority which also includes the power to preclude 
other superior or higher authorities. The claim for the monopoly of power thus is a claim 
for sovereign power. However, here law is not simply a dependent variable of sovereign 
political power. On the contrary, both are interdependent and their relationship is based 
on a political culture based on the premise of normative primacy of law over politics – 
that law is a means of political power exercise at the same time as it is a means of 
limiting that power. It is called a political culture as it includes much more than just the 
rule of law or ‘Rechtsstaat’, for instance aspects such as the acceptance and efficacy of 
judicial review etc (Holsti, 2004: 138; MacCormick, 1995: 98). 
Any such legal-reductionist conceptualisation seems inadequate as it does not theorize 
sovereignty other than as a derivate of a status of international law and therefore cannot 
give a differentiated account of political reality. This seems rather inaccurate 
considering the transnational European constitutional order which leaves behind the 
classical assumptions of sovereign statehood. That is why a concept of sovereignty that 
allows for shades of grey is better suited to understand and explain the complexity of 
decision-making powers and authority in a multilevel polity and legal architecture. 
Furthermore, the association of law with the existence of a sovereign state is by no 
means a necessary presupposition but has been a historical correlation of law and 
politics. However, European integration is transcending these concepts - thus the 
concept of sovereignty where law and politics coincide with each other needs to be re-
assessed and framed in a way that entails both the legal and the political dimension. 
Accordingly, sovereignty must be both legal and political. Political sovereignty means 
supreme political power; legal sovereignty supreme legal power which is the normative 
power and authority to make law supreme and exclude it from higher control. 
Sovereignty as a concept must consider both these political and legal dimensions. 
 
 
2.3.5  Diffusing different concepts of popular sovereignty 
 
‚Popular sovereignty itself is a symbolic construction’ (Portis, 2007: 757). 
 
Traditionally, the term constitution has been used with regard to the internal legal order 
of states – as an instrument of establishing political institutions, such as the government, 
 84 
legislative bodies and the judiciary, entrusting specific powers to these institutions, 
defining decision-making procedures and criteria for the validity of their outcomes and 
acts, and lying down fundamental rights and duties of the citizens. According to Pernice, 
in this way constitutions can be regarded the most plain expression of the sovereignty of 
a people (Pernice, 2008b: 5). To what extent elements of popular sovereignty are found 
on the European Union level may be disputable. We find strong elements of popular 
sovereignty for instance in the directly elected European Parliament that is supposed to 
enhance the representation of the people in Europe, or the European Citizens’ Initiative 
giving the European citizens the opportunity to petition to the Commission and asking 
for drafting specific legislation. Due to the current state of (financial) crisis within the 
European Union, and in particular the currency union, the empirical grounds for popular 
sovereignty may have been weakened or have at least somehow appeared from the radar. 
Here, it shall not be argued that the fallacy of popular sovereignty was grounded in its 
actual empirical occurrence. The fallcy is rather of conceptual nature and concerns the 
issue of how to account for the empirical forms of popular sovereignty within the 
Europan Union. In order to answer the question of how to account for the elements of 
popular sovereignty, different concepts of popular sovereignty can be employed. Within 
the debate of popular sovereignty in European constitutionalism we are often presented 
with a diffusion of different concepts of popular sovereignty which are related but not 
identical: popular sovereignty as a normative concept of liberal democracy and popular 
sovereignty as a positive concept of constitutional law.  
In general popular sovereignty refers to the idea that sovereignty as the ultimate source 
of authority resides within the people of a territory. The core idea of popular sovereignty 
is that the will of the people should ultimately prevail. The theories operationalising this 
idea, however, are different in their conceptions. Generally, they all draw onto the 
notion that the government is only entitled to exercise powers that the people have given 
to it, though not necessarily according to a principle of active self-rule or self-
governance. Normative concepts of popular sovereignty, that are inspired by several 
ways of liberal democratic thought, need to be distinguished from positive legal 
principles of popular sovereignty. Such legal principles of constitutional law are 
instruments of political legitimacy understood in a way that certain ‘chains of 
legitimacy’ trace back any governmental power to the people. Naturally, this legal 
principle is inspired by democracy theory, however, its actual valid content is 
determined by positive constitutional law and must not transgress into political 
philosophy. If legal principle of popular sovereignty would mean that the whole people 
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actually govern itself, then it most certainly could be described as an impossible fiction. 
In other words: ‘The pouvoir constituant (…) is the theoretical utopia of democratic self-
determination. After all, the actual practice of constitution-making almost never satisfies 
the democratic principles contained in the constitution through which the practice is 
decided’ (Moellers, 2010: 185). Accordingly, any normative concept of popular 
sovereignty ‘belongs to the theory of democracy as a basis for ideal constitution-making, 
to some greater or lesser extent achieved in the actual constitutional experience of 
different states or polities’ (MacCormick, 1999: 130). Normative popular sovereignty as 
a concept must not be diffused with legal principles of popular sovereignty that are set 
out in constitutional law and are therefore subject to methods of legal interpretation. 
Regrettably, in the debate on popular sovereignty and its meaning for (European) 
constitutionalism it is not always carefully distinguished between the standards required 
by a legal principle of popular sovereignty and the standards required by normative 
claims about a political system. With regard to normative claims it is often argued that 
popular sovereignty was implied in the idea of republican government. However it can 
also be argued against that since ‘republican’ government in the words of Lincoln would 
mean – ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people.’ ‚Of the people’ 
refers to that government is created by the people and that they have the chance to 
change it peacefully. ‚By the people’ means that government officials are from the 
citizenry at large, not only from a ruling class. ‚For the people’ means promoting general 
social welfare and individual rights. However, such ‘republican’ standards of 
government would be met even if the people had not selected their government but were 
ruled and patronized by a benevolent dictator (De Marneffe, 2004: 225f., 239; Jackson, 
1999: 444; March/ Olsen, 1986: 343). From a normative perspective, this ‘republican’ 
approach, however, tends to fall short of the input side of democratic legitimacy as 
implied by popular sovereignty and seems to focus too much on the output side. 
Whatever the standing of the republican idea within the normative theories of popular 
sovereignty may be, one can certainly claim that the republican tradition of connecting 
the idea of a constitution with the people acting as the original constituent power is 
barely applicable to the European constitutional order and the authority of domestic 
constitutions within this order (Kumm, 2005: 506). That is why normative concepts of 
popular sovereignty – inasmuch as any other concept of costitutionalism - have to be 
carefully examined for their suitability for the European context before they are utilised 
to justify certain claims about the exercise and legitimacy of political power in the 
European level. Otherwise the standards of political and democratic legitimacy might be 
 86 
overloaded with competing normative claims which lack validation for the political 
community through authoritative and collectively binding procedures of constitutional 
law-making. 
Nevertheless, popular sovereignty as a normative idea prevails as a core idea of many 
national constitutions in Europe and therefore has inspired the thought about the 
relationship between national and European law. Here, the basic idea behind the 
relationship between European and national law is still that all sovereign powers 
ultimately belong to the people of the state. This concept of popular sovereignty 
‘belongs to the theory of democracy as ideal moral theory, rather than to a descriptive or 
analytical legal or political theory’ (MacCormick, 1995: 100) and therefore must be 
distinguished from popular sovereignty as a legal principle. The legal concept of popular 
sovereignty vests sovereignty in the people through the means and normative provisions 
of constitutional law. It is thus a positive legal construct that allows for legal reasoning 
and testing according to specified standards of scrutiny. As such popular sovereignty 
links the concepts of state and nation and therefore implies that the nation state is the 
natural location of constitutional authority. As such legal construct, the will of the 
people is the root of any powers conferred to the European Union. In the literature on 
European constitutionalism, the notion of legitimacy is often equated with the particular 
form of democratic legitimacy that is found in nation states. Historically that might be 
sound, as much of the legitimacy debate has developed within the framework of nation 
states. However, conceptually and analytically, this equation is problematic as a nation 
state is no longer the only point of reference when discussing legitimacy. An output-
oriented concept of legitimacy allows for considering a much greater variety of 
legitimizing mechanisms than input-oriented legitimacy only. In the European 
constitutional order, there is a set of norms regulating the relationship between the 
Union and the Member States that is similar to federal states. The difference, however, 
is that Europe’s constitutional principles are rooted in a framework that is of a different 
nature than that in federal states. In states, the constitutional framework presupposes a 
demos as the constituent power and the ultimate source of the constitutional 
arrangement. The great ‘fallacy’ hereby is, that the notion of such demos is again a 
juridical presupposition and not necessarily political and social reality. In the EU, this 
presupposition is not existent as the constitutional architecture of Europe has never been 
based upon or validated by constitutional adoption by a European people. The European 
constitutional order does not reflect some of the features of classical nation state 
constitutionalism. Consequently, the meaning of the (European) constitution is not self-
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evident and cannot be reduced to an equivalent of the self-constitution of the people of a 
country. It comes across that popular sovereignty is either a concept of constitutional 
law or a normative claim, but not necessarily an empirical fact, as the EU does not 
derive its authority from the citizens but from the Member States. Therefore the claim 
that the European constitutional deficit is actually a democratic deficit is based on a 
diffusion of the legal principle of popular sovereignty with seemingly over-ambitious 
normative claims; therefore the argument that a European constituent power or demos is 
necessary for a European constitution seems misleading. The doctrine of the people as 
the constituent power is normatively based on natural law conceptions and thus 
vulnerable to objections against it. Though often claimed in the literature, a constitution 
does not necessarily need to be agreed upon by the governed people. Here, normative 
claims and empirical facts are often conflated. Although popular consent to an 
institutional setting might enhance its persistence over the time (studies in comparative 
politics suggest that there is a link between legitimacy and regime persistence and 
duration) and might be a crucial element for the duration of a constitutional regime, 
however, it is not a necessary condition for its establishment or exercise. Power can do 
without legitimacy. That we agree that it should not do without legitimacy is a 
normative claim, but not a resemblance of reality and not necessarily reflected one-to-
one in constitutional law principles of popular sovereignty. Normative concepts have 
certainly inspired legal principles of popular sovereignty. However, as a positive legal 
construct popular sovereignty governs the form of how power is exercised, for instance 
the extent to which powers can be transferred to the European level according to the 
German Basic Law. As such positive legal term popular sovereignty is to be rendered 
according to legal methods of constitutional adjudication and not to be diffused with 
normative claims of liberal democratic philosophy. Otherwise constitutional law would 
be open to almost any kind of political philosophy and ideology and would therefore 
lose its clarity and legal-positivist character (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 747; Dyevre, 
2005: 183f.; Harden, 1994: 613; Ladeur, 2008: 152; Pernice, 2009: 377; Piris, 1999: 
558, 569; Skach, 2005: 152f.; Walker, 2008: 137; Weiler, 2001: 5ff.). It can be 
concluded that the ‚fallacy’ of popular sovereignty lies within the tendency to diffuse 
different concepts, especially normative and legal-positivist concepts of sovereignty. 
Such diffusion leads to inappropriate accounts of the configuration of popular 
sovereignty in the European Union and loses sight of its particular features.  
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2.3.6  The zero-sum game of sovereignty 
 
Finally, Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty are often framed as 
a zero-sum game, where the gain of the first means a loss of the latter. Especially, in the 
literature on international relations, challenges to sovereignty are identified whilst they 
actually are an expression of exercising sovereignty. Slaughter (2004) for instance 
describes the following two challenges to sovereignty: First, the ineffectiveness 
challenge, which means that governments can no longer effectively govern their people 
without external interference through international political and economic 
interdependence. Second, the interference challenge, which means that regional or 
international human rights regimes infringe the governments’ jurisdictions in certain 
areas. Therefore threats to international peace could now evolve from a government’s 
purely domestic action or jurisdiction (Slaughter, 2004: 284). However, these 
‘challenges’ actually mean a trade-off between effective internal government that now 
requires external interference, which at the same time violates the principle of external 
independence. Trading internal effectiveness for external independence means playing 
off Westphalian sovereignty against international legal sovereignty. However, this 
approach does not comprehend that exercising international legal sovereignty could be 
understood as enhancing internal sovereignty by increasing the effectiveness and 
efficacy of policy-making. In other words: ‘Indeed, international legal sovereignty is the 
necessary condition for rulers to compromise voluntarily aspects of their Westphalian 
sovereignty. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the European Union’ (Krasner, 1999: 
19). Especially after WWII, European governments have subscribed to human rights 
regimes, without facing pressure from other political or societal actors. By exercising 
their international legal sovereignty, they have ‘compromised’ – or rather enhanced? – 
their Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner, 2001b: 237). However, their Westphalian 
sovereignty has not substantially been altered by increasing levels of interdependence, 
loss of border control or policy autonomy etc. It would only be challenged if states 
‘decrease their capacity to resist external authority (not influence) or, conversely, if they 
succeed in projecting their authority outside their borders’ (Caporaso, 2002: 14). 
Obviously, this has not been the case in European integration. It may be true that human 
rights norms restrict domestic authorities and their activities and hence challenge 
Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner, 2001b: 234). However, it also means that 
international legal sovereignty has been exercised to the benefit of the people governed 
by this sovereign power – this should not be regarded as a play-off between the two 
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dimensions of sovereignty but an expression of both of them. Acknowledging that 
sovereignty as both a concept and a practice has always operated under constraints 
(Kostakopoulou, 2002: 136), does not mean that there is a zero-sum game between 
different dimensions. Accordingly, there is no need for developing concepts of ‘new’ 
sovereignty as suggested by Slaughter (2004). Such ‘new’ sovereignty as the ‘capacity 
to participate in the international and transgovernmental regimes, networks, and 
institutions that are now necessary to allow governments to accomplish through 
cooperation with one another what they could once only hope to accomplish acting 
alone within a defined territory’ (Slaughter, 2004: 285) does not appear to be so ground-
breakingly new. It rather means an enhanced form of exercising international legal 
sovereignty – the compromises on Westphalian sovereignty caused by that are no loss 
itself but means a potential increase in domestic policy efficacy. 
Lastly, scholars observing a loss of sovereignty due to globalisation and related 
phenomena refer to a loss of control, not authority. However, interdependence 
sovereignty (or a lack of it) does not affect international legal or Westphalian 
sovereignty (Krasner, 1999: 12f.). When argued that globalisation and human rights 
regimes challenge sovereignty, it often actually refers to control. Globalisation threatens 
traditional forms of state control and thus challenges interdependence and domestic 
sovereignty. There is no evidence, however, for globalisation systematically challenging 
state sovereignty as such (Krasner, 2001b: 234ff.). 
Accordingly, exercising international legal sovereignty in a way that Westphalian 
sovereignty may be constrained does not mean that the latter is compromised or 
diminished. It could be rather understood as a means of increasing the efficacy of 
Westphalian sovereignty. Thus there is no zero-sum game between the two sovereignty 
dimensions. 
 
It has been shown that all these misconceptions of some of sovereignty’s conceptual 
features could possibly distort the analysis of European challenges to sovereignty if not 
properly considered and that they need to be carefully distinguished from the core 
features of the sovereignty concept. Some of those core features of the sovereignty 
concept – namely indivisible and unitary sovereignty – have been under severe attack by 
European integration and constitutionalism. However, these challenges are not of merely 
abstract or theoretical character. Quite the contrary, they have challenged those 
conceptual features of constitutional sovereignty in very practical terms. However, 
classical sovereignty and its core features have not occurred in uniform shape across the 
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constitutional traditions of European Member States. Though drawing on the same 
conceptual essence, especially unitary and indivisible sovereignty, the forms of classical 
constitutional sovereignty come in many different forms and operate in diverse legal, 
political and cultural environments. In order to grasp the conceptual challenges 
emerging from European constitutionalism it is thus necessary to understand where the 
essence of constitutional sovereignty is located in the Member States and how the 
practically different forms offer essentially similar ‘contact surface’ for the European 
challenges to constitutional sovereignty. That is why in the following two exemplary 
cases for different forms of constitutional sovereignty will be elaborated. 
2.4  Classical sovereignty in operation: Germany and the 
United Kingdom 
 
As mentioned before, constitutional sovereignty and its core essentials occur in different 
forms and shapes all over the Member States. Europe’s Member States have a rich and 
diverse history of embracing and institutionalizing sovereignty. Although all of them 
share the substantial core features of sovereignty, namely unitary and indivisible 
sovereignty, all of them have established different forms to operationalise the substance 
of constitutional sovereignty. Consequently, the conceptual challenges to sovereignty 
emerging from Europe aim at targets of practically different forms. In order to give a 
precise account of those conceptual challenges and their immense practical implications 
it is critical to understand the different appearances of constitutional sovereignty. It is 
evident, though, that not every single form of constitutional sovereignty in each of the 
28 Member States can be elaborated here. That is why two exemplary cases have been 
chosen: the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. The reasons to 
chose the two examples, apart from practical reasons such as accessibility of material 
and language skills, are manifold. First of all, both countries stand at socially and 
politically opposing sides of enthusiasm for Europe. While German governments and 
citizens have been widely supporting European integration, the United Kingdom has 
been notorious for being rather skeptical towards Europe. The more surprising it hence 
seems that it is exactly the other way around for the constitutional courts in Germany 
and the UK. Both countries thus offer very divergent perspectives on European 
integration and constitutionalism and their implications for the understanding of national 
constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, both countries draw on different legal traditions 
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and accounts for constitutional law. In Germany, there is a strong tradition of civil law 
and legal constitutionalism; whereas the UK embraces the tradition of common law and 
political constitutionalism. With regard to that the two countries deploy very different 
traditions of the state and government and the role of law to form and channel them. 
While in the UK the state or the government has traditionally been one player among 
others,11 in Germany – also due to its unique historical experience with criminal 
governments and massive human rights violations – the state has always been regarded 
as an elevated player who is subject to constitutional and public law tof which the 
principles and requirements are much different from civil law. For the analysis of 
practical forms of constitutional sovereignty and thus practical targets for European 
challenges the two examples of Germany and the United Kingdom offer diverse points 
of angles and perspectives which can be utilized for an ever more fruitful discussion and 
analysis. 
 
 
2.4.1  Constitutional sovereignty in Germany 
 
Theories about German constitutionalism and its features are characterized by a 
conceptual bias in favour of the legal constitution. Although the understanding of the 
constitutional world oscillates between the two terminological poles of a legal 
constitution on the one hand and the political, empirical ‘constitutional reality’ on the 
other, ultimately the legal constitution is thought to be the more important point of 
reference. Not at last this is due to the history of constitutional studies in the German 
speaking countries. Here, constitutional scholarship has developed as a sub-discipline of 
‘Staatsrecht’ – the law of the state – which has been closer to administration law than to 
political theory. Until the works of Rudolf Smend (1928) and Carl Schmitt (1928) in the 
early 20th century, constitutional law has not even been regarded as political, it was 
rather understood as purely technical, administrative and secondary to politics. The civil 
law tradition has further put forth the dominance of legalistic approaches in German 
constitutional studies. Here, the rules for structuring the political process are laid down 
                                                       
11 That is why the development of ‘constitutional’ law that is different and higher than 
‘statutory’ law (as an expression of the different standing of public power versus private 
individuals) has been a rather recent development that was mainly introduced by the Human 
Rights Act HRA 1998. By that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been incorporated into 
domestic UK law which has triggered profound transformations of UK constitutional law. 
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in advance and in form of legal provisions. Law thereby has an elevated role in 
governing politics and society (Kommers, 1991: 850). Accordingly, legalistic 
approaches stemming from the legal profession have been predominant in constitutional 
theory. Political science, however, is a comparatively new player in the field of 
constitutional scholarship in Germany. This is after all due to the history of the 
discipline: originating in the study of administration and administrative law, it was 
‘founded’ mostly by legal scholars (Abendroth etc.). Later on and especially after 
WWII, political science, for obvious reasons, was primarily focused on the study of 
democracy, peace and its civic and cultural preconditions. Following from that, even 
today the study of constitutional theory in German speaking countries is a field that is 
dominated by legal scholarship rather than political science. 
Accordingly, theorizing about the constitution has been very closely linked to the study 
of constitutional law and less frequently framed as a genuinely political theory. This is 
already indicated by the terminology that widely uses the term ‘constitutional study’ 
(‘Verfassungslehre’) instead of ‘constitutional theory.’ Consequently, many of the 
accounts are predominantly about systematising constitutional doctrine and the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) – as the German constitution is 
shaped by the FCC’s adjudication and interpretation of the written constitution 
(Kommers, 1991: 837). A constitutional theory that does not exclusively resort to this 
but opens way for alternative frameworks of constitutional thought, is hardly to be 
found. That is why most of the (legal) accounts of German constitutional theory 
automatically draw on the underlying assumption of the primacy of law over politics, 
without reflecting on the civic and political preconditions that make this assumption 
work. These conceptualisations thereby recourse to a one-directional relationship 
between law and politics and thus fall often short of essential and mutually constitutive 
interdependencies. This is particularly reflected in the core principle of German 
constitutional theory: the supremacy of the constitution. This key principle accounts for 
the concept of constitutional sovereignty, meaning that supreme political authority is 
ultimately vested in the constitution. 
 
The supremacy of the constitution (at the core of German constitutionalism) and 
constitutional sovereignty (at the core of German constitutional theories) have their 
origin in historical experiences with constitutions failing to effectively channel and limit 
politics. These are particularly the negative experiences with the Weimar constitution 
and the following Nazi regime. In the light of these historical failures, the drafters of the 
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German Basic Law in 1948/49 vested the highest authority in the constitution and 
established its elevated status over politics. The constitution – not only the written 
document but all material constitutional law – is binding for all three branches of 
government and puts human dignity and the protection of human rights above all causes 
of politics. This is first and foremost settled in Article 1 of the German Basic Law:  
 
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
state authority.  
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.  
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law.  
The German Basic Law has been designed as a ‘negative’ to the Weimar constitution 
which could not prevent its enemies from taking over political power, and to the Nazi 
regime that was in permanent breach of the constitution and conducted massive human 
rights abuse. Acknowledging that parliamentary majorities can err as well as abuse their 
power, the founding parents designed the Basic Law as the supreme institution 
ultimately binding all other political powers. That means, the legislature is bound to the 
constitution, the executive and judiciary are bound to the law. The latter is deriving 
either directly (basic rights, Art. 1 III BL) or indirectly (law-making procedures) from 
the constitution (Kommers, 1991: 846). Enjoying such highest authority within the legal 
system, the constitution is supreme. By that, it follows that statutory law – and thereby 
the legislative branch – have lower rank (Limbach, 2001: 1). According to Jutta 
Limbach, former president of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), the 
principle of constitutional supremacy is characterized by the following: first, the 
distinction between constitutional and other norms of law; second, that constitutional 
law binds the legislative, and third, an institution checking for the constitutionality of 
legal acts. Especially the exercise of constitutional review by an institution such as the 
FCC establishes the ‘practical point’ of constitutional supremacy and is an essential to 
the concept. Here, the low definiteness of the Basic Law’s provisions and therefore the 
need for constitutional interpretation further the elevated role of the FCC and its 
adjudication (Limbach, 2001: 3f., 7; Kommers, 1992: 847). If there was no such 
institution, whose judgements are binding law and usually implemented by politics, the 
constitution and its supremacy would be (practically) irrelevant.  
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Lastly, the concept of the supremacy of the constitution is deeply rooted in the 
traditional theory of dualism which is entailed in German constitutional law. Dualism 
assumes that national and international legal orders are separate and distinct, therefore 
have both different supreme laws and different ultimate authorities. The sources and 
subjects of each legal order are different and identifiable as such (Ludwikowski, 2001: 
253ff.). This dualist approach towards the relationship between national and 
international legal orders is shown by Art. 23 and Art. 25 of the Basic Law. This dualist 
approach ensures that the supreme constitution cannot be ‘automatically’ trumped by 
international law. 
 
Constitutional supremacy leads to a strong notion of constitutional normativity and 
constitutional law enjoying ‘natural’ primacy over politics. That means, from this 
perspective ‘the political process above all must yield to the hegemony of the 
constitution’ (Kommers, 1991: 849). However, the normativity of the constitution 
implies a gap between constitutional norm and constitutional reality. In the German 
constitutional order, it is up to the FCC to continuously elaborate and interpret the 
constitution and thereby close this gap. Here, German constitutional theory conceives of 
the Basic Law as a ‘unified structure of principles and rules’ (Kommers, 1991: 850f.). 
Structural unity also refers to the ideological unity of the constitution, as the Basic Law 
is envisioned as a unified structure of substantive values by the FCC. This is reflected by 
the concept of an ‚objective order of values,’ meaning that the constitution contains 
decisions on basic and fundamental values. Accordingly, every basic right has a 
corresponding value. Those have an independent reality imposing affirmative duties on 
all branches of government. From this follows that the German Basic Law is evidently 
value-oriented and not value-neutral (Kommers, 1991: 858ff.).  
Closely related to both structural unity and normativity is the principle of practical 
concordance as introduced by Konrad Hesse. This is a systemic principle serving to 
resolve conflicts of constitutional norms on a case-by-case basis, not on a dogmatic a 
priori basis. It means that no legal value of the constitution is to be realized on the total 
expense of another. This is because all constitutional values, except human dignity 
which is on top of the entire constitutional order, are conceived of being equal. 
Consequently, one value cannot have higher systemic status than the other. Therefore, in 
cases of conflict, they must be harmonized in a way that grants the highest possible 
degree of realization to both of the contradicting provisions – by asserting the balancing 
test. By that, the structural unity of the constitution as a whole, not just a conglomerate 
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of several values, is preserved (Kommers, 1991: 851, 871). It further enhances the 
normativity of the constitution as reconciling conflicting values also means closing the 
gap between constitutional normativity and reality.  
Some scholars regard constitutional theory as a whole, not only sub-categories such as 
normative constitutional theory, to be normative. This is purported by Martin Morlok 
(1988). According to Morlok the normativity of the constitution as the subject of 
constitutional theory does not necessarily determine the normativity of the latter. 
However, by accepting the constitution to be normative, constitutional theory was 
normative too, in a way that it should aim at strengthening its object’s normativity 
(Morlok, 1988: 54f.) and provide guidance aiming at ‘better practices’ (Morlok, 1988: 
43). Although the view that constitutional theory is entirely normative can be generally 
contested and although it seems more reasonable to conceive of constitutional theory to 
consists of various sub-disciplines among which normative theory is one of many, 
however, normative theories remain predominant in German constitutional theory. The 
basic assumption – not analytical feature – of these approaches is that the constitution 
and constitutional law are not at the total disposal of politics (Stern, 1984: 98, 109). On 
the contrary, those theories assume that (constitutional) law governs politics, thus 
politics is bound by law (von Hippel, 1967: 214f.). This idea is of course not bound to 
German constitutional theory only, but the very basis of constitutionalism that sought to 
rationalize political power exercise and entrench the Leviathan. Albeit, what particularly 
characterizes German constitutional theory is that it simply assumes politics (at least to 
be always willing) to be bound by law. Consequently, it misses out to elaborate 
mechanisms, concepts and preconditions why, how and to what extent politics are bound 
by law (or not). Furthermore, this assumption also biases the terminology and analytical 
focus in favour of legal accounts.  
The terminologies of these normative constitutional theories are framed accordingly. 
Therefore the most prominent definition of the constitution in German constitutional 
theory is the constitution as the normative fundamental and basic order of the state 
(Stern, 1984: 70f.). This terminology of the constitution implies tension between an 
abstract constitutional norm (ought) and its actual realization (is) (Schmidt-Assmann, 
1967: 51, 113ff.; Hesse, 1959: 3ff.). This is reflected by the strong polarization between 
‘legal’ and ‘political’ understandings of the constitution (Heller, 1970: 269f.; 
Kuechenhoff/ Kuechenhoff, 1977: 88ff.; Koja, 1993: 115; Henke, 1988: 591ff.; Kaegi, 
1970: 40ff.). The first hereby aims at describing and explaining the legal oughts of the 
constitutional order. The second draws on the sociology of the factual ises of a 
 96 
constitutional order (Kuechenhoff/ Kuechenhoff, 1977: 91) and is mostly a minor object 
of analysis and less recognised. According to Hesse, whose understanding of this has 
been most influential, both are mutually dependent, not opposite, and in a mutually 
correlative (Hesse, 1959: 9; Heller, 1970: 265; Haverkate, 1992: 6) or dialectic (Benz, 
2006: 143; Ermacora, 1970: 412f.) relationship. The normativity of the constitution 
depends on to what extent it succeeds to transform its oughts in reality (Hesse, 1959: 9). 
Hereby, it is often admitted, that the effect of the legal constitution is dependent on pre-
legal conditions such as the ‘constitutional goodwill’ of (political) actors (Hesse, 1959: 
11f.; Stern, 1984: 99; Haverkate, 1992: 18). However, this important assertion remains 
marginalised and is not further elaborated. Therefore, the normative German 
constitutional theories fall short of politics’ constituent effects on constitutional law and 
their interdependencies. By thinking of constitutions as being either law or politics, 
German constitutional theory is ‘stuck in aporia’ and falls short of its objects’ 
complexity (Vorlaender, 2006: 229). 
 
As a result, all this amounts to sovereignty in Germany being located in the constitution 
– and conceptually framed as ‘constitutional sovereignty’ (Gerlach 2003). The 
supremacy of the constitution is a legal concept with a strong political impact as it 
affects the interface between politics and law. The key aspect of constitutional 
supremacy is thus the relationship between politics and law. The Basic Law has solved 
this ‘age-old tension’ in favour of the law, by subordinating politics to law. This ‘bias’ 
in favour of the law has been a decision of the constituent power and therefore is far 
from being ‘natural.’ Some authors pay little attention to this and treat Germany’s 
constitutional decision in favour of the law as the very assumption of any concept. 
Though acknowledging political implications of constitutional jurisprudence (Limbach, 
2001: 7), they hardly recognise its genuinely political dimension. Accordingly, the 
supremacy of the constitution over politics is treated as an established fact rather than as 
a variable of constitutional theory. Regardless of this analytical deficiency, however, the 
constitutional supremacy has elevated status in constitutional theory and serves as the 
analytical basis for the concept of constitutional sovereignty. Therefore it can be 
concluded that sovereignty in the German political order in particular means 
constitutional sovereignty. The principle of supremacy of the constitution and a strong 
version of a legal constitution account for ultimate supreme authority vested in the 
constitution. This constitutional sovereignty is indivisible as the constitution is the only 
independent source of political authority. It is furthermore unitary as it is vested in the 
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constitution only and not divided or dispersed across other institutions. The German 
constitution comprises of the constitutional document (Basic Law), material 
constitutional law (both constitutional and statutory law), unwritten principles of 
constitutional law and the adjudication of the FCC. Due to the experiences in German 
history, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is framed in a way that primacy 
is given to a legal institution that is strongly protected from the daily shifts of politics – 
the relationship between politics and law thus has been resolved in favour of the latter. 
Accordingly, the claim about constitutional sovereignty is laid down in the written 
constitutional document (Article 1 of the German Basic Law) and safeguarded by the 
constitutional review exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).  
 
 
2.4.2  Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom 
 
Constitutions have become an almost universal instrument to limit and restrain political 
power. Although lacking a written constitutional document, the United Kingdom yet has 
a constitution. But not only the absence of a legal document has imposed some 
difficulties on establishing coherent concepts in British constitutional scholarship. The 
rather prevalent way of constitutional thought is – in sharp contrast to the German 
tradition – mainly anchored in historical or political accounts of constitutionalism. 
Concepts that abstract from specific political-historical backgrounds are hardly to be 
found. This has the consequence that – from the political theorist’s perspective – 
constitutional theory has merely offered ‘umbrella terms’ intrinsically linked to 
historically evolved principles of exercising and controlling public power (Murkens, 
2009: 432ff., 454). However, when it comes to identifying the dominating principle of 
British constitutionalism, there can be no doubt that this has been the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty derives from the elevated status 
and strong fusion of powers in the parliament and which is accompanied by a political 
constitution that, unlike a legal constitution, gives more leeway to political actors in 
decision-making in a way that it does not withdraw certain topics from the political 
agenda.  
 
In 1885, Albert V Dicey published his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, where he rationalized what he thought – and most scholars still agree – to 
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be the controlling principle of the British constitution: parliamentary sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, Dicey is not to take all the credit for inventing this principle as the idea of 
a sovereign parliament, independent from a monarch’s authority, had emerged since the 
Civil War and the Restoration period. Dicey, however, developed a normative argument 
of parliamentary sovereignty as representing the will of the nation and therefore entitled 
to carry out any action.12 According to Dicey, parliamentary sovereignty as a legal fact 
means that it has ‘the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no 
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set 
aside the legislation of Parliament.’ Or in other words: ‘simply the power of law-making 
unrestricted by any legal limit’ (Dicey, 1885/ 1961: 40, 72). In a positive dimension this 
means the rule of judicial obedience, in a negative parliament’s immunity against 
legislative overrule.13 On first sight, this doctrine seems to oppose the very idea of 
constitutionalism itself: the restriction of power exercise. But this is not necessarily the 
case, as there are two ways to ‘organize’ limitations on public power. First, in form of 
constraints on the legislature as implied by the concepts of ‘Rechtsstaat’ or 
constitutional democracy. Second, in form of entrenching executive power as suggested 
by the concepts of rule of law or separation of powers (Dicey, 1885/ 1961: 40 ff., 68; 
Loughlin, 2000: 137; Craig, 2000: 211ff.; Loftus, 2003: 7; Elliot, 2002: 340; Gordon, 
2009: 520; Murkens, 2009: 434ff.). 
Dicey further frames parliamentary sovereignty as a legal fact that is intrinsically related 
to its counterpart in political reality: the capacity to take effective political action. 
Throughout the 20th century, however, this legal conception based on political capacity 
has developed towards an autonomous legal doctrine. There are now three propositions 
deriving from the Diceyan account for constitutional law and theory: first, parliament 
can address any policy matter; second, the doctrine of implied repeal;14 and third judicial 
obedience and that no parliamentary act can be invalidated by the courts. The latter, 
however, raises the question if there can be any systemic source for judicial review? The 
answer is yes – if parliament is the ultimate sovereign, then the principles of legislative 
                                                       
12 According to some authors, Dicey already envisaged popular sovereignty when referring to 
the parliament, especially the House of Commons, representing the people’s will (Weill, 
2004: 387). 
13 Among constitutional scholars, there is some disagreement on where the focus of the 
Diceyan notion is. Some see it lying at parliament’s immunity against legislative overrule 
(Goldsworthy, 2005: 31), some see it at parliament’s capability to address any policy 
measures. 
14 If an act of parliament conflicts with an earlier one, the later one takes precedence. The 
prior act does not need to be repealed directly, but is impliedly repealed by the conflicting 
subsequent legislation. 
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intent and ultra vires serve as the source for legitimate judicial review. Here, judicial 
review serves to fulfill the will of the legislature, judges are acting as ‘agents’ of elected 
representatives. Regarding parliament as the supreme authority this has implications for 
the scope of judicial review in a way that the source and main point of reference for 
judicial review are the statutes themselves. They impose legal limits on administrative 
action and courts are to enforce the limitations, but they are not entitled to go further 
than the – more or less assumed – legislative intent (Dicey, 1885/ 1961: 73 f.; 
Goldsworthy, 2005: 26; Gordon, 2009: 520; Lakin, 2008: 728; Loughlin, 2000: 152 f.). 
 
The elevated status of parliament and the rather secondary role of courts exercising 
judicial review – which is not a scrutiny measure for the constitutional limits of politics 
but an agency ‘tool’ for examining as to whether the statutory measures meet the 
intentions of the legislator – account for a constitutional approach that is very different 
from a legal constitution: the political constitution. The paradigm of Britain’s political 
constitution has been most prominently elaborated by JAG Griffith in 1979. He designed 
it as a mere descriptive account. Here, the constitution of Britain is not (legally) fixed 
and not bound to one ultimate principle, but ‘no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also’ (Griffith, 1979: 19). According to him, Dicey’s and Bagehot’s 
theories accounting for strong legislative powers are ‘unhappily misleading’, as those 
were only ‘coincidental’ (Griffith, 1979: 2). What makes such a political constitution 
distinctive from a legal one is the mechanism of government entrenchment. While in the 
political constitution power holders are held accountable through political processes, 
while in the legal constitution judicial review serves as such mechanism. According to 
Tomkins, legal constitutionalism is based upon six tenets. First, law is distinct from and 
superior to politics. Second, law mostly takes place in the courtroom. Third, individuals 
should be free from government interference. Fourth, if government interference is 
necessary it must be minimal and justified by reason. Fifth, the extent and the 
justification of government interference are questions determined and deduced by law. 
Sixth, law should control government by rules and principles such as legality. Tomkins’ 
criticises liberal legalism for it was based upon the assumption that politics and law are 
in a polarized relationship and answers to political disputes were found in law. 
According to Tomkins, legal constitutionalism is blatantly undemocratic, as judges 
serving as ‘prime decision-makers’ are not accountable or representative. And since 
access to courts is restricted legal constitutionalism was ineffective at all (Gee/ Webber, 
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2010: 273; Tomkins, 2002: 162, 172; Tomkins, 2005: 11ff., 24 ff.). However, in a 
political constitution, the arena for checks and balances is not the courtroom since law is 
not considered a legitimate substitute for politics. Accordingly, (fundamental) rights are 
understood as political claims of groups or individuals imposed on public power holders. 
Consequently, those political claims need to be negotiated in genuinely political arenas, 
not in legal ones such as bill of rights regimes. The political constitutional approach 
claims that political decisions must be made by politicians not by judges. Law thereby is 
just a means towards an end and is employed by politics to resolve conflicts that are 
inherent in modern society. But law cannot be a general, ‘undeniably good’ concept that 
stands isolated from political acts. Solving political conflicts by rights-based reasoning 
in legal arenas such as courts would disguise the political character of such conflicts. 
Therefore, Griffith sees deliberative arenas and respective mechanisms for entrenching 
political actors at the heart of the political constitution. Especially, responsibility and 
accountability serve as such political remedies to ensure democratic politics making 
(Griffith, 1979: 2, 14 ff.). Therefore in the political constitution there is hardly any 
distinction between constitutional and political questions. So it seems logical, that no 
constitutional law imposes restrictions on power exercise. The control of government 
takes place in form of the principle of government’s auto-limitation and a supportive 
political culture. The nature of power limitation is rather traditional than legal (Murkens, 
2009: 447 f.). That means, that a constitution like the British ‘tries to find political and 
parliamentary solutions (…) rather than legal or judicial ones’ (Tomkins, 2002: 172). 
However, over the decades the concept of the political constitution has become more 
diversified, for instance by employing normative accounts of republicanism. The 
concept of the political constitution as a descriptive approach by Griffith has been 
developed further over the time. There has been especially a normative turn in that 
political constitutionalism. So the concept has been underpinned by republican norms 
for instance, as by Richard Bellamy (2007) or Adam Tomkins (2005). The first focuses 
on democratic legislative processes, the second on norms of non-domination, popular 
sovereignty, equality, open government and civic virtue. Such concepts of the political 
constitution envisage contingent responses to political circumstances through political 
processes that are based upon normative values rather than on reference to legal 
frameworks. Consequently, such republican constitutionalism emphasises the virtues of 
politics rather than its foibles and maladies. Governmental accountability and ministerial 
responsibility are the vital principles ensuring government entrenchment in the British 
constitution. Normatively, legal controls on political power are conceived of as inferior, 
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since judges enforcing such legal controls were less democratically legitimized than 
elected politicians, regardless of how democracy was defined. The political constitution, 
however, puts politics and political techniques of reconciliation at the centre. Here, 
freedom is not generated by the protection of individual spheres, but in the public sphere 
of political action. Accordingly, rights and freedoms are produced by politics and are 
rather dependent than superior to it. The criticism of that could be, that such a notion of 
constitutionalism and its link with ‘good governance practices’ holds the integrity of the 
entire legal order hostage to political morality instead of constitutional legality. A less 
normative approach to the political constitution has been introduced by Gee and Webber 
(2010). From their point of view, any normativity of the political constitution was 
indistinct and ill-defined – the reasons for that could be found in the concept itself, as it 
oscillates between normativity and descriptivity. However, the political constitution is 
understood as a ‘model which supplies an explanatory framework within which to make 
sense of our constitutional self-understandings’ and not as a normative (republican) 
project (Gee/ Webber, 2010: 273ff., 290 ff.; Murkens, 2009: 449; Tomkins, 2002: 174; 
Tomkins, 2005: 1 ff.). 
 
However, the overall concept of a political constitution as an antithesis to the legal 
constitution is not entirely convincing. As Griffith’ concept is merely an empirical and 
descriptive approach, the constitution is equivalent to empirical observation, whereas it 
is not clear what will be observed and on what analytical concept this observation will 
be based upon. In other words: if everything can be constitution, then nothing is 
constitution. The constitution here has no conceptual and explanatory value that is 
independent from empirical realities. Furthermore, the relationship between law and 
politics as law being plainly an instrument of government and therefore law as (political) 
command15 simplifies the complex interdependencies in that relationship. This ignores 
the fact that law has developed as a distinct concept – not always separate from politics, 
but independent from politics’ dynamics for employing own systems of reasoning. 
Although the republican version of political constitutionalism seems tempting in an 
idealistic way, it also seems somewhat troubling as it relies on mere political remedies to 
power abuse. It is a common place that power holders tend to form systemic alliances in 
order to prevent such internal political counterbalances. A strong antithesis between 
legal and political constitutionalism is unsound in the way, that law and politics are not 
necessarily captured in a polarized relationship. Government entrenchment can be 
                                                       
15 Other historically evolved concepts of law see Loughlin, 2000: 9 ff. 
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ensured by political and legal mechanisms at the same time, not by either or. And the 
argument that differences in democratic legitimization would serve as a reason to 
deprive legal controls is also not convincing. Regarding judges as democratically less 
legitimized focuses too much on the input side of democratic legitimization that is 
mainly generated through procedures of election for instance. But judges may derive 
their democratic legitimization from the output side, as they serve as a counter-
majoritarian institution in the system of checks and balances and of separation of 
powers. Sources of democratic legitimization can be systematically different, yet 
likewise substantially democratic. Though sometimes claimed by republican political 
constitutionalists, republicanism and legal constitutionalism are therefore not mutually 
exclusive. This is after all illustrated by the republican tradition in the United States that 
employs a strong version of legal constitutionalism and judicial review. There is no 
natural or logical antithesis between law and politics, political and legal 
constitutionalism – and any conceptual antithesis should be carefully examined, as it 
probably falls short of the interdependencies in the manifold patterns of the relationship 
between law and politics. However, there are attempts to resolve the paradox between 
law and politics: a prominent approach for instance adopts the principle of rule of law. 
Here, the rule of law as a principle is not conceptually bound to a specific approach of 
theorizing. It is employed by the principle of legality as well as by common law 
constitutionalism. Trevor Allan (2003) for instance has criticised the antithesis between 
parliamentary authority and the rule of law that is often envisaged in common law 
constitutionalism. This approach in common law constitutional theory was kept in a 
‘false antithesis’ between parliamentary vs judicial supremacy, which were in fact 
interdependent, not independent. Accordingly, legislative intent could only be 
interpreted in the light of ‘deep-seated constitutional values’ that were common law 
values (Allan, 2003: 569). Allan postulates that constitutional theory should reconcile 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. Therefore he suggests a ‘priority rule’ 
according to which legislation is not allowed to interfere with any rights that take 
priority automatically, unless parliament has explicitly authorized so (Allan, 2003: 578). 
Conceptualising rule of law as the controlling principle of the British constitution is thus 
an alternative approach to parliamentary sovereignty as the core principle of British 
constitutionalism. Another alternative approach is to base the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty on the doctrine of common law constitutionalism. That means that any 
authority of the parliament derives from – and is subordinate to – the common law. 
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Accordingly, both historically and theoretically the British constitution would be based 
upon the common law (Bogdanor, 2012: 180). 
However, it does not seem necessary to leave the familiar grounds of parliamentary 
sovereignty and switch to an alternative constitutional theory. Parliamentary sovereignty 
does not mean that the parliament is the most powerful institution in the land. It rather 
means that those institutions that have actual power and control, must exercise their 
powers through parliament (Waldron, 1990: 75). That is why classical parliamentary 
sovereignty drawing on an adequate relationship between law and politics in a way that 
the two are not assumed to be dependent but interdependent, seems sufficient. As 
mentioned before, the main problem of the political constitution vs. the legal 
constitution is the question, how the relationship between law and politics is framed. 
Proponents of political constitutionalism blame the legal camp for employing a 
polarized relationship, but at the same time deny any separate value of legal 
mechanisms. Both political and legal constitutionalism in their strict forms are mistaken 
by assuming just a one-directional relationship between law and politics. The former, by 
drawing on law only as command or instrument of government; the latter by drawing on 
law as the only reason or right and thus regarding law as a distinct concept employing 
logical deduction and therefore superior to and limiting politics. But these approaches 
simplify the complexity of the relationship between law and politics in a reductionist 
way and therefore fall short of the versatile relational forms. There is not one, but many 
relationships between law and politics, as they ‘collide and combine in a dazzling 
variety’ (Tomkins, 2002: 169). Politics and law are different ‘systems’ and it is highly 
unlikely that one will be absorbed by the other. They are related, but at the same time 
competing or complementary practices of conflict settlement and employing different 
logics and dynamics. The question as to whether we are witnessing a judicialization of 
politics or a politicization of law merely depends on what stance we take on the 
relationship between law and politics is framed and particularly as to whether we give 
priority to one of them. Either way seems insufficient – politics and law must be treated 
as distinct but interdependent variables without enjoying strict conceptual primacy. 
Keeping that in mind, it might be more adequate not to contrast political and legal 
constitutionalism, but to relate them to each other in a complementary way. Although 
constitutional theory has hardly ever explored this interface between modern political 
and legal constitutions, it seems very well possible. So it could be imagined that the 
legal constitution is based upon the idea that the political constitution is founded on law 
which is to be enforced in the courts. By that, political checks and balances are 
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complemented by judicial mechanisms and therefore interdependent. The political 
nature of the constitution is not necessarily denied by the idea of legal constitutionalism. 
The political constitution is ‘simply brought within a frame of law’ (Hickman, 2005: 
986, 989 ff.; Loughlin, 2000: 217, 233).  
 
 
Concepts re-approaching parliamentary sovereignty under the new constitutional 
order in the UK 
 
There is some unanimity among constitutional scholars, that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty has been challenged by the constitutional developments 
outlined above. Controversial is the extent of that challenges and if or how they can be 
accommodated with parliamentary sovereignty. Some authors see the challenges altering 
the environment of parliamentary sovereignty or enhancing the discrepancy between 
theoretical ideal types and empirical realities. The argument here is, that even before the 
Labour reform programme in 1997, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty in its 
classical account did not accurately describe the reality of legislative authority. There 
was a gap between theory (unlimited) and reality (limited) legislative power (Elliot, 
2002: 341). So parliament was constrained by political reality – that means the assertion 
of any legal powers has always been subject to extra-legal constraints. In other words: 
the legally unlimited set of policy options had been shrinked by political restraints. 
These ‘natural’ limits on parliament’s policy options would apply to any parliament in 
the world and can therefore not count as exclusively undermining parliamentary 
sovereignty. The absence of legal restrictions is not to be confused with the absence of 
any restrictions (Elliot, 2004: 547 ff.). Accordingly, parliament still had ultimate legal 
sovereignty, only the rules for exercising this sovereignty had changed. An example for 
such a changed rule might be that parliament could now control the form of its future 
legislation (Goldsworthy, 2005: 30). Whether such ‘practical’ restrictions to legal 
sovereignty have to be taken into account by theory seems a matter of controversy 
among scholars. Some authors like Goldsworthy and Elliot do not identify any need for 
revision, as parliament ‘is legally sovereign both in theory and reality and is subject to 
moral and political constraints both in theory and in reality.’ Accordingly, there were no 
need to revise the theory (Goldsworhty, 2005: 31; Elliot, 2004: 341 ff., 547). At least, 
there might be some need to account for the ‘altered environment’ of parliamentary 
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sovereignty within the theoretical framework, but not for parliamentary sovereignty 
itself (Elliot, 2004: 547).  
 
Sovereignty shared between parliament and courts/ judicial officials 
The concept of bi-polar sovereignty was first introduced by Sir Stephen Sedley (1995) 
and some regard it to be the most useful concept to understand sovereignty in the UK 
(Knight 2009). Here, sovereignty is shared between parliament and the courts. Bi-polar 
sovereignty opposes the traditional notion of institutional pragmatism16 in the UK since 
it conceives of the overlap between courts and parliament’s authority as an analytical 
function, not as a historical coincidence. Sovereignty is bi-polar, as parliament acts as 
the legal sovereign when framing relevant questions of law in a particular context, while 
it is the courts that apply and enforce the law. Those bi-polar sovereign powers are 
always interdependent and relational. Bi-polar sovereignty also acknowledges principles 
of rule of law and legality (Knight, 2009: 362, 371 ff., 386), though in a different way 
than in common law constitutionalism as bi-polar sovereignty is understood as a method 
– not as a theory – of understanding the relationship between the Crown in Parliament 
and the judicial branch. Therefore it questions locating sovereignty in the legislature 
alone (Knight, 2009: 366). 
Not only the terminology of bi-polar sovereignty seems confusing, as the traditional idea 
of sovereignty implies that it is hardly to be shared. It can also be questioned whether 
this concepts adds any value to the debate. If the overlap of parliament and courts was 
an inherent function of sovereignty exercise anyway, what is then the explanatory 
account of distinguishing that sovereignty as bi-polar? It seems more like this concept is 
introducing a further label into constitutional theory without providing any new content. 
 
Another approach that draws on a transformed relationship between the courts and the 
parliament sees parliamentary sovereignty based on judicial recognition. This rule of 
recognition was developed by H L A Hart (1961) in contrast to the Austinian notion that 
parliamentary sovereignty was constituted by law as command, deriving from the 
authority of a pre-legal sovereign (Austin 1904) (Goldsworthy, 2005: 10). Understood 
this way, all legal norms emanate from an omnipotent sovereign (Lakin, 2008: 713). 
According to Hart, the source of legal validity is not to be derived from commanding 
law, but from a consensus among senior legal officials from all branches of government. 
                                                       
16 Understood as institutions compensating each others’ deficiencies and overtaking functions 
during institutional development. 
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This consensus creates fundamental rules of recognition, that is, providing the criteria 
for legal validity (Goldsworthy, 2005: 14; Goldsworthy, 2006: 258). Drawing on the 
idea that parliamentary sovereignty as a fundamental constitutional rule depends on 
judicial acceptance as a necessary condition, Goldsworthy does not regard it as ‚strict’ 
parliamentary sovereignty, but a form of ‘co-ordinate authority.’ That means, 
sovereignty is shared between parliament and judicial officials (Goldsworthy, 2005: 15, 
22). The weaknesses of this approach have been convincingly elaborated by the 
approaches drawing on legality and will be shown in the following. 
 
 
Convention to bridge devolved sovereignty gaps 
One approach to reconcile theory and practice of legislative supremacy between 
Westminster and regional legislatures is offered by Elliot (2002: 357 ff.) and focuses on 
convention as a gap-bridging mechanism to accommodate the dispersal of legislative 
competences across different institutions with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Concerning the relationship between the Westminster Parliament and the 
Scottish legislature such a non-binding constitutional norm has already emerged. 
According to this Sewel convention, the Westminster Parliament will not legislate in 
devolved matters, unless the regional legislature has agreed upon (Elliot, 2004: 554). 
From a constitutional theory perspective, this convention is an organizational principle 
for the allocation of legislative competencies. As such it does not explain the underlying 
configuration of authority, but is derived from the latter. So the convention approach to 
reconcile parliamentary sovereignty with devolution is not convincing. Consequently, 
devolution imposes a challenge that needs to be taken into further consideration by 
constitutional theory. 
 
The conceptualizations as outlined above account for an altered ‘environment’ of 
parliamentary sovereignty. They do not acknowledge a fundamental transition in the 
essence of British constitutionalism towards a controlling principle other than 
parliamentary sovereignty. However, some authors regard the British constitution 
categorically transformed. Consequently, concepts addressing these phenomena must 
take this fundamental transformation into account. Hereby, approaches vary as to 
whether they conceive of the modification as being due to the correction of a conceptual 
misapprehension (principle of legality) or due to a successive transition process 
(common law constitutionalism). 
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The principle of legality – sovereignty replaced 
According to Lakin, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty can neither be explained by a 
pre-legal sovereign nor by a rule of recognition. The latter does not provide for a 
justification of parliament’s legislative authority. Further, it does not account for 
disagreement between judges as indicated by dissenting votes and legal disputes. Lakin 
convincingly argues against the idea of an empirically determined rule of recognition, 
since judges and other officials do not acknowledge legal validity by empirical surveys 
among their colleagues, but by normative arguments (Lakin, 2008: 710). That illustrates 
that such a rule is simply not existent (Lakin, 2008: 728). Lakin goes even further by 
stating that the rule of recognition cannot explain the transfer of sovereignty to 
parliament, but only the transfer itself. As the rule of recognition only elucidates the 
mechanism of an authority transfer, it could explain conferring sovereignty on any 
political body. But it does not distinctively account for parliamentary sovereignty 
(Lakin, 2008: 717). The latter must rather stem from a legal principle of political 
morality that is logically prior to the entity of parliament. This principle governs the 
exercise of political power across all branches and draws on the legal validity of that 
power assertion (Lakin, 2008: 729 f.). Lakin sees this principle of legality as the 
controlling factor of the British constitution. By giving such a legal account for the law-
making powers of parliament, he even claims to provide a ‘normative reason to erase the 
concept of sovereignty from our constitutional landscape’ (Lakin, 2008: 731). But this 
strictly legal account does not consider any political grounds of such legal authority. It 
seems not only to underestimate the role of politics in the relationship of law and politics 
- it rather seems to deny any relevance of politics in law-making. So it falls short of the 
political sources of law and legal principles which are essential for understanding not 
only the British constitution, but any constitutional order, and its legitimacy.  
 
 
Common law constitutionalism – parliamentary sovereignty limited by common law 
Common law theorists see the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty established by 
judicial jurisprudence (Lakin, 2008: 713). Locating the origin of legislative authority in 
the common law has strong implications for the scope of its authority. So parliament’s 
authority does not only stem from, but is also limited by common law norms that have 
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developed independently from parliamentary legislation (Allan, 2003: 564 ff.; Elliot, 
2002: 342). That means that parliament is not omnipotent, but bound by constitutional 
doctrines, the separation of power and other such principles (Eleftheriadis, 2009: 276; 
Jowell, 2006: 571). Also some constitutional judges, namely Lord Steyn and Lord Laws, 
see parliamentary sovereignty modified by common law. Lord Steyn acknowledged in 
Jackson17 a ‘new hypothesis of constitutionalism’, underpinning that parliament and the 
courts together should seek to further democracy. This view on democracy shifts away 
from the Diceyan account as it is no longer synonymous with majority rule, but with the 
rule of law and fundamental rights that are not at parliament’s disposal (Jowell, 2006: 
575). In his vote in Thoburn18 Lord Laws also refers to common law having transformed 
traditional parliamentary sovereignty. In International Transport19 he even regards the 
British constitution at an ‘intermediate stage between parliamentary supremacy and 
constitutional supremacy.’ Hereby, courts play a vital role in the establishment of 
fundamental common law principles that are the foundation of constitutional politics and 
the decision of political disputes (Poole, 2005: 142 ff.) ‘Ordinary politics’ are thought to 
cause danger for decision making without adhering to higher, fundamental rights may be 
biased in favour of those wielding power. According to common law constitutional 
theorists, constitutional and legislative politics are somewhat opposing. And it is only 
the common law as a higher constitutional law that ensures the respect for fundamental 
rights in the way that judicial review enforces the protection of fundamental rights 
against infringements by ordinary legislative politics (Poole, 2002: 152 ff.). 
This has strong implications for the source – and accordingly scope and legitimacy – of 
judicial review. The approach of ultra vires has been strongly criticised by common law 
theorists. They see the principles that govern administrative discretion to originate in 
common law, not in legislative intent. Accordingly, they conceive of the common law as 
providing for concrete rule of law principles. And this without any parliamentary 
authorization – therefore parliamentary sovereignty is limited by common law 
(Goldsworthy, 2005: 26; Allan, 2003: 564 f., 571). Though common law theorists have 
support from highest judicial instances, their ideas are critically examined and contested. 
Goldsworthy for instance regards the notion, that it is only the judges who give meaning 
to statutes and thereby determine the law, as misguided. Determination by courts was 
merely restricted to cases where the content of provisions is obscure and thus in need of 
                                                       
17 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
18 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151; [2002] 3 WLR 247; [2002] 4 All ER 
156. 
19 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State [2003] QB 728. 
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clarification. This, however, occurs only in a few cases (Goldsworthy, 2005: 24). Some 
authors even see the turn to common law reasoning as a ‘mere wrong’ for constitutional 
development, as it subordinates legal sovereignty to immutable values of common law. 
And this would be ‘profoundly undemocratic’ (Gordon, 2009: 521 ff.). Setting aside 
normative evaluations, as it draws on democratic legitimacy of decision-makers and 
courts which are highly subjective to personal views and beliefs, the common law 
approach is not convincing at least for historical and theoretical reasons. Historically, the 
courts were subordinate to parliament, so it was the latter that possessed ultimate 
authority to interpret the common law. The parliament has gained its authority by 
overcoming the monarch’s authority, not by grant from the judiciary (Jowell, 2006: 
565). Theoretically, it seems unsound that judges have conferred sovereignty to 
parliament and obey it, but at the same time were still able to deviate from their duty of 
obediance, although that rule of obedience was their own creation. And even if that was 
the case – what then is the source of the judges’ authority to create such doctrines? The 
judges’ authority can hardly be derived from the common law, since it is judge-made 
law and judges cannot transfer authority to themselves (bootstrap argument) 
(Goldsworthy, 2005: 13 f.). 
 
Taking all the above into consideration, it can be concluded that sovereignty in the 
United Kingdom has been and remains parliamentary sovereignty. Despite more or less 
recent attempts to reconsider, none of the accounts presented above seem finally 
convincing that parliamentary sovereignty needs to be re-assessed and revised. As the 
specific form of constitutional sovereignty parliamentary sovereignty is the defining 
feature of sovereignty and its practical form in the United Kingdom. It is a legal and 
political institution that governs the relationship between the rulers and the ruled and 
vests supreme political authority in the parliament. This claim about ultimate supreme 
authority is laid down in British constitutional law and is accompanied by the 
characteristics of the political constitution. The judicial review exercised on 
parliamentary acts is to be understood in a way that courts are acting as agents of the 
parliamentary will – accordingly, parliamentary sovereignty is indivisible as there is 
only one single highest authority in the political order of the United Kingdom: the 
Parliament. Furthermore, parliamentary sovereignty is also unitary as it is only residing 
in the institution of parliament – it is not dispersed across different institutions such as 
courts because these other institutions can be considered as agents of the sovereign 
parliamentary authority.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the first part of this chapter the meaning and concept of sovereignty as it has evolved 
in Europe was elaborated. This ‘classical’ conceptualisation is closely related to the 
development of the Westphalian Order in Europe that replaced personalised feudal rule 
by exclusive political authority within a specified territory. As the prevailing model of 
statehood in Europe Westphalia and its concept of sovereignty has become a paradigm. 
Sovereignty here is understood as a claim to ultimate and supreme political authority. 
Within this concept legitimate political authority is essential, whereby authority requires 
some level of political power in order to enforce its claim. However, authority can rely 
on political power but is not the same – power can be a foundation of authority, but 
authority can be exerted without coercion. Accordingly, sovereignty is a relational 
concept that links competence (authority) with capacity (power). Consequently, it cannot 
be reduced to a legal status without any actual effectiveness. In modern European states 
sovereignty has been institutionalised by the means of constitutions and constitutional 
law. Thus sovereignty is a legal institution and the tension between law and politics is 
inherent in the sovereignty concept. Here, law is both the foundation of politics and the 
medium through which this foundation is given legal expression.  
Generally, sovereignty is operationalised according to an internal and external 
dimension. The first means paramount supreme authority within a specified realm; the 
latter refers to a state’s self-governing authority and constitutional independence free 
from interference by external authorities. Another prominent operationalisation is 
suggested by Krasner (1999, 2001b) and differentiates four dimensions of sovereignty: 
international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and 
interdependence sovereignty. As the concern in this thesis are the challenges to ultimate 
sovereign authority – hence international legal and Westphalian sovereignty that broadly 
correspond with the internal-external categories – dimensions focusing on control rather 
than authority (domestic and interdependence sovereignty) are of less interest here. As 
will be shown in the following chapter, the concept of sovereignty entails two 
assumptions that are facing ‘true’ challenges by European integration: indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty. Indivisible means that there can be only one source of supreme 
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political authority; unitary means that this ultimate authority is vested in only one 
institution and cannot be dispersed.  
Unlike the real challenges to sovereignty that emerge from European constitutionalism, 
popular conceptual fallacies do not impose an ‘imminent threat’ to the concept of 
sovereignty but reflect misconceptions. Such common fallacies are conceiving of 
authorities other than political as a threat to sovereignty. However, what these non-
political authorities lack are the competence and capacity to make collectively binding 
decisions – thus they cannot be a threat to effective sovereign authority. Furthermore, 
the language of ‘shared’ sovereignty is decepting as it suggests that different 
shareholders of sovereignty would mean at the same time sovereignty being lost. 
Another conceptual fallacy is conflating authority with power and control. As has been 
mentioned previously, authority can rely on power to ensure its enforcement and thus 
the effectiveness of authority. However, authority can be asserted without coercion; thus 
authority and actual power or control are not the same. Also, sovereignty cannot be 
reduced to a legal status only as this would mean to omit effectiveness and capacity of 
authority that are essential to sovereignty. Diffusing different concepts of popular 
sovereignty is a widespread fallacy that is grounded in reading normative claims into 
positive principles of constitutional law and thus opening them to interpretations other 
than ‚prescribed’ by legal methodology. Finally, playing sovereignty as a zero-sum 
game that exerts international legal sovereignty on the expense of Westphalian 
sovereignty is a delusive approach. 
How classical sovereignty is practically unfolding has been shown by the cases of 
Germany and the United Kingdom that employ very different traditions of vesting 
institutions with highest political authority. The two cases of Germany and the United 
Kingdom have outlined that the conceptual features of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty are operating in different forms: while in Germany there is constitutional 
sovereignty, in the United Kingdom we find parliamentary sovereignty. That means, 
different institutions entail the claim to highest political authority – in Germany this is 
the constitution, in the United Kingdom the Parliament. It has been shown that despite 
sovereignty ultimately vested in different institutions, the conceptual features of 
indivisible and unitary sovereignty are well established. Thus classical sovereignty can 
operate in different forms, but yet draw on the same core assumptions of indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty. In the next chapter it will be shown how exactly the two conceptual 
assumptions of classical sovereignty are undermined by the legal-political architecture 
of the European Union and how these challenges become practically relevant in the two 
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cases of German constitutional sovereignty and British parliamentary sovereignty. It will 
be argued that the traditional concept of sovereignty that ‘sought to defend the autarchic 
nation state’ has become ‘unrealistic’ as in an interdependent world nation states are no 
longer the dominant form of states and policy making (Engle, 2008: 36). Increasing 
transnational political and economic interdependencies and challenge the traditional 
sovereignty concept. However, the greatest challenge for classical sovereignty is 
European integration (Nuernberger, 2010: 6). 
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual Challenges to Sovereignty by 
the Transnational European Constitution 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‚National sovereignty is, more often than not, taken for granted’ (Heartfield, 2009: 713). 
 
Sovereignty is one of the constitutional features that are traditionally associated with 
nation state constitutionalism and thus with the concept of the constitution. The modern 
sense of the constitution refers to  
 
‚a document that sets out the fundamental principles of the governing order and the fundamental 
rights of citizens as against the state, in legally unmediated norms of the highest rank. In the 
context of traditional expectations, whoever speaks of a constitution speaks of sovereign states. 
However, the opening of states and the search for legal and political forms and for future-
oriented cultural concepts for the global economy no longer permit insistence on the classical 
concept of the constitution as the expression of state autonomy manifested by a nation’ (Roeben, 
2004: 345). 
 
However, considering the effects that European integration had on the expression of 
political authority in Member States, it seems questionable if the conceptual features of 
sovereignty can still be applied to European constitutionalism. The classical theory of 
sovereignty understands sovereignty as indivisible and unrestricted and as a singular and 
unified feature. Consequently, it is no wonder that scholars see this conception 
challenged by recent developments in globalisation and regional integration (Marquardt, 
1994: 632; Rudolph, 2005: 2f.). Although the academic literature now widely regards 
classical sovereignty as contested by European integration, the solutions suggested so far 
seem to miss the actual problem and thus remain inconclusive. The reason for that is that 
many of the analyses employ a concept of classical sovereignty to research political 
authority in European constitutionalism and thus reproduce the fallacy of blind 
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conceptual transfer. For it is exactly the new form of multidimensional and multilevel 
political authority in Europe that has transcended the Westphalian form of sovereign 
authority and therefore challenged the classical concept of how to understand and think 
about it. That is why a one-to-one transfer of the sovereignty concept to the European 
context is flawed by traditional assumptions of sovereignty that are inapplicable in 
European constitutionalism. Any analysis based on such erroneous assumptions and 
conceptual inaccuracy inevitably produces inconclusive results.  
The previous chapter has already indicated that some of the ‘inherited meanings of 
sovereignty make it an unsuitable organizing principle of non-state political 
organizations’ (Kostakopoulou, 2002: 144). Especially the notions of indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty are highly affected by the European legal-political order, especially 
when the relation between European and national legal orders is concerned. As 
mentioned before, indivisibility of sovereignty encompasses two claims: the first means 
that there is only one supreme source of authority within a given realm. The second 
means that this supreme authority lies within one person or institution (Morris, 1998: 
198f., 204f.). In European constitutionalism the issue at stake is how and to what extent 
the transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the European level has 
transformed classical sovereignty. Has it been shifted? Has it been divided? Or has it 
been lost? The answers to these questions are varied. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that by forming a supranational authority which is constitutionally distinct from 
Member States constitutions a transfer of such sovereignty rights has taken place. On the 
other hand, it could also be claimed that Member States have remained sovereign, 
without any transfer of sovereignty rights, by just founding an international organisation 
to pursue their policy goals in a more effective way. Therefore, instead of having 
transferred sovereignty Member States would in fact observe their obligations emanating 
from the Treaties (Jackson, 1999: 450ff.). These two different point of views reflect 
opposite perspectives on the reason of the validity of European law. Does European law 
owe its validity to the Member States or is it valid by its own means? Is the European 
Union a derivate of the Member States who remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ or is it 
an organisation sui generis independent from Member States? The aspect of validity is 
vital here since it directly refers to the very nature of political authority within the 
European Union and thus the configuration of sovereignty. The issue of authority 
becomes manifest in cases of conflict between national and European law and in the 
subsequent question which law takes primacy in such conflict: European law or Member 
State constitutional law? In the first part of this chapter (1) it will be shown that classical 
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approaches, based on a traditional understanding of indivisible and unitary sovereignty, 
take opposite stances. One argues for European Constitutional Supremacy (ECS), 
meaning that European law precedes national constitutional law (1a), while the other 
argues for National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) and thus sees national 
constitutional law as the prevailing law (1b). However, both approaches draw on the 
same assumption of indivisible and unitary sovereignty which in many ways is 
inadequate for European constitutionalism (1c). It will be elaborated that the reason why 
traditional indivisible and unitary sovereignty is an unsuitable concept in this context is 
the fact that European integration transcends the classical sovereignty perspective on the 
relationship between European and national law (2). In particular the question if 
European law has emancipated from its original legal foundation is of greatest 
importance (2a). It will be shown that such emancipation has taken place through the 
processes of European transnationalisation (2b) and European constitutionalization (2c). 
Accordingly, the features of indivisible and unitary sovereignty in the classical concept 
have been challenged by European constitutionalism in three particular ways (3). Firstly, 
the preliminary rulings procedure has generated multiple levels of authority – as 
opposed to a single level of authority as in classical sovereignty (3a). Secondly, the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect of European law have established multiple 
sources of authority – in contrast to a single source of authority as in traditional 
sovereignty (3b). Thirdly, new non-hierarchical forms of authority relations transcend 
strict hierarchy as implied by the classical concept of sovereignty (3c). It will be finally 
concluded that sovereignty as a concept is still meaningful for European 
constitutionalism and thus does not need to be abandoned. This is because sovereignty is 
about the configuration of political authority – and in the European constitution we can 
indeed find political authority - authority and sovereignty are therefore far from being 
lost in Europe. However, the European architecture of political authority comes in a way 
that is in contrast to the features of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. That is why those 
features need to be revised in order to provide for a new European concept of 
sovereignty.  
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3.1  Classical approaches towards the relationship between 
national and European law 
 
‚In Canada, Germany and the United States, the (federal, A.B.) supremacy rule plays a much 
less prominent role in legal debates precisely because the hierarchical primacy of the 
constitution is firmly established. In the EU legal order, on the contrary, the hierarchical 
relationship between EU law and national law needs to be more heavily emphasized by the 
European Court and its supporters because the ultimate hierarchy of norms is not settled in 
favour of EU law’ (de Witte, 2012: 47). 
 
There are two contrasting perspectives on the relationship between European law and 
national constitutional law and on which one takes primacy in cases of conflict: 
European Constitutional Supremacy (ECS) vs National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) 
– the terminology has been introduced by Mattias Kumm (2005) and will be used 
throughout this thesis for it seems more concise than competing terminologies. It will be 
shown in the following that both perspectives provide for sound reasoning and thus 
seem equally plausible. However, the problem is that they are both based on reductionist 
assumptions that fall short of innovative legal developments in Europe and therefore can 
be regarded as equally implausible. 
 
 
3.1.1  European Constitutional Supremacy (ECS) 
 
ECS has been promoted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its adjudication. 
Supremacy of European law means that it determines its status in national legal orders 
and contains the ultimate source of authority. According to the ECJ’s reasoning, ECS is 
grounded in the principle of rule of law that requires an even application of European 
law throughout the Member States, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the 
autonomy of the European legal order. By promoting ECS the European court adopts an 
international law perspective which is grounded in two main aspects in order to justify 
the primacy of European law. The first is the international law doctrine pacta sunt 
servanda. That means that international law treaties must be observed by the contracting 
parties – including the obligation to respect the supremacy of treaty provisions over 
national law. This principle draws on the notion that the Member States have agreed 
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upon creating a new body of law and thus have the duty to oblige the treaties and their 
provisions. This includes that even the supremacy of a national constitutional provision 
cannot justify the non-obligation of the treaties. From the European perspective, the 
supremacy of European law as established by the ECJ precludes national constitutions as 
the supreme law of the land. Being a coherent and well-integrated legal system, it is 
inapt to ‘digest’ other supreme elements. That practically means that in the domestic 
sphere a conflict between national and international legal provisions is unproblematic 
and may remain unsolved; however, in the international arena such conflict cannot 
release states from their obligations. From this doctrine follows, that the Member States 
have accepted to obey the obligations arising from European law by signing the 
Founding Treaties (Ludwikowski, 2001: 268, 295; Kwiecien, 2005: 1481). 
The problem with this approach is that – according to the ECJ’s very own ruling in Van 
Gend en Loos20 – the Community is no longer a classical order of international law and 
thus its doctrines do no longer apply. This approach therefore offers only ‘poor 
legitimation’ for European Union power (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 373f.).  
The European legal order has been constituted by international treaties. Therefore its 
original legitimization through international law is ‘very plain and visible.’ Although 
originally dependent on ‘external’ international law, from an internal point of view 
European law can be seen as an independently valid and autonomous legal order. That 
means that the European Union is entitled to the established practice that judicial organs 
of international organisations have jurisdiction to determine their competences by 
interpreting their founding treaties. This jurisdiction also includes the competence to 
declare the organisation’s actions invalid, for instance due to lack of competence 
(Weiler/ Haltern, 1996: 428f.). And even if the European legal order were not 
independently valid, this would be no reason to treat the European norms as less 
constitutional than national constitutional law. On the European level, there are legal 
norms that constitute and empower respective organs and there are doctrines and legal 
principles. All these qualify as a ‘fairly thick body of law ‘ that is ‘fully constitutional in 
any reasonable interpretation of ‘constitution’’ (MacCormick, 1997: 337). 
The second aspect adopted by the ECJ is that the European legal order was separate 
from national legal orders. According to the ECJ’s Foto Frost21 decision in 1987, EU 
law is valid because it is a separate legal order and must be supreme due to the principle 
of rule of law requiring even application and effect of European law throughout all 
                                                       
20 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62 ECR 1. 
21 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck–Ost C-314/85 1987. 
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Member States. It is therefore valid regardless from the criteria given by the Member 
States legal orders. The ECJ regards the Treaties at the top of the hierarchy of rules 
(Dyevre, 2005: 180; Kwiecien, 2005: 1481). However, the weakness in the ECJ’s 
reasoning is that being a separate legal system does not necessarily mean that it is also 
independent from the Member States constitutions. It could be argued that European law 
owes its existence to the founding treaties, those to international law and hence to the 
legal orders of the Member States. Thus the European legal system is not self-sustaining 
but somewhat dependent on other legal systems – the Treaties therefore do not constitute 
an independent legal order or separate basic norm. There is rather a dependent 
relationship between the national and European legal orders. Furthermore, the intention 
to create a separate legal order is nowhere indicated in the Treaties – this was in fact 
established by the ECJ (Hartley, 2001: 226ff.). This judicial activism can be questioned 
as it has constructed the Treaties in a ‘constitutional mode rather than employing the 
traditional international law methodology.’ Stein (1981) for instance is rather sceptical 
about this ‘fragile jurisdictional base’ and concluded the Court has ‘arrogated to itself 
the ultimate authority to draw the line between Community law and national law’ (Stein, 
1981: 1).  
The shift to ECS as postulated by the ECJ means a significant re-distribution of political 
power between political actors. And this particularly concerns the question about the 
ultimate source of sovereignty - as most obviously shown by the jurisprudence of 
national constitutional courts. Any court accepting ECS would cede its authority as the 
ultimate interpreter of the law applicable in its jurisdiction (Kumm, 2005: 279ff.). 
Particularly in Germany, where classical constitutional sovereignty is jealously defended 
by the highest court, the struggle for accommodating national constitutional supremacy 
with practical ECS has been the main issue in the FCC’s adjudication concerning the 
status of European law in Germany. However, the FCC as well as several constitutional 
courts of Member States have not accepted ECS, but ‘established a fine-tuned legal 
balance between the requirements of European integration and State sovereignty’ which 
has not been a ‘smooth harmonization’, but led to a ‘peaceful co-existance’ (de Witte, 
1995: 161) in practical terms, but ultimately relies on the national constitution as the 
highest source of authority. 
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3.1.2  National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) 
 
Contrary to the ECJ postulating the supremacy of European law above all Member State 
law, some scholars (Kwiecien 2005) and some Member States constitutional courts, 
especially the German FCC, have argued against European Constitutional Supremacy 
and promoted National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) instead. Their arguing 
particularly refers to the principle of conferral according to which European law 
supremacy can only be conditional in a sense that it has been ‘granted’ by the Member 
States constitutions. 
Against the ECJ’s monist approach it has been held that the autonomy of the European 
legal order does not logically entail supremacy. Instead, any supremacy of European law 
had its origins in the consent of the states and thereby the principle of conferral and thus 
in the Member States constitutions. According to this point of view, the conferral of 
sovereign powers – manifested through a Member State act of assent – is a reversible act 
(as has been argued in the German FCC’s Lisbon judgment) and therefore sovereignty 
remains within the Member States. Consequently – and opposite to the ECS perspective 
– Europe derives its powers from the Member States and has no competence-
competence and cannot autonomously define its competences, actions and policy goals. 
It only has the powers and the capacity to act within areas that have been assigned to it 
through the Treaties or their amendments (Piris, 1999: 567). This shift of powers to the 
European level, however, has not yielded a loss of sovereignty on the Member State 
level. With regard to the ‘internal’ or ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty dimension, capacity 
means the monopolisation of positive law by the sovereign (national) legal order and 
accordingly, the capacity to act within the national borders. In its external sovereignty 
dimension capacity refers to the autonomy of the national legal order and the capacity to 
act in the international arena. Hereby, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated 
in its Wimbledon decision in 1923 that the obligations imposed on states by international 
treaties are not infringing sovereignty but are its very attribute (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 
2004: 743; Dyevre, 2005: 176). Accordingly, the obligations of international treaty law 
do not diminish the capacity of political decision-making authorities. However, the basic 
idea of all Member States constitutions is that ultimate authority lies within the national 
constitution and that only limited powers can be transferred to the European level. Those 
delimited powers and the permissible level of integration have been established by the 
highest courts, the most prominent here is the Maastricht decision of the German FCC 
(Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 744). Here the German FCC sees seven criteria to conclude 
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that sovereignty is hold within the national constitution and that the European Union 
lacks competence-competence and thus ‘full’ capacity and sovereignty: (1) the Member 
States remain the Masters of the Treaties as every delegation of competences is subject 
to unanimous approval and procedures of constitutional ratification. (2) The 
competence-competence remains within the Member States. (3) The Union’s 
competences are mainly limited to the economic field, core spheres of state sovereignty 
such as defence, foreign policy and internal affairs are subjects of intergovernmental 
cooperation. (4) The Maastricht Treaty does not infringe state sovereignty as substantial 
powers remain within national institutions. (5) Democratic legitimacy derives mainly 
from the national level. (6) The EU has no legal personality.22 (7) Ultimate supremacy 
lies within the national constitutions (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 745f.).  
From all this it could be concluded that there was no genuine European political 
authority and hence no European sovereignty. Due to the principle of conferral and 
therefore the lack of competence-competence on the European level the EU’s powers are 
originally and inherently limited and thus the Member States’ sovereignty remains 
untouched (Hartley, 1999: 160; Preuss, 1999: 420). Though the nation state’s capacity to 
act as the primary administrative, legal and political power may have been weakened, 
there was no ground to reason, however, that there has been a demise of the nation-state 
as such (Bellamy/ Castiglione, 1997: 422). 
According to the NCS point of view, the derivate nature of the EU’s authority and 
powers preclude its ability to trump national law, unless a national constitutional 
provision authorises such. NCS therefore means that the national constitutions, more 
precisely the ‘opening’ or ‘integration’ clauses, are the basis for European law validity. 
In other words: national constitutional law determines the status of EU law within the 
national legal order. The validity of the domestic legal rule governing the supremacy of 
EU law depends on the national constitution - eventually that means the last say about 
EU law supremacy and possible limits remains with the national constitution (Hartley, 
2001: 243). Member state law is not dependent on European law, therefore it is the 
Member State law that governs the application of European law but not a provision of 
European law itself (Hartley, 2001: 239). Accordingly, the primacy of European law is 
determined by the decision of the Member States to transfer powers to the EU. The 
exercise of such powers, transferred by a process that was in compliance with the 
national constitution, is valid even if it is conflicting with national constitutional 
                                                       
22 After the Lisbon Treaty the European Union has legal personality. 
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provisions.23 Even though, the supremacy given to European law by the Member States 
is rather restricted since Member State courts have established reservations that exempt 
certain provisions from European law primacy: constitutional rights, ‘Kompetenz-
Kompetenz’ and ultra vires enactment of European legal acts, and specific provisions of 
Member States constitutions (Grimm, 1997: 230; Kumm, 2005: 263 f.; Kwiecien, 2005: 
1485; Ludwikowski, 2001: 281f.). In conclusion, NCS allows for supremacy of 
European law. However, this supremacy is not generated by the nature of European law 
but ‘by grace’ of Member States. 
By promoting NCS, a traditional concept of unitary and indivisible sovereignty is 
adopted in order to justify that ultimate supremacy belongs to the national constitutions. 
According to this view, which has been frequently reiterated by the highest national 
courts, the legal actors in Member States apply European legal norms not because they 
regard them as legally authoritative by themselves, but because certain provisions of the 
national legal order that function as opening clauses validate those European norms. 
Thus European norms are valid by virtue of the national constitution, not by the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. The opening clause has incorporated EU law – thus any primacy of the 
latter is also by virtue of the constitution. The European Union is regarded as an 
international organisation of states, founded on international treaties concluded between 
those states. Although the Union entails supranational elements, its authority to exercise 
power and competences derives from and is limited by the Treaties. Because the 
European Union is a common project of the Member States, the latter take ‘normative 
priority’ (Ryan, 2004: 173) over the EU’s autonomy or independence. Accordingly, the 
EU is regarded as a recipient of sovereign powers that were transferred from the 
Member States and that ultimately remain at their disposal. According to this approach, 
the Member States are and remain the Masters of the Treaties as they decide upon the 
transfer of competences and powers to the European level. Due to the principle of 
conferral the Member States are the ultimate resort of power and sovereignty - the 
Union, however, has no inherent powers and competence-competence and hence no 
sovereign authority. The problem with rendering EU law supreme due to national 
                                                       
23 By acknowledging the possibility that states make law opposing international treaty 
obligations, the ECJ in van Gend regarded international law and state sovereignty as 
opposing each other in certain cases and that the Member States had retained their state 
sovereignty under the EEC treaty – otherwise, elaborating a rule of precedence would have 
been unnecessary. Thus the court’s special focus on the (conflicting) law-making powers of 
the Member States can be interpreted as a ‘tribute to state sovereignty.’ Also, the 
preliminary ruling procedure can be regarded as a ‘national, or constitutional, language of 
precedence as opposed to the international language of bindingness’ (Spiermann, 1999: 
773f.). 
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constitutional provisions is that it may be justified by national constitutional law, but not 
by public international law (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 761; Crowe, 2008: 168f.; 
Dyevre, 2005: 179; Weiler/ Haltern, 1996: 413ff.).  
 
NCS as an approach towards the relationship between European and national 
constitutional law is in some ways unsound. Generally speaking, the arguments for NCS 
strongly resemble arguments related to democratic legitimacy. In liberal democracies, 
the supremacy of the constitution has been grounded on the idea of the people as the 
constituent power. Accordingly, NCS could be reasoned if, and only if, there was a 
European demos acting as such. NCS is understood as a defining feature of legal 
practice whereby legal decision-making means referring to the constitution as the 
ultimate source of authority. Hereby, there is a difference between the ultimate legal rule 
the practice actually follows and the ultimate legal rule it should follow. NCS as such an 
ultimate legal rule thus can be challenged within that practice (Kumm, 2005: 266ff., 
294).24 However, even when assuming that European institutions have no legislative 
competence-competence, it does not necessarily follow that the ECJ should not have 
judicial competence-competence to finally decide whether community legislation is in 
line with treaty provisions. It does not seem convincing why national (highest) courts 
should be privileged to act as such final arbiters (Weiler, 1999: 312). 
Additionally, NCS is often based on normative arguments justifying that ultimate 
sovereignty belongs to the Member States. It is argued that the ‘authorship’ of the 
Member States ‘commands respect’ as the democratic legitimacy of decision-making 
was significantly higher on the nation state level. A stronger political culture on the state 
level would favour Member State legal orders at the apex instead of the supranational 
EU level that lacks sufficient public identification. However, this ‘concern for 
democratic legitimacy’ suggesting Member States legal orders as the basis of European 
law is a ‘formal approach’ that authorises Member States primacy based on the text of 
the Treaties as the only source of power exercise in the European Union. From that point 
of view, EU institutions receive a ‘mandate’ from the Member States. However, such 
formalistic approach focuses only on the input side of democratic legitimacy but 
                                                       
24 The question which ultimate legal rule is to choose is not susceptible to legal resolution. 
The ultimate legal rule validating the whole legal system cannot be justified by referring to 
(another) validating rule. If there was such another rule, then the validating rule, not the rule 
validated by it, would be the ultimate legal rule. The choice for NCS or any other rule 
therefore has a decisionistic form and remains outside the scope of legal reasoning (Kumm, 
2005: 273). Kumm argues, that this decisionistic concept of choosing a rule is ‘incomplete’ 
and therefore requires an accompanying normative account of the best rule that provides 
guidance for the judges’ choice (Kumm, 2005: 274). 
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disregards the output side. This output side of legitimacy has always been a major 
argument for international organisations and their contracting members as they achieve 
certain policy goals in a more effective way than by merely domestic action and thus 
enhance the legitimacy of policies by their effectiveness. However, even Ryan himself 
admits that such a formal approach is purely positivist and leaves no room for criticising 
the outcomes of the current arrangement without concluding that the Member States 
should not have entered it. Criticism based on the assumption that outcomes could or 
should be different – depending on normative or functional assumptions – within the 
actual order, does not leave much room in this formal approach (Ryan, 2004: 173ff.). 
Furthermore, such strictly formal approach that mainly focuses on written legal 
provisions falls short of the complex legal architecture of the European Union whose 
Treaties are one – among others – sources of (primary) law. Applying a conventional 
national law method and focusing on one source only seems neither imperative nor 
appropriate for analysing the specific political and legal configuration of the European 
Union and its distinctive features. Therefore it can be concluded that normative 
democratic theory and a formalistic approach do not justify the Member States 
constitutions and their integration clauses as the basis for the validity of European law.  
 
 
3.1.3  The inadequacy of the classical perspectives 
 
However, the analytical shortcoming of either classical perspective, ECS versus NCS, is 
that they only address the question about the original founding basis of European law 
and its status within national (constitutional) law. However, they do not recognise 
substantial effects of legal-political European integration on the Member States and the 
innovative legal developments of European constitutionalism that go far beyond the 
grasp of classical sovereignty approaches. 
First of all, the European Treaties have imposed substantial restrictions on the Member 
States’ own competence-competence. The Treaties go far beyond classical international 
treaties - this particularly by establishing qualified majority voting, the Commission’s 
almost exclusive right to initiate legislation in areas where the Member States have lost 
their sovereign rights, the directly elected European Parliament that shares the right of 
co-decision with the Council and the independent Court of Justice. European law is 
binding, supreme and sometimes has direct effect without any action of national 
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authorities. Furthermore, the Treaties contain some elements of a constitution such as 
organising government, rule of law, individual rights and their protection (Piris, 1999: 
559ff.). Hence the Member States’ national legal autonomy – an unlimited power of 
national authorities to legislate within their territory – has been significantly constrained 
by the Treaty ratifications whose substantial and practical impacts on the Member States 
go far beyond the treaty obligations of classical international law. National legal orders 
are now bound to comply with European law within the scope of the mutually agreed 
treaty obligations. Within this framework the Member States also lost absolute sovereign 
authority as it is now dispersed across both the European and the national level. The 
autonomous competence-competence of Member States thus has been qualified. 
Accordingly, a case of conflict between national and European law cannot be resolved 
by simply alleging absolute legal or constitutional autonomy residing within the 
Member States. Consequently, it seems more advisable that European law is supposed to 
loose its direct applicability and binding force by a declaration of the ECJ, not by 
unilateral action of Member States. Otherwise the character of ‚Community’ law would 
be entirely lost and the legal basis of the Community itself would be questioned 
(Mueller-Graff, 2005: 4ff.).  
A second analytical problem with these classical approaches is that both ECS and NCS, 
however, do not consider the possibility that European law may have developed in a 
way that it has emancipated from its original founding basis. The question about the 
original basis of European law is independent from the question about the possibility 
that European law has constitutionalised and legally transformed and therefore may have 
acquired features that are fundamentally different from its original character. According 
to the classical perspectives ECS vs NCS, there must be one ultimate source of authority 
and hence one institution where this final authority is vested in. However, when taking a 
look at the developments in the legal and political configuration in the European Union, 
it appears that taking a stance for either ECS or NCS both seems justifiable. There are 
valid reasons for justifying either one or the other point of view but no approach seems 
ultimately convincing.  
Both ECS and NCS provide an account of ‘either or’ in order to explain the character of 
the European legal order. The results of such ‘either or’ approach seem dissatisfying as 
the choice for one always loses sight of parts of the other. This is because both 
perspectives miss an essential feature of the European polity: its multilevel architecture 
that integrates both the national and the European level into a multilevel constitutional 
architecture. That means, with regard to the source and location of authority it can be no 
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longer a matter of ‘either or’ but ‘both.’ Accordingly, the classical perspectives of ECS 
and NCS that both draw on a notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty are no longer 
suitable for the European legal order. Here we have indeed witnessed a transition of the 
Westphalian understanding of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Today’s political 
constellation is rather ‘post-Westphalian’ in a way that we no longer find mutually 
exclusive nation state domains, but overlapping transnational spaces due to globalisation 
and constitutional pluralism (Walker, 2002: 18). Especially the transfer of competences 
to the European Union has led to what is widely regarded as a significant ‘erosion’ of 
classical sovereignty within the Member States. However, the significant transfer of 
powers to the European level does not mean that the European Union has become a 
sovereign state itself. Applying the traditional concepts of sovereign nation-statehood to 
European governance without modification leads to the ‘erroneous assumption’ that the 
EU aspires statehood. However, there seems no sufficient ground for arguing that 
European integration would ‚naturally’ lead to statehood. By European integration and 
Europeanization supreme power, government, territory, population and capacity for 
international action are now distributed among multiple levels of governance and no 
longer exclusively vested in one level. Most obviously this can be observed in the 
following: EU institutions issue more than half of the Member States’ legislation, EU 
law is practically recognised as the supreme law of the land, state territory becomes less 
important due to the abolition of border controls and market freedoms, multi-national 
people hold EU citizenship and Europe has broad competences for international action. 
It is clear that the Member States no longer possess ‘full’ sovereignty in the classical 
sense. As a consequence, the traditional understanding of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty as suggested by both ECS and NCS appears outdated. 
 
The developments in the European political and legal architecture are in fact contrasting 
the classical perspective of ECS vs NCS. Over the years, EU law has been penetrating 
national legal orders in away that makes it more difficult to uphold national 
constitutional doctrines in cases of conflicts with European law (Kumm, 2005: 285). 
Through internationalization and supranationalism the distinction between national and 
international law has become less sharp (Ludwikowski, 2001: 262). National, 
supranational, international and local legal structures are rather overlapping and 
intertwined with each other which makes a clear distinction of authorities impossible. 
Instead of being either monist or dualist, the entire global legal system seems now rather 
multi-focal. The factual ‘death of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty’, though 
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disregarded by courts such as the FCC, has caused the demise of the classical 
sovereignty concept (Ludwikowski, 2001: 253f.).  
From this follows that European integration cannot be explained alongside the 
traditional lines of international organisations vs national constitutionalisms. This is 
especially because the degree of handing over powers to the European level is 
unprecedented and has taken place in areas that are considered the core of state 
sovereignty. It cannot be denied that European law has its origin in international law 
treaties. The adoption, ratification and amendments of those international law treaties, 
however, are governed by the Member States’ legal orders (MacCormick, 1999: 131). 
Although the EU was founded by treaties governed by international law, it has 
developed in a way that it is now governed by constitutional law (Pernice, 2010: 13). 
Through decades of innovative development the European legal order now constitutes a 
‘full-blown’ distinct legal order as there has been an institutionalisation of a legal order 
under the founding treaties and the preservation of the acquis communautaire. 
Additionally, there are long-established European law-making, executive and judicial 
organs that have operated effectively and efficaciously over a substantial period of time 
(MacCormick, 1999: 131). Furthermore, European law application and enforcement 
relies to a great extent on Member State institutions; thus it is both normatively and 
politically dependent on Member States law and practice (MacCormick, 1999: 132). 
Although the supremacy rule has a ‘federal flavour’ it does not distinguish European law 
from international law. It can be rather described as a ‘creative development’ of 
international law (de Witte, 2012: 48). Although there is not a single characteristic that 
distinguishes European law from international law, the combination of all its innovative 
features moves it beyond classical international law. These features are the broad 
competences extending into virtually all policy areas; a common currency and a 
common citizenship; the acceptance of the Member States to abandon their competences 
in the areas of exclusive EU competence; a decision-making regime involving 
institutions not controlled by the Member States as well as majority voting; the 
mechanism of enforcing state compliance; and national courts obeying their duty to 
apply European law. The combination of these features ‘is indeed unique and makes it 
seem somewhat odd or artificial to discuss the European Union as an example of an 
international organisation’ (de Witte, 2012: 50).  
Lastly, the contracting Member States are facing the practical claim by the ECJ that 
European law constitutes an autonomous and independent legal order. Here it can be 
argued that international treaty law has been used only as an instrument to establish an 
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autonomous and independent political authority on the European level (Pernice, 1999: 
5). This claim is different from classical international law as the latter entitles the 
contracting parties to determine the status of international law in their domestic legal 
orders. The European legal order, however, is more than international law and more than 
the integration clauses of national constitutional law. This new form of transnational 
European law is different from international law in a way, that it has moved away from 
being an ‘old order’ (see Van Gend en Loos) of international law that reasons the 
legitimate authority of the EU with the doctrine pacta sunt servanda (only). Therefore a 
purely ‘internationalist’ approach offers as much ‘poor legitimation’ and explanation for 
the power of the European Union and the validity of European law as does a purely 
national constitutionalist approach (Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 373f.; Albi/ van 
Elsuwege, 2004: 756; Kostakopoulou, 2002: 145; Walker in Walker, 2003: 9f.; Werner/ 
de Wilde, 2001: 303f.).  
Considering all the above, it can be concluded that it is impossible to integrate both the 
constitutional and international law features of the European order when applying either 
ECS or NCS as an analytical perspective. The fusion of both international and 
constitutional law features is indeed a constitutive element in the European legal order – 
therefore we require an approach that does not account for ‘either or’, but is capable of 
integrating both constitutional and international law aspects. Consequently, such 
approach cannot be ECS or NCS since both perspectives are analytically inadequate to 
account for the transnational characteristics of the European legal order. Consequently, 
an alternative concept is needed that encompasses the EU’s international and 
constitutional law features and that particularly focuses on its innovative and distinct 
transnational characteristics (de Witte, 2012: 51). This becomes even more obvious in 
the light of European developments that have transcended the classical distinction 
between international and national constitutional law. However, which processes have 
led to the transformation of the legal-political architecture in Europe and therefore 
outdated the classical perspectives on the relationship between European and national 
law? What excactly are the European challenges to the classical concept of indivisible 
and unitary sovereignty? In the following it will be elaborated how two particular 
phenomena of European legal development – transnationalisation and 
constitutionalisation – have challenged the classical notion of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty. 
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3.2  European integration transcending the classical 
perspective on the relationship between European and 
Member State law 
 
‚It is hard to find a field where the end of the sovereign state has been more often proclaimed 
than in the field of European integration’ (Werner/ de Wilde, 2001: 302). 
 
3.2.1  The question of emancipation 
 
The fallacy of the classical competing perspectives ECS vs NCS is that they do not 
envisage the possibility of legal-institutional development – such as transnationalisation 
and constitutionalisation – of Europe. They only focus on the origin of the legal basis for 
European law but do not consider the question whether European law has possibly 
emancipated from its original foundation. The dilemma seems that both lines of 
argument – the international law and the constitutional law approach – seem reasonable 
though mutually exclusive. Taking side for either one or the other perspective appears to 
be a matter of normative preferences instead of conceptual reasoning. This is because 
both approaches take an ‘either or’ stance by assuming an indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty concept which can be employed to identify one ultimate source of political 
authority vested in one single institution. However, what is blinded out in this reasoning 
is the possibility of establishing multiple sources of political authority by the process of 
legal-institutional transformation of the European polity. 
There can be no doubt that the law of the European Union originates in the Founding 
Treaties constituting an international organisation at that time. However, it is disputable 
whether until today the European Union has ‘emancipated’ itself from this international 
law origin by a process of constitutionalization and is hence governed by its own 
constitutional law instead of being still governed by an international law foundation with 
the Member States at the sovereignty core of the European Union. The two classical 
perspectives, however, cannot account for this question as to whether European law has 
developed in a way that it is now emancipated from its original founding basis as they 
can only provide for an analytical ‘either or’-perspective. This is because they mainly 
draw on the question to what extent the European political architecture has been 
independent. Here, some scholars regard the institutional bases of the EU and its powers 
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as autonomous and independent from Members State control in some policy areas 
(Stone Sweet, 2004: 17); whereas others see Europe originally constituted by the 
Founding Treaties and thus its constitutional definition and limits established through 
those treaties between Member States (MacCormick, 1996: 555). Another argument 
suggests that although there is no sufficient legal justification for the European order to 
be separate, it should be assumed to be separate in order to account for sovereignty. 
Here, Hartley (1999) argues that the reasoning of the ECJ that European law is a 
separate legal order actually made it also separate from international law, especially 
when considering the subsequent developments in the court’s jurisprudence. However, 
although the ECJ may have established this as a political fact, there is no sufficient legal 
justification for this conclusion. According to Hartley, it is advisable just to assume that 
European law is separate from international law in order to assess the question of 
sovereignty. Accordingly, the Founding Treaties could be considered both international 
and European law, whilst secondary European legislation and the principles of its legal 
order as established by the ECJ case law are merely European law (Hartley, 1999: 139). 
The argument of Hartley (1999), however, provides a vivid illustration about arbitrary 
argumentative manoeuvring when trying to answer the question about autonomy or 
dependency of European law. He suggests that, considering the Treaty amendment 
procedures, it can be argued that European law positively emancipated from its 
international law basis, as there are no restrictions (explicit or implied) to be found for 
the amendment of the Treaties. Furthermore, the ECJ has proven its ability to develop 
European law against the clear wording of the Treaties and the intentions of its authors. 
Finally, even if the formal amendment procedure would be omitted, the amendment 
would still be valid and not be challenged by the ECJ. Thus it could be concluded that – 
concerning the amendment procedure – European law is independent from international 
law. However, Hartley argues that in terms of validity the European legal order is 
separate but not independent since it owes its existence to other national legal systems 
(Hartley, 1999: 142ff.). He regards this as a compelling reason to conclude that 
‘Community law is an essentially dependent system of law. It is not valid in its own 
right, but owes its validity to international law and the legal systems of the Member 
States. Ultimately, it is controlled by the Member States (…) The Member States remain 
sovereign’ (Hartley, 1999: 179). 
It does not even help to take a look at the jurisprudence of the European court who could 
be expected to shed light on the question if European law is international law or 
something else. But not even the ECJ has provided a clear answer but rather seems to 
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circumvent a consistent account for it. Although in van Gend en Loos in 1963, the ECJ 
described European law as a ‘new legal order of international law’, one year later in 
Costa vs ENEL it concludes that in ‘contrast with ordinary international treaties, the 
EEC Treaty has created its own legal system’ (Hartley, 1999: 131ff.). Although the ECJ 
had concluded in those judgements that the European legal order is different from 
ordinary international treaty law, it, however, does not necessarily mean that European 
law is something else than international law. In van Gend the ECJ described the 
European legal order as ‘a new legal order of international law’, but dropped the last few 
words in Costa and described it just as ‘a new legal order.’ Accordingly there is no 
sufficient evidence that the ECJ had changed its view in the latter judgement as to not 
recognise EU law as something else than international law. Furthermore, the ECJ has 
never developed a doctrine of non-international law character of European law – it has 
emphasised its autonomy but never stated that it has ceased to be international law. Even 
in Kadi 2008, the ECJ again stressed the autonomy of EU law but did not see anything 
else than international law (de Witte, 2012: 38ff.).  
 
It has become more than obvious that the classical perspectives are incapable of 
providing conclusive and consistent accounts when it comes to the question of 
emancipation. Especially when taking a closer look on the institutional design of the 
European Union, even at its beginning as the European Communities, and its legal 
developments over time, it is clear that the classical ‘either or’ approaches are unable to 
grasp the characteristic features of the European legal order. The relationship between 
national and European law can hardly be framed as either autonomy or dependency 
since any autonomy of a legal system is always relative. Even if European law is 
regarded as systemically autonomous, this would not mean that such autonomy could be 
equated to a detachment from its original treaty basis and vice versa (Moellers, 2010: 
183). As mentioned before, it is undoubted that the European Union began as a 
traditional multilateral treaty, thus the origin of European law is to be found in 
international law and its principles. The European legal order was originally not 
designed as a constitution but as a treaty. Treaties are different from constitutions in a 
way that they are not treated as higher law and their interpretation is subject to canons. 
They devise checks and balances to control the powers of the organisation they set up in 
order to leave state sovereignty untouched. This is most obvious in two of the 
characteristics of the Community’s founding treaties: first, the Treaties do not establish a 
human rights protection scheme for the individuals affected by the treaty, and second, 
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they do not stipulate a constitutional right to European citizenship. However, as an 
international organisation the Community has always been peculiar and already 
distinctive from classical international law. That was because of its unique institutional 
structure and unprecedented legislative and judicial powers: the Member States 
accepting the jurisdiction of the ECJ to resolve disputes over Community law; the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ on Community law involved in domestic cases via the 
preliminary rulings procedure; and the Community issuing directly applicable legislative 
acts. However, these novel features do not necessarily justify the conclusion that the 
contracting parties intended to create more than a sub-system of international law, 
although the ECJ has taken a different point of view (Mancini, 2000: 1f.; Hartley, 1999: 
129ff.). In fact it can be argued that both is true: European law is dependent on national 
constitutional law but is also autonomous. This is because the validity of European law 
within a Member State and its application by national courts depend on the national 
constitutional law that has to recognise European law as valid by its own standards in 
order for European law to enter into force. In other words: the recognition of European 
law depends on another legal system - however, at the same time this recognition is only 
possible when European law is considered to have validity on its own. It can also be 
argued that even if a legal order was created by another legal order, this would not 
preclude the possibility that the new legal order could possibly emancipate from its 
founding legal order. Acknowledging this possibility, the decisive analytical question 
then would be: Has European law gained independence from its original founding basis? 
From all this follows that the classical approaches that draw on an indivisible and 
unitary notion of final political authority are inadequate for assessing the relationship 
between European and national constitutional law since they can only provide an 
account for ultimate supremacy of either European or national constitutional law – 
which is exactly the feature that has been transcended by European legal-political 
integration. Instead the classical approaches seek to reduce this relationship to the 
founding basis of European law. However, reducing the question if European law is 
either international law or constitutional law to a question about autonomy versus 
dependency seems in fact like a dead end. Such approach cannot account for subsequent 
developments in the European legal architecture that may emancipate the European legal 
order from its original legal basis and thus may have created a new form of political 
authority (and hence sovereignty) that transcends the strict hierarchy of political 
authority as suggested by ECS (autonomy of European law) versus NCS (dependency of 
European law). In the following, we will take a look to the specific legal-political 
 132 
developments in the European Union that are responsible for transcending the classical 
configuration of final political authority and thus the respective classical concepts to 
identify ultimate supremacy. 
 
 
3.2.2  Transnationalisation 
 
‚Transnational law works itself like a drill through the few remaining blanket covers hastily 
thrown over an impoverished and internally decaying conceptual body’ (Zumbansen, 2008: 
739). 
 
Transnationalism refers to ‘sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, 
affiliations and social formations spanning nation-states’ (Vertovec, 2009: 2). As a 
concept, transnationalism grasps linkages and exchanges among non-state actors across 
national borders (Vertovec, 2009: 3). Transnationalism and transnationalisation hence 
describe a state and a process where cross-border or global relationships have been 
intensified and take place in a common, virtual arena of activity. However, there needs 
to be a considerable empirical degree of such transnationalisation before the theory of 
transnationalism can be applied; that means transnational phenomena are not singular 
cases on a low scale of activity but a completely new pattern of activity. Therefore the 
following conditions must be met: there need to be a significant number of actors 
involved; the activities and practices must be of certain stability and resilience over time 
and not be exceptional or occasional; and the content of these activities must not be 
captured by any concept that already exists. Nevertheless, theorizing about transnational 
developments often faces ‘conceptual muddling’ (Vertovec, 1999: 448) as social 
sciences research offers a wide range of perspectives on empirical studies of 
transnationalism, but hardly offers an overall and comprehensive concept. Competing 
concepts to analyse political organisation beyond the nation state are global, 
cosmopolitan, supra-state, supranational, international and transnational. The 
terminology of ‘transnational’ is yet preferable as it has less historical connotations than 
‘international’, does not imply a certain geographical space as ‘global’, does not include 
universalistic pretensions like ‘cosmopolitan’, and is generally inclusive of all the other 
terminologies. The transnational terminology integrates state and non-state actors 
operating on different territorial levels without re-enforcing classical dichotomies. 
Therefore it is capable to encompass the transcendation of the national across borders 
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and to bridge dichotomies. In this concept, states are regarded as a historically 
contingent phenomenon that is continuously contested instead of being ‘timeless 
essences’ (Anderson in Anderson 2002: 15f.; Portes et al. 1999: 219). Vertovic (1999) 
suggests that with regard to European integration the process of transnationalisation has 
taken place in six dimensions: first, transnationalisation as a social morphology or social 
formation; second, transnationalisation as a type of consciousness; third, 
transnationalisation as a mode of cultural reproduction; fourth, transnationalisation as an 
avenue of capital; fifth, transnationalisation as a site of political engagement, and finally 
transnationalisation as the (re-) construction of place or locality (Vertovic, 1999: 447ff.). 
However, regarding the focus of this thesis – the conceptual challenges for indivisible 
and unitary sovereignty emerging from European integration – one seventh dimension 
needs to be added: transnationalisation as an institutional transformation of law and 
politics. That means the process of transnationalisation has also meant a transformation 
of the European legal order into something beyond the conventional categories of 
international vs constitutional or private vs public law. Traditionally, the relation 
between individuals and the state has been governed by national constitutional law; and 
the relations between states by international law whilst both legal orders remain 
essentially distinct. The EC Treaty,25 however, was an international treaty entered into 
by states while, and unlike classical international treaty law, conferring rights and 
obligations on respective nationals. This transcendation of classical distinctions and the 
supranational elements of the European Union, the enforcement mechanisms established 
by the Treaties and the landmark decision of the ECJ Van Gend en Loos in 1963, mean a 
transformation of a regional treaty with characteristics of traditional international law 
into a unique and innovative constitutional charter. The Treaty of Lisbon continues this 
process of establishing a transnational legal order based on individual rights and 
freedoms. Political spaces and authoritative decision making is no longer limited to the 
state, neither empirically nor analytically. Accordingly, the concept of transnational law 
as ‘methodological lens through which we can study the particular transformation of 
legal institutions in the context of an evolving complex society’ (Zumbansen, 2012: 307) 
is an ‚accurately fitting’ instrument to understand the form and substance of the 
European legal order. This new form of European transnational law challenges legal 
concepts that have developed alsongside the Westphalian order that has been centred on 
nation states relating to each other in accordance with the principle of sovereign 
                                                       
25 After the Treaty of Lisbon, the two prevailing treaties governing the European Union are 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU). 
 134 
equality. Transnational law, however, focuses on analogies between domestic and de-
nationalised spheres of activity as they have emerged in European integration with 
multiple norm-producing actors and rule makers. Accordingly, transnational European 
law is both domestic and international and neither. This in-between state of transnational 
law is highly visible in the fields of constitutional and administrative law, for instance 
the balances between public administration and private execution or between 
government and governance. Transnational law therefore allows for a parallel view on 
the traditionally distinct spheres of domestic and international jurisdiction. 
Transnationalisation therefore includes the role of borders or cross-border regimes 
respectively which are marginalised in traditional perspectives of international vs 
national law but in fact have been characteristic and constitutive in European 
integration. Transnational integration here was advanced by functional and economic 
integration and aimed at creating interdependencies in trade and production. Thus 
transnationalisation also employs a different logic of norm production. There is a 
principle of sectoral differentiation in operation that deploys its very own and specific 
logic of integration rather than overall principles of political or economic integration. 
This sectoral differentiation follows a logic of networking and generates its own rules. 
These private regimes of rule management differ from traditional hierarchical normative 
systems of the past. Such European transnational law also transcends the dichotomies 
between public and private international law since this concept entails all types of laws 
that regulate cases and events transcending national borders. Both public law and private 
law as well as categories that go beyond their scope are covered in legal 
transnationalisation. Euroepan law as transnational law is therefore not opposing the 
conventional ‘international vs national’ perspective – it is looking at legal integration 
from a different analytical angle and breaks down the dichotomy between domestic and 
international law by focusing on the parallels between both constellations. Transnational 
law illuminates the inseparability of issues underlying domestic vs international 
constellations. Herein lies its ‘subversive’ potential. It is capable of elucidating norm 
production processes in dispersed and fragmented (political) spaces. 
Transnationalisation of law is a multi-faceted and complex process that operates both 
vertically and horizontally. Consequently, transnational law is ‘something in between’ 
national and international law and comprises both public and private law. National 
political and legal systems become more permeable to other Member States. Hence in an 
era of transnationalisation, the regulatory practices of constitutional government are 
moved beyond their traditional organisational framework, i.e. the state. Therefore 
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European law can be seen as not totally different from, but a mutation of both 
constitutional and international law. In conclusion, as European legal 
transnationalisation has transcended the classical dichotomy of international vs national 
constitutional law it challenges their underlying notion of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty (Crowe, 2008: 173; Zumbansen, 2008: 738ff.; Ladeur, 2008: 159; Ladeur, 
2009: 1358ff.; O’Dowd in Anderson, 2002: 111f.; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 354; 
Wiener, 2007: 2). 
 
 
3.2.3  Constitutionalisation 
 
In addition to transnationalisation, also the process of constitutionalisation has 
challenged the classical perspectives on the relationship between European and national 
law and their underlying concept of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. According to 
the ‘constitutionalisation thesis’, the international law foundation of the Treaties has 
been transformed into a constitutional order by the judicial activism of the ECJ. The 
concept of constitutionalisation refers to ‘juridification of the political exercise of 
power’ and with particular regard to international law it means ‘developing autonomy of 
international regimes from intergovernmental action’ and thus the ‘gradual formation of 
a new legal level’ (Moellers, 2010: 195). Constitutionalisation of the Treaties therefore 
refers to a process that transformed EU law from an international legal arrangement 
binding upon states into a legal order that is vertically integrated and confers judicially 
enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities. This process is thus a 
transformation of an international organisation into a ‘partly domesticated system of 
governance founded on law directly applicable to individuals’ (Caporaso, 2002: 16). 
Accordingly, European law goes beyond the traditional dualism of international law 
where international treaty provisions become effective only when transposed through 
national law (transformation act). This, however, is no longer applicable to European 
law, especially regulations. Here an unmediated relationship between the Union and the 
individuals is constituted. Consequently, it is not accurate to argue that only the case law 
of the ECJ concerning direct applicability has initiated a process of constitutionalisation 
of European primary law. Individual citizens have been laid out as a subject of European 
law from the very outset, while the jurisprudence of the ECJ has increasingly 
strengthened the position of individuals over the years. Accordingly, the point triggering 
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the process of constitutionalization could be seen much earlier than when the ECJ 
started rendering individuals subject to European law – maybe even as early as 1945 
when political actors concluded that Europe cannot be composed only of nation states if 
future catastrophes were to be avoided (Pernice, 1999: 5). Hence the transformation act 
is not the only bridge connecting national and European law nor is it transforming 
European law into national law; it rather means one of many elements for national 
participation in the European constitution. Member States are thus no longer the masters 
of the treaties nor are they masters of their own constitutions (Pernice, 2004: 17ff.; 
Pernice, 1999: 3f.).  
Although it was led by the ECJ, constitutionalisation has been driven by deeper social, 
economic and political forces, especially by the linkages among private litigants, 
national courts and the ECJ. Hereby, the process of constitutionalisation has taken 
different dynamics: the creation of legislative and executive institutional structures, the 
establishment of a bureaucracy, the introduction of direct representation, and the 
establishment of an own legal order (Bellamy et al, 1995: 60). The newly developed 
constitutional features of the Treaties are supremacy, direct applicability, direct effect 
for both regulations and directives, pre-emption, the obligation of directive-conform 
interpretation and the mandatory reference procedure. These consitutional features of 
Europe are also subsumed under the term supranationality.26 There is no generally 
accepted legal definition of supranationality but two different approaches to it: an 
absolute and a relative one. The absolute notion of supranationality implies the 
competence on the supranational level to exert power without the consent of the 
Member States. Translated into legal terms, that means the existence of an autonomous 
legal order that is directly applicable or binding upon the Member States and enjoys 
                                                       
26 The European Union has introduced supranationality as a new mode of political association 
(Somek, 2001: 28). There are two different conceptions of supranationality: first, as a 
‘rational bypassing of democracy’, and second as ‘boundary patrol.’ The first draws on a 
system of negotiation among governments and a mode of problem-solving that is 
unavailable on the national level alone because the problems at stake are of transnational 
scope. By this, the reach of national politics is extended and thus democracy is enhanced, 
assumed that this bypassing coheres with the limits of national democratic governance 
(Somek, 2001: 29). According to the concept of boundary patrol, supranationality does not 
strive for unity or the demise of nation-states, but tames nation-states by submitting 
domestic politics to solidarity on the European level. Nation-states limit themselves in order 
to promote the values embodied in a community of states and thereby promote the common 
good of their own citizens. Nation-states are maintained by containing their abuses. The 
boundary patrol aims to secure the following three borders that can potentially be abused: 
first, the external boundaries of a state; second, the boundary between a nation and a state; 
and third, the social boundary between citizens and strangers (Somek, 2001: 33). 
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supremacy over conflicting national norms.27 It can be argued that the autonomy of 
European law, direct applicability and supremacy are legitimated by the combined treaty 
ratifications of the contracting parties in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. However, community institutions have no competence-competence, i.e. 
the power to create competences. In fact they have their roots in the national 
constitutions and are limited by the principle of conferral. That is why they do not 
dispose of powers created autonomously and independently – hence there is no absolute 
supranationality on the European level. However, direct applicability, autonomy and 
supremacy of European law constitute relative supranationality as a distinctive and 
unique feature of European law (Mueller-Graff, 2005: 1ff.; Mancini, 2000: 4ff.; Weiler, 
1999: 296). 
The ECJ developed the idea of a community constitution in line with its view that 
European law established a new legal order that is distinct from the law of the Member 
States. This constitution was conceived of deriving from the Treaties and containing 
norms that confer authority to create general norms to the Community legal bodies. 
Additionally, the constitution substantially delimits the law-creating authority of both 
Community and Member State institutions. The substantive norms are constituted by 
principles of the Treaties, principles stemming from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, guidelines derived from international treaties protecting 
human rights of which the Member States are signatories and from the ECHR. The main 
principles derived from the Treaties and developed by the ECJ are proportionality, legal 
certainty, equality and non-discrimination, legality or rule of law, cooperation, 
democracy, subsidiarity and transparency. The Constitutional Treaty will maintain the 
mixed constitutional authority that emanates from national polities and from European 
constitutionalism. The lack of a constituent power should not be conflated with a lack of 
normative authority. Ultimately, constitutional authority can be traced back to the 
Member States, but as it is exercised jointly at the European level, it follows that this 
level has both normative and political authority. The European constitution is not a 
constitution that ‘reigns supreme over the constitutional authority of the states’, but 
entails a commitment to constitutionalism as a form of power and government. 
Constitutional authority and constitutionalism in this sense are not the same (Maduro, 
2005: 352f.; Weyland, 2002: 19f.).  
                                                       
27 As established by the ECJ jurisprudence in Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
(6/64); Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62; 
Van Duyn v Home Office [1975] Ch. 358 (C-41/74); Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth 
Kamann v Land Nordrhein–Westfalen Case 14/83 [1984] ECR. 
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Accordingly, constitutionalisation has become far more than a thesis since it has caused 
significant legal-political impacts. The so-called thesis has entailed practical 
consequences as it has been the point of reference for further political, legal and 
jurisprudential developments. The specific dynamics and logics of the 
constitutionalisation of the European Union can be captured by the theoretical approach 
of constitutional synthesis as introduced by Fossum and Menendez (2011). This theory 
regards European constitutionalisation as a ‚process in which already established 
constitutional states integrate through constituional law. This is a process where 
participant states establish a supranational politcal community in which they become 
integrated without losing their institutional structure and identity’ (Fossum/ Menendez, 
2001: 45). The establishment of a European legal-politial order, however, has not 
followed a revolutionary or constitutional moment but the evolutionary logic that 
national constitutions ‚seconding’ to the European constitutional law. Also, this means 
that the legal developments were accompanied by institutional developments of the 
political infrastructure – that is why European constitutionalisation is not only a process 
of constitutionalising of the legal but also the political order(s). Lastly, European 
constitutionalisation has established a coherent (single) European constitution that 
consists of multiple institutional layers – thus European constitutionalisation has been 
based on pluralist and non-hierarchical institutional structures (Fossum/ Mendenez, 
2001: 45ff.). 
This constitutional sythesis has created significant real-life consequences and impacts in 
legal and political reality. Such impacts cannot be doubted and indeed has been helped 
by favourable circumstances: the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg and the neglect by the 
media as well as the ECJ’s judges’ enthusiastic attitude towards Europe, and two mighty 
allies, the European Commission and the national courts, the latter especially by the 
preliminary ruling procedure which rendered Community law effective and accepted 
throughout the Member States. The Commission has served as a ‘watchdog’ of Member 
States compliance to the Treaties and therefore has been most supportive to safeguarding 
the endeavours of the ECJ (Mancini, 2000: 1ff.). With regard to these developments the 
‘constitutionalisation thesis’ has shaped constitutional reality to a great extent and thus 
has become part of that reality. That is why the process of constitutionalisation has 
created a factual challenge to the sovereignty concept and has also been revolutionary 
for it has broken with traditional views and conceptions of the political organisation of 
societies and thus challenges the theories of states and constitutions and 
constitutionalism. Accordingly, European law can be regarded as a ‘mutation of 
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international law’ that has ‘transnationalised’ away from its origins in international 
treaty law towards constitutional law in a particular fashion beyond the nation-state. 
Within this transnational legal order, ‘(c)onstitutionalisation refers to the impact of the 
diffusion of the ECJ’s doctrines of supremacy and direct effect within national legal 
orders’ (Stone Sweet, 2004: 14). The constitutionalisation of the Treaties is supported by 
the transformation of the ECJ from a purely administrative court into a kind of 
constitutional court exercising judicial review over the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty law. Although such role of the court was not envisaged in the Treaties it has 
been developed on a case law basis over the years. By this adjudication, the ECJ 
developed the European law and its principles on a common law basis. The European 
legal architecture is ‘a legal system which eschews the classical dichotomy between 
international and national law’ by conferring rights upon individuals through 
international treaty law.28 Accordingly, constitutionalisation in the EU comprises both 
the evolving European level and the national levels of constitutional law. The European 
constitution thus builds on multilevel constitutionalism as an ‘interactive process of 
establishing, dividing, organizing, and limiting powers, involving national constitutions 
and the supranational constitutional framework, considered as two interdependent 
components of a legal system governed by constitutional pluralism instead of 
hierarchies’ (Pernice, 2009: 349f., 353; O’Neill, 1994: 8ff.; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 
354, 356). 
 
In conclusion, European law as a transnational and constitutional order beyond the 
nation state challenges the traditional concept of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. As 
a transnational legal order it breaks down the distinction between national vs 
international as well as public vs private law since it rather parallels the classical 
dichotomies. It has emerged from analogous dynamics inherent in both of the classical 
distinctive spheres of law and thus transcends the traditional distinctions between them. 
Accordingly, transnational European law is not fundamentally opposing the 
conventional categories but integrating them into a mutation of international law. This 
new form of transnationalised law is a multi-faceted phenomenon operating both 
vertically and horizontally. This process of legal transnationalisation has been 
accompanied by the process of European constitutionalisation. By this, European law 
has been transformed from international law into a vertically integrated, multilevel and 
transnational constitutional order. In the literature it is sometimes questioned whether 
                                                       
28 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62. 
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this process – led by the ECJ but grounded in deeper social, economic and political 
forces – could be based on a sound and consistent legal philosophy. However, the 
peculiar dynamics of constitutionalisation in Europe can indeed be captured by the 
theory of constitutional synthesis (Fossum/ Menendez 2011). European 
constitutionalisation understood this way had a major practical impact on both the 
European and Member States legal orders. Accordingly, the constitutionalisation of 
European law comprises both European and Member States constitutional law. This 
specific multilevel and multi-authority architecture of the transnational European 
constitution that features new forms on non-hierarchical relations between political and 
legal authorities, is fundamentally different from the classical concept of indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty.  
In Europe, the Member States have ‘broken sharply’ with the traditional Westphalian 
sovereignty concept of political authority since they have decided not to exclusively 
retain it on the Member State level but to pool sovereignty and transferred policy 
making authority to the European level without the possibility of vetoing subsequent 
policies (Keohane, 2002: 748). Unlike the membership in international organisations, 
the transnational and constitutional features of the European Union polity challenge the 
notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty as they in fact establish a new constellation 
of political authority. This new configuration of authority in the European constitution 
comprises the following three elements: multiple levels of authority, multiple sources of 
political authority, and new forms of authority relationships. 
 
 
3.3  Challenges for the conceptual features of indivisible 
and unitary sovereignty 
 
3.3.1  Preliminary rulings and multiple levels of authority 
 
The preliminary rulings procedure indicates that political and legal authority is now 
located on multiple levels – instead of one single level as in classical indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty. The procedure according to article 267 TFEU prescribes that a 
domestic court can – and in case it is a court of last instance must – ask the ECJ for an 
interpretation of a European legal provision if this provision is decisive for deciding the 
  
  141 
case at stake. Here, it must be considered that the preliminary ruling procedure is not a 
remedy for the individual before the national court – it is rather a right of the deciding 
judge. The preliminary rulings procedure ensures the uniform application and 
interpretation of European law by legal actors throughout the European Union. It also 
takes away the procedural autonomy of domestic courts of last instance. In Germany for 
example, courts of last instance increasingly refer to the ECJ, however, the FCC has not 
issued only one reference to the ECJ. From this follows, that both levels of judicial 
decision-making, the national and the European judge, are working together in solving 
the case. Thus both actors possess legal authority for case resolution.  
Furthermore, the preliminary reference has generated some degree of judicial 
empowerment through judicial dialogues between national and European judges. More 
importantly, however, is that through this dialogue national judges have become 
increasingly accustomed to the European ‘toolbox’ for resolving cases. Using the 
instruments provided by the ECJ will lead to a faster and efficient case resolution which 
national judges, especially those facing a considerable workload, are probably 
appreciating. By that, the judges help to guarantee the effectiveness of European law 
within the Member States (Mueller-Graff, 2005: 12; Stone Sweet, 2004: 22). 
The classical distinction between the national and the international or supranational 
arena is no longer adequate when European law is involved in domestic case resolution. 
The preliminary rulings procedure has also generated a shift in judicial authority that 
bolstered European constitutionalisation since it assigned the ECJ with new roles and 
powers evolving from its judicial discretion. European integration and 
constitutionalisation have been significantly fostered by the ECJ’s judicial discretion – 
the ‘authority of judges to interpret and apply legal rules to situations in order to resolve 
disputes.’ This judicial discretion has furthered the shift in judicial authority due to its 
transformative effects on the relation between the European and domestic legal orders 
and actors. Firstly, it assigned the court with substantial power as it operates as the 
authoritative interpreter of European law both before the European and domestic courts. 
Secondly, the European court has enhanced European constitutionalisation also because 
of weak direct and indirect means that are available to the Member States to control the 
ECJ. Lastly, the ECJ’s judicial power has been shaped by its procedures and 
jurisprudential coherence. Especially the extent of its discretion and its activation 
through litigation29 have been conditional for the variation of judicial discretion and 
                                                       
29 Stone Sweet offers a theory of precedent, based on the approach that legal institutions 
develop according to path dependency (Stone Sweet, 2004: 31ff.). According to this, the 
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judicial power. Via the preliminary ruling procedure and an increased number of 
references from national courts to the ECJ the European legal doctrines have been 
enabled to vertically penetrate the national legal orders and to horizontally expand to 
more and more policy areas (Alter, 2001: 190; Stone Sweet, 2004: 23ff.). 
This shift in judicial authority and the ECJ’s ‘judicial activism’ in rendering European 
treaty law as constitutional calls into question the doctrines and usages of the ‘legal 
infrastructure’ of national and international law. The ECJ has initiated 
constitutionalisation by interpreting the Treaties as if they were a constitution – without 
express authorisation by the Treaty and even against the opposition of Member States 
governments. The national governments could have hindered this process by the means 
of unanimous treaty revision. However, the process of treaty revision, and especially the 
unanimity requirement, and the court’s dominant status due to its discretion shielded 
constitutionalisation from Member State interference. Consequently, a sharp and precise 
distinction between national law and European law in the resolution of cases where 
European law is at stake will no longer be possible. On the contrary, domestic and 
European law in these constellations are intertwined and constitute a multi-level legal 
order instead of two separate ones. This constitutionalisation entailed significant and 
dramatic adaptation requirements for national legal orders. These were initiated by 
private actors activating and sustaining integration, and the ECJ and some national 
judges interested in expanding transnational society and supranational governance. The 
shift in legal authority and constitutionalisation has thus followed a self-sustaining logic 
(Stone Sweet, 2004: 20f.; other approaches Stein 1981; Weiler 1981, 1991, 1994). 
Additionally, the success of the ECJ’s doctrine to interpret the Treaties as a 
constitutional charter was highly dependent on the acceptance by national actors, mainly 
national (constitutional) courts. Their acceptance has been based on de facto acceptance 
due to practicalities instead of de jure rationale of doctrine. Furthermore, institutional 
barriers, such as the high number of veto players in the European context, made it more 
difficult and practically impossible for national political actors to reverse the 
establishment of the ECJ legal doctrines (Alter, 2001: 195ff.; Ladeur, 2008: 162; Stone 
Sweet, 2004: 66; Weiler, 1999: 225). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
constitutionalisation of European law can be explained and analysed by considering 
previous historical, evolutionary steps, rather than ‘new’ conditions or triggers and 
functional logics. Hereby, the point when the ECJ introduced supremacy and direct effect 
can be understood as a critical juncture in the process of European legal integration (Stone 
Sweet, 2004: 31). 
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In conclusion, the preliminary rulings procedure has institutionalised opportunities for 
co-operation between national and European judges. This co-operative working 
relationship has not only facilitated European constitutionalisation and the proliferation 
of European law and its ‘toolbox’ for case resolution into national legal orders, but 
generated a shift in judicial authority that is now spread across multiple levels – the 
national and the European level. This new dispersion of authority challenges the 
classical understanding of sovereignty as indivisible and unitary – in a way that there is 
no longer one source of ultimate judicial authority located in one single court acting as 
the final arbiter. In cases where European law is decisive for domestic case resolution, 
the distinction between two separate legal orders is no longer possible. Instead, there is a 
European legal order in operation that consists of multiple authorities intertwined across 
several levels.  
 
 
3.3.2  Supremacy and direct effect of European law and 
multiple sources of authority 
 
The European constitution exists and ‘has existed ever since the ECJ introduced the 
doctrines of supremacy and direct effect’ (Somek, 2007: 1126). The establishment of 
these two doctrines of European law illustrates that in Europe there is no longer one 
single source of political authority but many. The establishment of several doctrines and 
cornerstones of the European legal system has not taken place within the framework of 
constitutional conventions or intergovernmental conferences, but through gradual 
adjudication and case law developments. Hereby, the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy of European law play an elevated role. According to the constitutionalisation 
thesis, the ECJ has endeavoured to dispose of the two features of a classical international 
law treaty – a missing scheme of individual human rights protection and missing 
citizenship – in favour of a constitutionalisation of the Treaties. The constitutionalisation 
process has been successful particularly due to the establishment of the two key 
principles of European law: supremacy and direct effect. These doctrines ensure that 
national legal actors show a sustained commitment to making European law effective 
within national legal systems – not by urgency or force, but in complicity with national 
judges and private litigants. That means, in cases of conflict national authorities must 
give precedence to the European provision and set aside the conflicting national 
 144 
provision. In this sense national authorities can be seen as European agencies. Hence 
direct effect and supremacy are the constitutional pillars of the European legal order, the 
core of the European constitution. By their establishment, the ECJ created a 
transnational legal space ‘within which individuals could seek regress for complaints 
before domestic courts relying on Community law’ (Caporaso, 2002: 17). The question 
about which authority in the European Union can legitimately claim ultimate superiority, 
however, has not been resolved (yet) – which paradoxically seems both the very 
criticism about European democratic theory and beyond resolution (Eleftheriadis, 1996: 
35; Stone Sweet, 2004: 22; Pernice, 2009: 374; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 372f.). 
 
 
Direct effect of European law 
 
Closely related to supremacy is the principle of direct effect. That is, when a national 
provision is set aside, at the same time direct effect of the prevailing Community 
provision is acknowledged (Scheunig, 2004: 711). Direct effect means that provisions of 
European law can confer legal rights on individuals that must be protected and enforced 
also by national courts. The establishment of the direct effect doctrine had three 
important consequences: First, it gave individuals the possibility to enforce their rights 
in domestic courts. Second, it turned national courts into the principal instruments for 
the effective application of European law. Third, it led to the recognition of the primacy 
of European law. Direct effect does not only address the status of norms, but also their 
subjects’ political status and identity. In this sense the European Union is a new legal 
order. For the establishment of direct effect as a core element of the constitutionalisation 
process the ECJ landmark decision Van Gend en Loos30 is most important. Here the ECJ 
stated that provisions of the EEC Treaty confer rights upon individuals and that the legal 
order established by that treaty is a new legal order. According to the court, this legal 
order can be regarded as new since traditional international law does not have direct 
effect as it only governs the relationship between sovereign states. However, it can be 
questioned whether the court’s view on international law may ignore developments of 
international law throughout the 20th century. For instance, military tribunals set up in 
the 1940s and 1950s have demonstrated an understanding of international law, 
especially rules on warfare, that recognises direct effect on individuals. Especially after 
                                                       
30 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62. 
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the Second World War, jurisprudence accepted that direct effect was in fact not alien to 
international law. This has also been legal practice; for instance when the Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated its opinion on the Courts of Danzig case in 1928 
that international law can confer rights upon individuals, depending if this was the 
intention of the contracting parties – in this way international law is not exclusively 
subject to states but to the intentions of the contracting parties. Hence the ECJ held quite 
early that the Treaties have constituted a new legal order that is distinct from both 
general international law and the laws of the Member States. This is because it has direct 
effect through conferring rights and obligations also on individuals – not only on certain 
institutions of its Member States (MacCormick, 1997: 334; Spiermann, 1999: 765ff.). 
The principle of direct effect, which started with van Gend en Loos, led to the result that 
Community law had successively acquired the status of quasi-federal law, especially 
regarding its practical relevance for individual citizens. Therefore the authority of the 
Community and the ECJ has grown at the expense of national governments and courts. 
Direct effect as a doctrine regards the application of a provision of one legal system in 
another legal system. The way how this application is made is governed by the 
relationship between the two systems. If one system is dependent, then the transfer is 
determined by the independent system. The obligation to give direct effect to certain 
legal acts or provisions of EU law stems from the treaties, while carrying out this 
obligation is a question of national law. However, the real innovation introduced by 
directly effective and applicable legal acts by the European Union is that these legal acts 
do not depend on a domestic legal act of transposition as classical international law. 
Unlike traditional international law conferring rights upon individuals etc. they are 
effective regardless of the national constitutional law that incorporates international 
treaties into domestic law. While traditional international law provisions are dependent 
on the constitutional law and how it incorporates international law into the domestic 
legal order (monist or dualist), directly effective European law is independent from this 
national constitutional law basis (Hartley, 1999: 135; Hartley, 2001: 237ff.; Jacobs, 
2008: 9; Stein, 1981: 24; Stone Sweet/ Brunell, 1998: 66; Weiler/ Trachtman, 1997: 
375f.). 
 
 
Supremacy of European law 
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Another principle of European law that has called into question the traditional 
conceptualisation of sovereignty is the doctrine of supremacy of European law. It is 
regarded as the second core element of European constitutionalism and has been 
continuously developed through the jurisprudence of the ECJ (Van Gend En Loos, 
Simmenthal,31 Costa vs. ENEL, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft). The matter of 
supremacy only arises in the case of conflict between a legal norm that is applied in 
another, different legal system. In general, the fundamental question as to whether 
national law can be overridden by international or European law must be determined by 
the law of the state. Generally, there are two approaches towards the transformation of 
international into national law as required by the international legal obligation to observe 
the treaties. First, the monist approach as followed by the ECJ, and second, the dualist 
approach as employed by the FCC (Ludwikowski, 2001: 280). According to the monist 
approach, national and international law are treated as the same, therefore the problem 
of constitutional conflict does not arise. The dualist approach draws on the assumption 
that both national and international legal orders are distinct and have different supreme 
laws and ultimate authorities (Ludwikowski, 2001: 253ff.). In dualist countries, like the 
United Kingdom or Germany, the status of a treaty depends on the constitutional or 
statutory law by which the treaty provisions are given effect (Hartley, 2001: 240f.). By 
such transformation acts, the supremacy principle has been incorporated into national 
constitutional law – for instance by the European Communities Act 1972 in the United 
Kingdom.32 
The supremacy of European law is required by two important factors: first, by the 
functioning and effectiveness of the European polity and its legal order, and second by 
the rule of law. Both government effectiveness and rule of law are conditions for the 
functioning and even application of European law throughout all Member States as well 
as the effective protection of individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by European 
law. Especially the second factor is crucial for the legitimacy and acceptance of 
European law as it requires equal and consistent application of European law to all cases 
across all Member States. Hence the supremacy of European law in cases of conflicts 
                                                       
31 Italian Minister of Finance v Simmenthal (Case 106/77) 1978. 
32 In Germany, each treaty ratification or amendment requires a separate act of assent 
according to article 23 I Basic Law. For instance, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty have 
been incorporated into German law by the ‘LissabonUVG’, the ‘Act of Implementing 
Changes to the Basic Law to Ratify the Lisbon Treaty’ (A.B.) and accompanying legislation 
governing the structures and procedures of German institutions involved in implementing 
the Lisbon Treaty (for instance the ‘Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz’ or ‘Gesetz über die 
Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union). 
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with national legal provisions is not only a purely functional requirement but follows 
from the very substance of the concept of law (Mayer, 2006: 6f.; Pernice, 2002: 520; 
Pernice, 2009: 404).33 
Before, however, the supremacy principle is applied in cases of conflict, the primacy of 
the European legal order is ensured by a general obligation to render national legal 
provisions in conformity with European law in order to avoid conflict in the first place. 
This has become a principle of the German legal order as established by the FCC 
jurisprudence and obliges the courts to construe German law ‘Europe-friendly’ (Von 
Colson und Kamann 1984) (Spiermann, 1999: 771; Kostakopoulou, 2002: 146; 
Ludwikowski, 2001: 278; Grimm, 1997: 229f.; Scheunig, 2004: 707). This obligation to 
render national law ‘in the light of directives in particular and in conformity with the 
requirements of Community law in general’, however, cannot exceed the wording of 
national law provisions. That means the national courts are ‘not bound by that obligation 
to exceed the limits of interpretation that are inhered in national law’ (Mueller-Graff, 
2005: 10). Hence the supremacy of European law implies a principle of norm 
construction: the courts have to chose the interpretation of a norm at stake that is most 
compatible with European principles. Hence supremacy gives the ECJ ultimate 
jurisdiction over the interpretation of European norms (Weyland, 2002: 24).  
However, conflicts on a constitutional level between national and European law cannot 
always be avoided because European principles are usually more vague and more 
general than the provisions of Member States constitutions (Weyland, 2002: 21). For 
such cases of hard conflict – when the conflict between two legal provisions cannot be 
avoided by interpretation – a principle that governs the solution of the conflict is 
necessary. Here, the supremacy principle governs the conflict resolution. Supremacy of 
European law means, in cases of conflict between a European and a national legal 
provision, the latter is not applied though it remains valid. The supremacy principle 
subordinates substantive national constitutional provisions to substantive European 
constitutional norms. That means the national provision is disapplied in the specific case 
at stake whilst the European provision prevails. However, the national norm remains 
                                                       
33 According to Dyevre, the most plausible solution for conflicts between European and 
national legal norms would be that the national norms prevail. The reason for that was, that 
the effectiveness of a legal order depends on the acceptance by its subjects, that is the 
courts, administrations, the police and other legal operators. The ECJ alone could not apply 
and enforce EU law but depended on those (Dyevre, 2005: 181). However, this reasoning 
seems not convincing as national legal operators not necessarily prefer ‘their’ legal order to 
prevail but may accept European law supremacy due to the reasons outlined above. It seems 
not sound to assume that legal actors would not accept European law just because for 
reasons of national ‘ownership’. 
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valid as only a national court is competent to declare national legal provisions null and 
void. Supremacy thus governs the application of norms, not their validity. Although 
(supranational) Community law is now absorbed by Union law through the Lisbon 
Treaty, there are still some policy areas that do not have supranational character, such as 
the CFSP, and thus are not subject to the supremacy rule (de Witte, 2012: 47). However, 
regarding the protection of fundamental rights European law may fall short behind the 
protection as established by national constitutional law since not all fundamental rights 
are recognised by all Member States and therefore are not encompassed by the ‘common 
constitutional traditions’ that are the common denominator of European fundamental 
rights. In such cases of conflict between European and national fundamental rights 
where European law offers a lower standard of protection, than the higher standard of 
national constitutional law must prevail (Weyland, 2002: 21).  
 
European law supremacy has been established by the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
According to van Gend and Costa vs ENEL, Community law is a distinct independent 
legal system and thus national (constitutional) law is not relevant for establishing the 
validity of Community law (Stein, 1981: 14). It cannot be argued – as by the Italian 
government in the Costa case – that a succeeding national provision can overturn an 
international law provision (lex posterior derogat legem priori)34 because Art. 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties and the case law of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice clearly state that the international law provision must be fulfilled 
and municipal law cannot be used to justify a failure in obliging international treaty 
provisions. Such scenario is not recognised by classical international law (Spiermann, 
1999: 771f.). Supremacy thus undermines the standard dualist solutions to conflicting 
national and international law such as lex posterior etc. By constructing this new legal 
system the ECJ constitutionalised the Treaty of Rome and introduced the ‘single most 
important institutional innovation’ (Stone Sweet, 2004: 19). In other words: ‘The 
Court’s supremacy doctrine was constitutional in that it sought to organise the juridical 
relationship between otherwise distinct legal orders: the national and the supranational’ 
(Stone Sweet, 2004: 81). The adjudication of intra-judicial conflict, between ECJ and 
national constitutional courts judges, about the supremacy doctrine has been the primary 
mechanism of legal integration and can be described as ‘constitutional dialogues’ (Stone 
Sweet, 2004: 81). In its case law, the ECJ assumed a working partnership between the 
national courts and the European court in order to create a constitutional rule-of-law 
                                                       
34 A later law repeals a prior one. 
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Community. Hereby, national judges act as agents of the community order. Therefore 
the effectiveness of European law critically depends on the national judges’ willingness 
to refer to the ECJ and settle disputes in conformity with European law (Stone Sweet, 
2004: 20; Stone Sweet/ Brunell, 1998: 66).  
Whilst Van Gend en Loos made the community legal order different from international 
law, Costa vs ENEL 1964 provided for a new understanding of that legal order: the 
principle of supremacy of European law. However, the two landmark decisions van 
Gend en Loos and Costa vs ENEL were not just re-phrasing established principles of 
international law in the language of constitutionalism. They form the basis, the point of 
reference of the innovative approach to the community legal order as introduced by the 
court and thus are more than just rhetoric as the ECJ went beyond the categories of 
international law. This is reflected by its focus on the idea of state sovereignty, which 
can be in conflict with international law under certain circumstances, and which is the 
point of reference for community legal powers as they have been transferred by the 
Member States. According to the ECJ, the community legal order was not just a new 
legal order of international law but an integral part of the legal systems of the Member 
States – and being such part of the national legal system the European court had to pay 
attention to the Italian government’s argument about national law in that way there was 
no longer a conflict between national and international law but between national and 
national law and thus a rule of precedence needed to be elaborated. Though from the 
perspective of international law, ‘there was nothing impressive about the general 
approach adopted by the European Court’ (Spiermann, 1999: 781, 774f.), from the 
perspective of constitutional sovereignty the ECJ’s rulings were quite extraordinary. 
Although the principle of supremacy is not been laid down in the Treaties but 
established by ECJ case law, it has been practically accepted by most of the Member 
States courts – though ‘national judges embraced the various logics of supremacy with 
differing degrees of enthusiasm’ (Stone Sweet, 2004: 70f.). In practice, the national 
courts have traced back supremacy and direct effect to the delegation of powers based 
on the national constitutions instead of tracing it back to the autonomy of Community 
law (Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 751). In the literature it is controversial why and on 
what grounds national constitutional courts have accepted – at least practically – 
European law supremacy. Authors like Weiler (1991, 1999) suggest that they have 
asserted an act of voluntary subordination driven by their normative subscription to the 
idea of Europe. Hartley (2001) suggests that supremacy can be implicitly traced back to 
the principle of direct effect. Although no provision of the Treaties indicated that 
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European law prevails over Member State law, direct effect, however, implies that it 
should have ‘at least a certain degree of supremacy.’ Additionally, the ECJ 
jurisprudence regarding directly effective Community law prevailing over Member State 
law (prior and subsequent) was based on the proposition that this was implicitly agreed 
by the Member States when they signed the Treaties as such prevalence could not be 
derived from any other source (Hartley, 2001: 242). Other scholars such as Alter (2001) 
doubt the more or less tacit assent by Member States legal and political actors. 
According to her, the acceptance resulted plainly from a lack of resources for active 
opposition. The absence of loud voices of objection to the significant transfer of national 
sovereignty, however, could not be interpreted as approval or acceptance. She suggests 
that there is plenty of evidence that Member States did not agree with this kind of 
transformation. However, the reasons for the transformation to happen despite of that are 
firstly, the ECJ escaped Member States control, and secondly, the Member States were 
unable to reassert control. Although political actors in fact seemed to fully understand 
the implications of these doctrinal changes, they had little resources and were operating 
under short-term time horizons, so that politicians’ reaction to these wide-reaching 
doctrinal changes were rather weak and, as a consequence, they lost the fight about these 
doctrinal changes. Also, as soon as ECJ doctrines and European law supremacy had 
been supported and applied by domestic courts, the doctrinal changes could no longer be 
just ignored by politicians as they now had become enforced by national judiciaries 
(Alter, 2001: 182ff.).  
 
It can be concluded that direct effect and supremacy are the core elements of the 
European constitution and condition both the efficacy and prevalence of European law 
in national legal orders. The first confers rights and obligations not only on the Member 
States but also on individuals and thus has been a key for the constitutionalisation 
process. The latter ensures the effect and even application of European law throughout 
all Member States. Though the grounds for the acceptance of European law supremacy 
by the Member States courts may be manifold and debated among scholars and 
practitioners, there can be no doubt that supremacy has been accepted in judicial practice 
and constitutional jurisprudence. Supremacy of European law has been accepted on 
practical and pragmatic grounds by the Member States courts – dogmatically and 
theoretically, however, the supremacy question remains inconclusive. Especially with 
regard to fundamental principles in national constitutions, European law supremacy is 
not based on legal-dogmatic reasoning. That means when there is a European legal 
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provision that contradicts a fundamental constitutional provision, the former prevails in 
the European legal order whilst the latter prevails on the national level. Consequently, 
there remains a conflict between the super-rule of the European and the national legal 
systems and thus the question of authority (Hartley, 1999: 167f.). Although in practice 
cases of such fundamental constitutional conflict may be rare, the theoretical issue 
remains. This underlying dogmatic conflict illustrates the challenge for the traditional 
concept of indivisible and unitary sovereignty and its assumption of a single source of 
ultimate authority. It also illustrates the need for a new concept of sovereignty that 
accounts for multiple sources of authority located on multiple levels instead of one 
single source of ultimate political authority. 
 
 
3.3.3  New non-hierarchical forms of authority relations 
 
The processes of transnationalisation and constitutionalisation have imposed another 
conceptual challenges on indivisible and unitary sovereignty in a way that they imply 
new forms of authority relations both between different types of actors and different 
normative orders. The transnational constitutional legal order of the European polity 
significantly challenges the state-centred view on international relations and 
international, constitutional and regulatory law. Transnational law such as the European 
constitution, however, has not been generated only by state actors but also by the 
relations between state and non-state actors. Those are no longer seen as excluding each 
other, but as integral parts in the decision-making and norm production process. Thus 
the traditional legal perspectives on how to conceptualise relationships between only 
states or their representatives in the international arena seem no longer adequate. Instead 
it is necessary to systematically consider the importance of non-state actors and 
transnational cross-border relationships in the process of emerging new legal orders. 
Hereby transnationalisation has transcended the intergovernmental perspective 
according to which only governments and their power, interest and resources dominate 
integration processes, while private actors only play a secondary role. By recognising 
the role of private and non-state actors in the process of norm production and political 
decision-making transnational law enables a much ‘richer’ understanding of both 
regional and international legal regimes and their underlying dynamics. In contrast, the 
oppositional terminology of public vs private law or state vs non-state actors falls short 
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of grasping these new phenomena in law making processes. In the multilevel European 
architecture there are different constellations of actors involved in political decision-
making and accordingly a shift in the logics of decision-making towards a new mode. 
Here inter-state or inter-governmental bargaining, states and governments are no longer 
exclusively governing decision-making processes. It is in fact private litigation that has 
emerged in different sectors and has led to a contingent and new transnational legal 
architecture. European transnational law transcends the traditional authority relations 
between state and non-state actors and presupposes a legal way of thinking about 
untraditional, alternative forms of transnational activities of norm production and 
interaction of (legal) actors (Zumbansen, 2008: 743; Moravcsik, 1991).  
The transnational European constitution accordingly transcends the notion of strict 
hierarchy as implied by indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Hierarchy is an 
organisational principle and describes a structure of political power that vests decision-
making political authority in one single entity. Here, competences are distributed 
vertically and derive from the above entity, finally tracing back to the authority at the 
apex of the hierarchy structure. The functional principle here is command and obedience 
(Neyer, 2002: 16). With regard to the new developments in European norm production, 
hierarchy is no longer the prevalent logic of norm production. Hierarchical decision-
making is now ‘replaced’ by logics of networking and sectoral emergence. Transnational 
legal regimes emerge sectorally and both generate and manage their own rules. This 
logic is different from the classical (hierarchical) understanding of how legal systems are 
established. The European polity does not resemble the classical patterns of territory, 
norm production and authority constitution etc. It rather resembles those of transnational 
legal systems that are mutually adjusting, co-ordinating and learning (Ladeur, 2008: 
159; Ladeur, 2009: 1358ff.).  
Additionally, the European multilevel legal architecture challenges the strict hierarchy 
of norms as implied by the concept of indivisible sovereignty when the question of 
validity is concerned. As outlined previously the classical perspectives of ECS vs NCS 
cause significant analytical problems: One the one hand, if the European constitution 
derived its validity from the Member States constitutions (NCS), then it could not be 
supreme. On the other hand, if it was an independent legal order not deriving from the 
Member States constitutions (ECS), then it could not be binding on them. The dilemma 
seems to be that a European constitutional order that assumes a strict hierarchy of norms 
cannot be both binding and constitutional. Strict hierarchy focuses more on the 
distinction between legal norms and their extra-legal grounds in an established legal 
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system rather than the possibility of developing a new legal order that may be a 
conglomerate of several intertwined legal orders. The ECJ asserted that the legal order 
constituted by the Treaties is not simply a framework of international law norms under 
the principle pacta sunt servanda. It is rather a new legal order comprising both treaty 
norms and secondary norms to which the Member States have transferred some of their 
sovereign rights. This kind of juridical character has been ascribed to the Community by 
its authoritative judicial organ. Neither old nor new members casted doubts on the 
principles established by the ECJ which can be read as their tacit assent to the thesis that 
the Community has a new legal order existing by its own though having its origin in 
international treaty law.  
As mentioned before, the European legal order challenges the resources of legal theory 
that are tailored mainly to states and states acting within the framework of international 
law. Any quest for strict hierarchy – and thus classical sovereignty – in the relation 
between European and national law generates a paradox: As long as Member States 
remain sovereign subjects of international law, their constitutions will not be of lower 
rank than European law in the hierarchy of norms. However, international law 
obligations do not allow Member States to disregard certain treaty provisions, such as 
the supremacy principle. This paradox further demonstrates that indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty and legal hierarchy, can no longer provide for an adequate account of the 
relationship between national and supranational law, but would leave the matter as 
‘insoluble’ (Kwiecien, 2005: 1490f.). Furthermore, the quest for a clear hierarchy in the 
order of European and domestic norms reflects a conservative and positivist approach in 
legal theory. Hereby, the most important issue seem the questions about the standing of 
European law within the national legal orders and about a precise rule of conflict. This 
touches various complex questions – including the question about the nature of a legal 
system, the nature of its foundation and possibility of change, about hierarchy (or 
heterarchy) of its sources, and about ultimate authority and political prominence. 
Framing the European legal order as an independent and new constitutional order – as in 
the ECJ ruling Costa vs ENEL – instead of classical public international law has been 
the court’s strategy to achieve legal uniformity throughout the European Union. The 
paradigm of the European constitution (and thus its supremacy) was the ECJ’s answer to 
the challenging questions of legal integration. As this doctrine has been established by 
the court without political debate or consultation, it can be regarded as a legal-doctrinal 
position of the ECJ that depends on amendments of national legal orders made by 
national courts and is thus ineffective only by itself. The problem hereby is that a legal 
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doctrine cannot be a binding basis when it depends on amendments at the same time; or 
in other words, it cannot be legally binding while changing legal validity at the same 
time. A legal doctrine of a legal system should not change or challenge the very 
foundations of that legal system, otherwise it cannot be legal doctrine. However, the 
legal actors in Member States apply European legal norms not because they regard them 
as legally authoritative by themselves, but because of provisions of the national legal 
orders that function as opening clauses validating the European norms. Constitutional 
actors in Member States do not accept the European constitutional discipline because it 
is a legal doctrine based on subordination to a higher authority deriving from a European 
demos. They have rather accepted it on pragmatic and practical grounds – no matter if 
this was due to a lack of resources of objection (Alter 2001) or a voluntary act 
resembling true liberty and emancipation (Weiler, 2001: 14) (Eleftheriadis, 1996: 38; 
Eleftheriadis, 1998: 256ff.; MacCormick, 1996: 555f.). 
 
The practical implication of the hierarchy dilemma is illustrated most impressively by 
the history of adjudicating constitutional conflict regarding the supremacy of European 
law by the ECJ and national constitutional courts. However, the problem of which 
jurisdiction has the ultimate authority to determine the validity of European law has not 
been decided yet and ‘may in fact be irresoluble’ (Stone Sweet, 2004: 91). The ECJ’s 
answer to the question of the standing of European law in national legal orders and thus 
the question of how to reason its supremacy is adopting a monist model of the 
relationship between European and national laws. The Court sees the new legal order of 
the Treaties as the highest source of law. In contrast, the German FCC for instance 
adopts a dualist model. These different legal reasonings create problems of coherence 
that cannot be resolved by looking at one legal order only since it partly derives from 
each legal order: 
 
‘The structure of the legal order of the European Community – and the choice between ‘monist’ 
and ‘dualist’ models – is a question that cannot be answered by means of constitutional doctrine 
or by reference to the concepts of sovereignty (or competence-competence). Any attempt to 
resolve the issue along these lines will have to beg the constitutional question. Hence, neither 
the European Court of Justice nor the German Constitutional Court has provided us with a 
convincing theoretical account of the Community legal order. By taking for granted what had to 
be shown, they merely asserted and did not defend their constitutional choices’ (Eleftheriadis, 
1998: 269).  
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However, resolving this question by taking account of the European legal order as an 
artifice as suggested by Eleftheriadis (1998) and hence shifting the focus away from the 
question about its the standing in national legal orders, does not seem a promising 
approach for legal practice. It would rather focus on the transnational character and the 
normative justification of the European legal order but less on its consistency and 
continuity both internally and externally in relation with other legal orders 
(Eleftheriadis, 1998: 265ff.). But the problem with this approach is that it does not offer 
any solution to the practical issue of adjudication the constitutional conflict. And if both 
rule of law and the functioning of the European polity require a consistent approach to 
this issue, then any viable approach must offer an answer to this question and cannot 
neglect the practical implications of the theoretical inconsistency. 
 
This being said, it can be concluded that the political architecture of the European Union 
is a result of new constellations of political and legal actors and a pooling of sovereignty 
instead of a structure that resembles the traditional patterns of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty. There is no strict hierarchical relation between the multiple sources of 
authority (Bohman, 2004: 320). Accordingly, an approach to sovereignty is required that 
takes into account these new forms of non-hierarchical authority relations. It can be thus 
concluded that classical framworkd of hierarchical relationships between actors and 
legal orders are not applicable to the multilevel European legal architecture, since the 
constitutive feature of this architecture is comprising of ‚geared’ multiple levels of 
authority that cannot be ranked according to a strict principle of hierarchy. 
Additionally, preliminary references have fostered a co-operative working partnership 
between national and European judges and European constitutionalisation. This has 
generated a shift in judicial authority in case resolution in a way that there is no longer 
one single authority decisive for resolving the case at stake but multiple authorities. 
Contrary from what the traditional concept of sovereignty may suggest, the multilevel 
architecture of the EU seems to entail new and multiple claims to legal authority within 
a defined political space. That means neither the legal nor the political ‘substance’ in 
Europe is centralised in one entity. The structure of its political authority is rather 
polycentric and policy making authority is beyond the cognizance of one single 
institution. 
Furthermore, direct effect and supremacy as the core of European constitutionalisation 
and key doctrines of the European constitution have challenged the traditional 
understanding of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. By launching direct effect and 
 156 
supremacy, the ECJ opened the European legal order to private actors and undermined 
national constitutional orthodoxies of national vs international law. Additionally, 
supremacy entitles national judges to treat European law as a superior and autonomous 
source of law and as directly applicable within national law. By that national judges are 
in fact engaged in judicial review, even of legislative acts, in order to make European 
law effective for individuals. However, in Germany this competence has actually been 
reserved to the constitutional court. This illustrates how the supremacy principle has 
generated a shift in authority as it transformed the constitution of ultimate and single 
authority located on the Member States level only. Within this new configuration of 
judicial authority the traditional concept of indivisible and unitary sovereignty and its 
one source of authority in a polity is no longer adequate. Instead of two separate legal 
orders with each possessing champion judicial authority there is now a new form of 
legal order comprising of multiple levels of authority that are genuinely intertwined and 
geared together.  
In conclusion, the specific European fragmentation and diffusion of power and authority 
across several levels and institutions goes well beyond the experiences of contemporary 
statehood and its theoretical concepts such as classical indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty (Preuss, 1999: 421; Stone Sweet, 2004: 22, 82; Streinz, 2008: 179; Walker, 
1998: 359).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In most studies of European constitutionalism and its impact on national constitutions, 
sovereignty as a condition for constitutionalism has been treated as an a priori truth 
rather than an object of critical examination (Dyevre, 2005: 175). That is why we are 
confronted with approaches to sovereignty that fall short of the legal-political 
complexity of the European Union structure. In this chapter it has been shown that the 
two main competing approaches that account for sovereignty in the relationship between 
the European Union and its Member States misrepresent the institutional and normative 
way in which sovereignty operates in the European Union. The first approach that 
regards European authority as delegated authority from the Member States and thus the 
Member States as the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ draws on an indivisible notion of 
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sovereignty in a way that political authority that is ultimately located on the nation state 
level. The second approach, that views the European Union polity constituting its own 
authority supreme over Member States authority, draws on exactly the same idea by just 
replacing the nation state level by the supranational level. Both accounts fail to grasp the 
specifically multi-dimensional configuration of political authority in the architecture of 
the European Union polity that comprises both the Member State and the European 
level. This fallacy of single-focused authority is then also extended to the question about 
European law validity. There is no doubt that the validity of European law is grounded 
in the ratification or adoption of the Treaties according to national constitutional 
procedures. This does not preclude, however, the European legal order from being a 
distinct legal order. And within that distinct legal order, the criteria for the recognition of 
validity have become internal to this legal order. The validity of European law is 
governed by criteria of both systems: the European and the domestic. European legal 
provisions are acknowledged as valid and applicable in relevant situations by reference 
to a state’s internal (constitutional) criteria of validity. The claims of the two competing 
camps that postulate ultimate legal authority either for the European or the Member 
State level, however, do not seem ‘intrinsically more plausible than the other’ (Walker, 
1998: 361f.). Furthermore, both approaches fall analytically short of the possibility that 
European law has emancipated from its original foundation – although it is obvious that 
European law is now ‘a thicker and more substantial, more internally-institutionalised, 
body of norms’ than general international law. European norms with direct effect and 
conferring rights and obligations on both citizens and Member States, and establishing 
procedures to ensure these rights and obligations through collaboration between the ECJ 
and member states courts, differentiate European law from classical international law. 
Thus the classical dichotomy between international and constitutional law approaches 
seems inaccurate when it comes to the European legal order since ‘the blurring of this 
dichotomy is precisely one of the special features of the Community legal order and 
other transnational regimes’ (Weiler/ Haltern, 1996: 417). Hence the European 
constitution is a more or less coherent constitutional system consisting of several layers 
of constitutional law. Read this way, the supremacy principle does not ascribe hierarchy 
of norms to these different layers but accounts for the practical applicability of 
conflicting norms belonging to this multilevel, non-hierarchical legal structure (Mayer, 
2003: 50; Walker in Walker, 2003: 11ff.; MacCormick, 1995: 100f.; MacCormick, 
1996: 559). 
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In this chapter it has also been shown that the Member States and the EU institutions 
fundamentally differ in their views as to whether and to what extent the mutual 
interdependencies affect the supremacy of national constitutions (Ludwikowski, 2001: 
277). The jurisprudence of these constitutional conflicts in Germany and the United 
Kingdom has developed pragmatic and practical solutions. However, those solutions are 
not always sustained and can be subject to revision, as shown particularly by the FCC’s 
recent adjudication. Therefore, the problem of constitutional conflict does not remain a 
merely theoretical one. On the contrary, the controversy about the relationship between 
EU law and national legal orders ‘remains very much alive’ (Kumm, 2005: 262) and 
‘ambiguous’ (Kwiecien, 2005: 1480). In other words: the question which legal order 
prevails in case of conflict and which court has the final competence of review, remains 
unresolved in both theory and (to some extent) practice. This question of ‘last instance’ 
is the main line of the constitutional conflict raised within the framework of a dualistic 
approach as employed in both countries.  
Hereby, the conflicting views on which law is supreme and on which court is the final 
arbiter, reflect the quest for ultimate and supreme authority and thus a classical concept 
of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. As a legal concept, sovereignty structures the 
relationship between the legal orders and their institutions of the EU and Member States. 
As illustrated in section 3, the many and far reaching consequences of European 
transnationalisation and constitutionalisation on Member States authority have generated 
challenges for the classical concept of sovereignty. These affect both its external and 
internal dimensions. The first means that the state as a whole can act autonomously and 
independently. Internal sovereignty, however, means the ultimate source – a specific 
institution, not an aggregate state level – of legal authority within a state. Both forms of 
sovereignty are distinguished conceptually, but are in fact two sides of the same concept 
in a way that formal sovereignty must be accompanied by effective capacity to act. In 
liberal democracies, the idea of popular sovereignty is often employed to justify political 
power exercise. Regarding the power structures and constitutional system within a state, 
this actually might be ‘little more than a legal fiction,’ but externally, in the international 
arena, this has important consequences. That is, institutions that exercise political power 
on the supranational and international level must derive their legitimacy and 
accountability from the people, the Member States citizens. That is why the concept of 
popular sovereignty (‘electoral democracy’, ‘principle of democracy’), as an element of 
democracy is used by constitutional courts to scrutinize European integration. The 
prevailing underlying notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty in constitutional 
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jurisprudence is regarded as the main obstacle to the full ‚reception’ of EU law in 
Member States, especially its primacy over national constitutional law. Though having 
established a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between state sovereignty and the European Union 
in a pragmatic way, doctrinal and theoretical conflicts have still not been settled. 
Especially in the scholarship of European law, the concept of sovereignty has been 
insufficiently acknowledged (de Witte, 1995: 145). Though the constitutional conflicts 
are extensively analyzed in the literature and sovereignty is mentioned in that context, it 
is hardly identified as the ‘ultimate’ problem. However, if sovereignty is conceived of as 
indivisible and unitary, the constitutional conflict seems irresolvable. Accordingly, any 
theoretical effort to accommodate the classical concept of sovereignty with the 
challenges imposed by the European constitution, seems like ‘dancing on a doctrinal 
tightrope’ (de Witte, 1995: 170f.). Sovereignty, however, needs to be understood as both 
a doctrine and a set of activities and practices. As a doctrine, sovereignty is regarded as 
unified and inseparable; in practice however it is plural and divisible. This discrepancy 
between theory and practice is in fact the real problem of sovereignty in the European 
Union and its Member States (Sheehan, 2006: 2). 
 160 
Chapter 4 
A Multidimensional Concept of 
Sovereignty in the European Constitution 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‚The theory of divisible sovereignty cannot easily be reconciled with the logical structure of the 
term ‚sovereingty.’ If ‚sovereignty’ denotes the ultimate authority within a particular territory, 
then it seems more logical to conceive of this ultimate authority as being held by one institution 
or collectivity rather than it being dispersed among several institutions. If soverignty is divided, 
it loses its distinguishing trait’ (de Witte, 1995: 172). 
 
In the previous chapter I have explained in what way European integration, especially 
the processes of transnationalisation and constitutionalization, has undermined the 
classical configuration of political authority – vested in a single institution that has 
ultimate and final authority – and thus the classical concept of sovereignty. As 
elaborated previously, the dilemma here is that if constitutional sovereignty is conceived 
of as indivisible and unitary, the EU legal order would not be constitutional since it lacks 
autonomy from the Member States legal orders but is indeed closely intertwined with 
them. That means, as long as the efficacy of European law to some extent is governed by 
other legal orders, EU law cannot have independent validity and thus fully-fledged 
constitutional quality. Especially the Westphalian thesis of inseparability of the 
sovereign nation-state and the constitution presupposes autonomy as a condition for 
constitutionality. According to this classical point of view, a sovereign state transferring 
its competences to another legal entity would lose its sovereignty (Dyevre, 2005: 
170ff.). This perspective is a prime example of framing the question of European 
sovereignty in terms of classical sovereignty and clearly demonstrates how the relation 
between state sovereignty and European supranationality is framed as a zero-sum game 
(Zuern, 2000: 185). This zero-sum game also extends to the question of enforcement 
capacity as an attribute of a sovereign authority. Sovereignty as a concept draws on both 
a political reality – that means the actual monopolised capacity to enforce authority – 
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and exclusive legal authority. With regard to the actual capacity it can be doubted if the 
EU can possess sovereignty as its legal authority and enforcement depends on the 
Member States’ respect for European law. However, it has been argued that this 
enforcement capacity must not be confused with coercive power. In the legal 
architecture of the EU the potential of coercive force is not to be overestimated as its 
multilevel architecture draws on different, rather voluntary, mechanisms and incentives 
to obey European law. Accordingly, the capacity of using coercive force to 
authoritatively enforce compliance does not seem a necessary condition for sovereignty 
as other compliance and enforcement techniques can achieve the same results 
(Nuernberger, 2010: 11ff.).  
With regard to the unique architecture of political authority in Europe, it seems 
advisable to leave behind the classical perspectives. For although the Member States 
have transferred some sovereign rights to the European level, they have retained some 
on the national. By this the status of independence and external sovereignty of the 
Member States has not changed – neither on the horizontal nor on the vertical level. This 
does not conflict with the fact that in an internal sense - meaning the internal perspective 
between Member States and Europe - the former have disposed of fundamental powers 
that are essential to sovereignty and therefore of ‘full’ and ultimate political authority in 
the classical sense. In Europe, a structure of political authority has evolved that is no 
long asserted by one single institution but by several dispersed across multiple levels 
operating alongside several normative frameworks. Sovereignty thus has been ‘diffused 
or parcelled out in a new and distinctive way.’ The Member States and the European 
political system coexist – both not anymore or not yet fully sovereign in the traditional, 
autonomous sense (MacCormick, 1997: 337ff.).  
These challenges to constitutional sovereignty that have evolved from the European 
constitution and its particular shape of political authority are, however, not only of 
theoretical nature. They also concern the very practice of constitutional sovereignty in 
the Member States, especially when it comes to reconcile conflicts between European 
and national law and the question which one takes precedence:  
 
‚The Court of Justice’s effort to establish a de facto sovereign legal order with constitutional 
authority in its own right have provoked and will provoke reactions of political and judicial 
players at the national level’ (Eckes, 2012: 249). 
 
Accordingly, we find an extensive jurisprudence by constitutional courts that have been 
trying to accommodate the supremacy of European law with Member States 
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constitutional law. Here, the European challenges to political authority have provoked 
constitutional conflicts in many Member States in a way that constitutional courts had to 
deal with European claims to political authority that were incompatible with their 
framework of national constitutional sovereignty. From these constitutional conflicts has 
emerged a variety of jurisprudence that has tried to resolve these conflicts over decades. 
This constitutional adjudication provides an inspirational source for theorising about 
constitutional sovereignty in Europe as it delineates the formidable practical impacts of 
sovereignty questions and the very specific concerns of the constitutional actors about 
sovereignty in their Member States. If a new concept of sovereignty aspires to provide 
explanatory and practical value for constitutional reality, then it cannot ignore the 
concerns of the actors that are not only immediately involved but also experts in 
constitutional law in their countries. That is why the constitutional adjudication of 
European law supremacy in Germany and the United Kingdom are example cases as 
with regard to constitutional sovereignty they are located on the opposite poles of the 
concepts of sovereignty. While Germany employs a very strong version of legal 
constitutionalism where the constitution enjoys highest authority, the United Kingdom 
and its political constitution – that originally did not even distinguish between 
constitutional and statutory law – gives highest authority to the parliament. Thus the 
constitutional adjudication in these two countries is a rich source for theorizing about a 
new sovereignty concept as it provides very different theoretical and practical expertise 
on how sovereignty is and ought to be in operation. In Germany and the United 
Kingdom the constitutional courts have developed quite diverse strategies to deal with 
sovereignty challenges. Although different in their accounts, due to different 
constitutional traditions, however, the strategies developed by both the German FCC and 
the British Law Lords have in common their basic assumption about sovereignty. Quite 
disappointingly, in their adjudication of the constitutional conflicts they both imply and 
reinforce a classical notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. However, as it is 
precisely indivisible and unitary sovereignty that are challenged by the European 
constitution, the solutions developed by the constitutional courts are inadequate to 
resolve the constitutional conflicts in the long run and hence can only temporarily 
conceal the principal issue at stake that will most certainly come up again when the next 
treaty ratification or amendment is due.  
Since this chapter is concerned with developing a new concept of sovereignty that is no 
longer based on the assumption of indivisible and unitary sovereignty, it is imperative to 
consider both the conceptual challenges as well as the practical side of how the 
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challenges to sovereignty have been dealt with in constitutional adjudication. This 
practical side has two aspects: first, it is part of the problem since by drawing on a 
classical notion of sovereignty the constitutional jurisprudence often reinforces the issue 
at stake, instead of attempting to find a sustainable, theoretically sound and practical 
solution. Second, the practical dimension of the sovereignty challenge must be part of 
the solution. This in a way that the concerns expressed by the Member States 
constitutional courts cannot be ignored in the process of developing a concept of 
constitutional sovereignty that is adequate for the new configuration of political 
authority in Europe and acceptable for political and legal actors in the Member States. 
The latter is no marginal but rather critical aspect – a new concept of sovereignty that is 
not ‚absorbed’ by the affected institutions and actors, who after all define the prospects 
and limits of the European constitution, would not deploy any practical impact and thus 
would remain irrelevant.  
That is why in a first step in this chapter, the two exemplary cases of Germany and the 
UK will be elaborated as to how their constitutional courts have adjudicated the 
challenges to constitutional sovereignty that have emerged from the European 
constitution. In the following we will have a look on how two constitutional courts from 
very different constitutional traditions – the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
and the British Law Lords – have tried to reconcile the sovereignty challenges evolving 
particularly from European law supremacy with their accounts for national constitutional 
sovereignty (1). Here it will be shown that the approaches of the two constitutional 
courts are part of the problem in different ways: The German FCC has jealously 
defended national constitutional supremacy and only conditionally accepted the 
supremacy of European law. This account, in one or the other way, is found throughout 
all its judgements and has been based on legal reasoning that reinforces the classical 
notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty (1a). Against the odds of widespread Euro-
scepticism in the United Kingdom, however, the Law Lords have developed a rather 
pragmatic acceptance of European law supremacy that seems to originate less in a 
jealous defence of parliamentary sovereignty than in pragmatic reasoning which 
ultimately falls short of developing a comprehensive alternative account of 
constitutional sovereignty in the UK (1b). In other words: while the German FCC has 
been too anxious and conservative in its approach towards sovereignty, the Law Lords’ 
seem to have settled for it too hastily and prematurely. Both accounts, however, do not 
meet or address the challenges of the sovereignty challenge accurately. They ultimately 
fail to account for the new and specific architecture of sovereignty in the European 
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Union. Consequently, it is necessary to develop and revise the concept of sovereignty in 
a way that it truly reflects the challenges to the conceptual assumptions of indivisible 
and unitary sovereignty. That is why in a second step in this chapter a multidimensional 
concept of sovereignty will be introduced (2). Here it will be argued that this new 
sovereignty concept is broadly located within constitutional-pluralist approaches while 
opposing the assumptions of global constitutionalism (2a). Then the concept of 
multidimensional sovereignty in Europe will be elaborated. Multidimensional hereby 
means that multiple sources of authority in Europe and the Member States constitute a 
complementary (non-indivisible) authority structure that transcends the traditional 
notion of indivisible sovereignty (2b). Additionally, multidimensional also means that 
multiple levels of authority constitute a multilevel (non-unitary) constitutional structure 
that transcends the classical idea of unitary sovereignty (2c). Lastly, it will be explained 
how this new concept is a meaningful and useful alternative that is also employable in 
constitutional practice and politics.  
4.1  The sovereignty ‘backlash’ in the adjudication of 
European law supremacy in Germany and the United 
Kingdom 
 
‚Some national courts, notably the German Constitutional Court, have not only appeared to be 
reluctant to accept unconditional primacy of European law, they also have contested the 
authority of the ECJ’ (Mayer, 2006: 5). 
 
The incorporation of transnational European law, that has characteristics of both national 
and international law, into the national legal orders has provoked constitutional conflicts 
in a number of Member States. As concluded previously, the configuration of authority 
in the European constitution – that means in particular multiple sources of authority, 
multiple levels of authority and non-hierarchical relations between political authorities – 
undermines the classical concept of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. The clash 
between this new configuration of authority in Europe and the classical understanding of 
Member State sovereignty becomes most obvious in the adjudication on European law 
supremacy that has been issued by several constitutional courts, especially the German 
FCC and the British Law Lords. Although the supremacy of European law has not been 
written into the Founding Treaties, it has been developed by the ECJ since its Costa vs 
ENEL decision of 1964. However, the ECJ’s dogmatic claim to European law 
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supremacy and the tendency of the Community to gain more and more powers and to 
expand its competences has been a ‘ticking constitutional time bomb’ (Weiler/ 
Trachtman, 1997: 387f.) for sooner or later the Member States constitutional courts felt 
inclined to draw a line between the authority of the Member States and of the EU. 
Especially in Member States envisaging a dualist approach of incorporating international 
into national law, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, the constitutional courts 
have rejected the ECJ’s view on the hierarchy of norms that subjected national 
constitutional law to European law supremacy (Kwiecien, 2005: 1486ff.; Ludwikowski, 
1999: 276ff.). As a result of this constitutional conflict, supremacy has been 
pragmatically accepted, set aside specific constitutional reservations in some Member 
States, by the supreme courts of most Member States. However, instead of accepting 
supremacy of the European legal order unconditionally, most of the constitutional courts 
have established a ‘fine-tuned legal balance’ that is not expressing a ‘smooth 
harmonization’, but rather a ‘peaceful co-existence’ (de Witte, 1995: 161). That means 
in pragmatic terms the constitutional courts have found a practical solution to the 
constitutional conflicts arising from the supremacy question. Nevertheless, the 
dogmatic-conceptual conflict remains as the legal reasoning of the constitutional courts 
invoke a classical understanding of indivisible and unitary sovereignty that is 
incompatible with the architecture of authority in the European constitution. The way 
how the constitutional courts have dealt with those challenges and resolved the 
constitutional conflicts demonstrates that their solutions are based on notions of classical 
sovereignty – therefore they can only temporarily mask the constitutional problems by 
providing pragmatic (UK) or even impractical (Germany) approaches towards 
sovereignty.  
 
 
4.1.1  Germany – conditional acceptance of European law 
supremacy 
 
‚The BVerfG has never relinquished its claim to a right to decide the point at which it would 
leverage its constitutional control; it merely modified this threshold’ (Mayer, 2010: 415). 
 
Being one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), Germany has been widely regarded as a strong proponent of European 
integration. However, European law supremacy has not been accepted in Germany 
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without reservations. The FCC has rather established differentiated legal reasoning that 
practically grants European law supremacy, but subjects it to Germany’s constitutional 
supremacy in a dogmatic way. Although the supremacy of Community law over German 
statutory legislation had been soon accepted (BVerfGE 31, 145, 147), the supremacy of 
European law over constitutional law has been strongly resisted. The resistance of the 
FCC against the primacy of European law targeted in particular the ultimate 
constitutional review of EU legal acts and the allocation of powers between the 
European and the national level (Scheunig, 2004: 704ff.) and was grounded in the 
principle of constitutional supremacy and its underlying notion of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty. In what way this has raised constitutional conflict and how the FCC has 
reasoned its reservations, will be shown in the following by outlining the most important 
FCC judgements throughout the history of European integration. 
 
 
‘Solange I’ 1974 and ‘Solange II’ 1986 – counter-limits to European law supremacy 
 
Though Germany has been a major proponent of European integration, its courts – 
especially the FCC – have been generally suspicious towards increasing regulation and 
policy making on the European level. This suspicion was mainly grounded in the fact 
that the high standard of fundamental rights protection as ensured by the German Basic 
Law had no pendant in European law. It has been this lack of protection of rights whilst 
constantly expanding regulatory activity on the European level that has caused 
reservation among the German courts. The problem in particular was that the remedies 
for individuals against violations of rights by European legal acts were not 
commensurate with the protection level established by the German Basic Law. 
Therefore, in its 1974 Solange I35 judgement the FCC held that as long as the 
Communities do not provide for a codified catalogue of fundamental rights and an equal 
level of protection, the FCC retains the power to examine secondary European law if it 
violated basic rights and principles of the German constitution. This judgement 
fundamentally opposed the ECJ’s case law in two ways: first, by subjecting the 
jurisdiction for reviewing European legal acts to a court that does not belong to the 
European legal order: the German FCC; and second, by applying a scrutiny standard 
other than the Treaties: the German constitution. In other words: European law could be 
                                                       
35 BVerfGE 37, 271; English translation in 2 CLMR 540 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. 
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scrutinized by a non-European institution and measured against a non-European 
standard. However, in 1986, the FCC abandoned this position in practical terms. In 
Solange II36 it ruled that the Community has now developed its own system of 
protection of fundamental rights – through the ECJ’s case law – that was equal to the 
level required by the German constitution. By holding that ‘as long as’ there is effective 
protection ensured by the ECJ, the FCC would not exercise its jurisdiction. Both of the 
judgements developed a theory of counter-limits: the first counter limit is the 
equivalence principle, the second that the transfer of sovereignty rights does not allow 
for abandoning the identity of the German constitutional order. Though practically 
abandoning its competences by not exercising them, the FCC did not give up on its 
jurisdiction as such. It rather imposed a condition on the European rights protection: the 
principle of equivalence for which the FCC might control in cases of doubt (de Witte, 
1995: 158; Reich, 1996: 104f.; Grimm, 1997: 231ff.). In other words: the FCC did not 
accept the supremacy theory of European law over German constitutional law but 
regards the German constitution as the highest authority that cannot be delegated to 
other authorities. The only reason not to exercise its principal authority, however, is the 
equivalence approach that does not require double-check. The ‘Solange’-reasoning thus 
draws on a notion of authority ultimately and solely vested in the German constitution 
and thus sovereignty that is indivisible and unitary.  
 
 
‘Maastricht’ 1993 – the co-operative relationship 
 
In the Maastricht decision37 that followed upon the ratification of the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU), the FCC ruled that it still has the jurisdiction to challenge 
Community legal acts in case they exceed the Union’s competence or infringe 
fundamental rights. This was because the constitutional requirement of involving the 
German Bundestag in all relevant steps in European integration ultimately defined the 
limits of European legal acts. Otherwise they would be ultra vires. Because the 
conditions were set out in the German constitution, it has to be the German FCC (not an 
external court as the ECJ) that controls the powers that have been conferred to the 
European Union and the protection of fundamental rights. However, the FCC stated that 
                                                       
36 BVerfGE 73, 339. 
37 BVerfGE 85, 155; English translation in 1 CLMR 57 Manfred Brunner et al. vs the 
European Union Treaty. 
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it exercises its competences in a relationship of co-operation with the ECJ. In this co-
operative relationship it is the ECJ’s task to guarantee fundamental rights protection in 
each particular case, whereas it is up to the FCC to maintain the general standard of 
protection. Consequently, the FCC is still authorised to review European legal acts in 
order to scrutinize as to whether they remained within the national-constitutional limits 
of conferred powers or transgressed them. Furthermore, the FCC emphasized again the 
supreme sovereignty of the German state: all authority of the Union would derive from 
the Member States that remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties.’ Therefore only European 
law that is grounded in the Treaties (that represent intergovernmental agreement 
between the Member States) could set aside national law (Reich, 1996: 105; Wieland 
1994: 261ff.; Grimm, 1997: 232ff.).  
In sum, the German constitutional court defended its position to examine Union law by 
applying the standard of German constitutional law. Again, it rejected the theory of 
principal supremacy of European law as it had been developed by the ECJ, and offered a 
theory of practical co-operation that is yet based on contrary dogmatic and conceptual 
premises. The constitutional conflict arising in the relationship between European and 
national constitutional law was therefore resolved in favour of the Member States by 
employing a classical notion of sovereignty. This endeavour has been labelled as a 
‘rediscovery of sovereignty’.38 By defending the identity of the constitutional order as 
belonging to the German state and invoking constitutional supremacy, the FCC in fact 
holds that state sovereignty that cannot be divided or dispersed (de Witte, 1995: 166ff.; 
Reich, 1996: 105). This reasoning advocates a classical concept of indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty which has in fact been transcended by the architecture of the 
European polity and which does not longer reflect the constitutional reality in Europe. 
 
 
‘Bananenmarktordnung’ 
 
The so-called banana case is complicated as it involves national, European and 
international law as well as the national constitutional courts’ competence to review 
European legal acts. The case was triggered by a Council Regulation in 1993 that aimed 
at harmonizing the fragmented, national banana markets. Due to previously highly 
                                                       
38 In form of the legal construct of popular sovereignty laid down in the German Basic Law 
as the Maastricht ruling draws upon the individual right to vote laid down in Art. 38 as the 
basis for democracy in Germany and the European Union accordingly. 
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diverging national policies and conflicting GATT provisions the harmonization measure 
was challenged in the WTO arena, before national courts and the ECJ. The litigation 
before German courts has led to judgements which contested the affirmation of the 
Regulation by the ECJ. Regardless of the outcome of the litigation on the international 
level, however, the most important issue here is the jurisdictional conflict between the 
ECJ and German courts whereby the latter have shown ‘signs of simmering revolt 
against the Court of Justice rulings on the subject’ (Peers, 1998: 154) and against its 
exclusive jurisdiction in fundamental rights protection. So this case has shown that the 
competence still hold by national (constitutional) courts – namely to review European 
legal acts according to national constitutional standards – was not mere theory, but 
practically carried out and in blunt contrast to the ECJ’s jurisdictional claims.  
 
 
‘Lisbon’ 2009 – ultra vires and constitutional identity review 
 
Though eventually approving the transformation act and therefore the Lisbon Treaty in 
its Lisbon39 judgment on 30 June 2009, the FCC imposed significant limits to further 
integration in Europe. Hereby, the FCC’s reasoning combines claims of democratic 
theory with a classical understanding of sovereignty. Unlike in the previous Maastricht 
decision, the court now specified ‘substantial responsibilities’ that must be retained at 
the national level and could not be transferred to the EU unless violating the German 
constitution. According to the court’s reasoning, those responsibilities or ‚core state 
functions’ would emerge from the political formation of economic, cultural and social 
circumstances of life. In order to identify these non-transferrable core state functions, the 
FCC establishes two approaches that both originate in the positive, democratic principle 
of the German constitution. The first has been labelled as the ‘ethno-cultural’ (Steinbach 
2010) or the ‘constitutional identity’ (Schorkopf 2009) approach and is grounded in the 
idea that there are significant cultural differences between Member States impeding a 
European demos. The second approach is described as the ‘essentiality’ (Steinbach 
2010) or ‘electoral democracy’ (Schorkopf 2009) approach. It evokes a form of 
legitimisation as required by the principle of essentiality of German constitutional law. 
According to this, ‘essential’ policies must be enacted by the parliament that is directly 
legitimised by the German citizens. The court states, however, that this principle does 
                                                       
39 BVerfGE 123, 267. 
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not require an identical counterpart on the European level. Nevertheless, the reassertion 
of democracy in Lisbon – that is not only furthering but extending its Maastricht 
predecessor – has important consequences for future European integration. Core national 
functions must be maintained at the national level and are not subject to integration. All 
remaining amenable powers are transferred according to the principle of conferral and 
thus can be scrutinized for ultra vires. That means, all exercise of power on the 
European level was based on delegation by the Member States. National parliaments, 
not the European Parliament, were the subject of legitimization - sovereignty therefore 
remained ultimately within the Member States as the Masters of the Treaties (Schorkopf, 
2009: 1220ff.; Steinbach, 2010: 374ff.; Jancic, 2010: 353, 381). 
By establishing the review standards of constitutional identity and ultra vires,40 the FCC 
entitles itself to examine any European legal act in case it could transgresses the 
competences delegated to the EU or the limits set by national constitutional identity. As 
a consequence, the FCC abandons its previous position not to exercise its scrutiny 
powers (Solange) or to assert them in a co-operative relationship (Maastricht). Through 
the re-affirmation of the dualist approach towards European integration and adopting 
new standards of review, the FCC denies to integrate the German parliament into a 
pluralist or multilevel constitution. The Lisbon judgement thus can be seen to express 
the German judges’ ‘fear of subjecting themselves to the European Court of Justice’ 
(Grosser, 2009: 1263) and the new architecture of sovereignty within the European 
constitution. Instead, the FCC jealously defends its position as the final arbiter and 
draws on a strong notion of indivisible and unitary Member State sovereignty as both the 
source and limit for European integration. Like in Maastricht, classical sovereignty is 
‘still the guiding explanatory doctrine and national parliaments are now more than ever 
the central institutions of the Union’s democracy’ (Jancic, 2010: 340). In Lisbon the 
FCC re-invokes its well-known conceptual elements of sovereignty – ‘Staatenverbund’, 
Member States as Masters of the Treaties and citizens as the subject of democratic 
legitimization. The court frames sovereignty as a quantifiable concept whose elements 
can be listed whilst others can be singled out, and the German citizens ultimately 
deciding on that (Jancic, 2010: 353ff., 382; Niedobidek, 2009: 1269ff.; Schorkopf, 2009: 
1220ff.).).  
However, practically the FCC and other German courts have rarely made use of their 
reservations. The restrictions as set out by the FCC’s jurisprudence have in fact 
                                                       
40 By applying ultra vires, instead of ‘legal instrument transgressing the limits’ 
(ausbrechender Rechtsakt) as set out in Maastricht, the FCC recourses to a well-known 
approach of international law. 
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remained without ‘practical significance’ (Scheunig, 2004: 710; Pliakos/ Anagnostaras, 
2011: 119). The FCC has barely ever realized its reservations (as in the banana cases of 
Lisbon) and mostly been supportive for European policies. However, the fact that the 
FCC’s bark has been worse than its bite does not change the fact that the problem of 
accommodating the European challenges with constitutional sovereignty remains. So 
far, the FCC has rather re-enforced the notion of classical sovereignty instead of offering 
a conceptual alternative that adequately reflects the new conditions of sovereignty in 
Europe. 
 
In conclusion, the notion of indivisible and unitary sovereignty has been jealously 
defended by the German constitutional court throughout the history of adjudicating the 
constitutional conflict caused by the principle of European law supremacy. As early as 
1974 it has established its competence to review European secondary law for  
compliance with German constitutional law and based this argument on the doctrine of 
constitutional supremacy and thus a classical concept of constitutional sovereignty. Over 
the years, the FCC has refrained from exercising its competence – however, in principle 
it has never given up its authority to do so and occasionally proved its willingness to 
make use of its competence (banana cases). The invocation of classical indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty by constitutional jurisprudence in Germany has failed to 
accommodate constitutional theory with the actual legal-political realities in Europe. 
Although a solution for practical case solution has been found, the conceptual 
incompatibility remains – and is likely to rise again.  
 
 
4.1.2  The United Kingdom – pragmatic acceptance of 
European law supremacy 
 
Constitutional developments during the last half of the 20th century have challenged the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and its conceptual status within British 
constitutionalism (Elliot, 2004: 554; Gordon, 2009: 519 ff.; Loftus, 2003: 4 f.). The 
incorporation of the human rights regime provided by the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law,41 and the devolution42 processes had 
                                                       
41 Another source of pressure on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is the 
incorporation of the human rights regime, as provided by the ECHR, into British law and 
remedy. Especially three provisions of the HRA 1998 Act have imposed significant 
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significant impact on the doctrinal status of parliamentary sovereignty. However, the 
most important constitutional challenge Britain has faced was its membership in the 
European Union. As EU law expressively recognises the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the litigation of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as a source of its own human rights standard, some of the effects of the ECHR 
are relevant in the EU context. Here, especially, the following two ‘European’ 
phenomena have particularly challenged parliamentary sovereignty: first, the increased 
role of domestic courts in human rights litigation, and second, the supremacy of 
European law. Britain has been member of the ECHR since 1953, but only with the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) it has opened human rights litigations under the 
ECHR to settlement in domestic courts. How this should be evaluated is a highly 
controversial question in constitutional theory. Some authors see it carrying judges away 
from their ‘constitutionally proper function of interpreting legislation’ towards judicial 
legislation without democratic legitimization as courts were unrepresentative and 
unaccountable entities (Cram, 2006: 61 ff.). At the same time, it is also acknowledged 
that courts might be in charge of acting as the ‘bulwark of individual liberty’ against 
infringements by a powerful executive (Cram, 2006: 64). Cram eventually suggests not 
to regard this role of the courts as a threat on elected representatives but as a form of 
constitutional dialogue more or less involving courts in substantial decisions (Cram, 
2006: 66 ff.). Others, however, regard the relationship between parliament and courts in 
the UK to be now reversed: originally it was the courts carrying out parliament’s will, 
but now, in human rights matters, this was exactly the other way around (Elliot, 2004: 
553). Here it will not be judged as to whether this kind of involving domestic courts in 
human rights matters means a ‘constitutional dialogue’ or illegitimate ‘judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                 
challenges on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by re-framing the relationship 
between parliament and the courts. First, the duty of the courts to render domestic statutes 
compliant with provisions of the ECHR. This means, that of the several alternative 
interpretations of a statutory provision the courts are to apply the one that is consistent with 
the ECHR. If such a compliant interpretation is not allowed by the statute’s literal meaning, 
than, secondly, a declaration of incompatibility may be granted by higher courts. Such a 
declaration does not affect the validity of the provision, but opens up the possibility of a 
fast-track amending legislation – that means legislation triggered by the courts. In theory, 
parliamentary legislation derogating from the ECHR is still possible, but practically 
hindered by those HRA 1998 provisions. So the consistency with the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is only formal, as legislative powers and therefore parliamentary 
sovereignty are diminished (Elliot, 2002: 346 ff.; Loftus, 2003: 25). 
42 Another challenge to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been imposed by 
devolution granted to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The devolution legislation rests 
upon the notion that the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament is sustained. But this is 
mere theory, as it seems to be practically impossible to take away those competences and 
freedoms once given to regional legislatures (Elliot, 2002: 352; Elliot, 2004: 546). 
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supremacy.’ Regardless of how this new relationship between courts and parliament 
might be evaluated from a normative point of view, the human rights litigation under the 
HRA 1998 actually reflects the new conditions of constitutionalism and a new reality of 
shifted and dispersed political authority in Europe. 
The second phenomena accounting for a fundamental transition of the British 
constitution is the supremacy of EU law which means the most significant source of 
pressure on constitutional theory (Gordon, 2009: 519). The United Kingdom acession to  
the European Communities in 1973 was governed by the European Communities Act 
1972 (ECA 1972). By joining the EC Britain had to recognise the supremacy of 
Community law as established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and therefore to 
accept a superior legal authority other than the Westminster Parliament (Loftus, 2003: 
28). The crux here was, that – according to the notion of parliamentary sovereignty – the 
1972 Parliament could not bind its future successors to the supremacy of EU law and 
derogate from the doctrine of implied repeal.43 Several constitutional judgements have 
dealt with this particular aspect of European law supremacy – the most important are 
Macarthys Ltd v Smith,44 the Factortame I45 & II46 cases and Thoburn v Sunderland City 
Council.47 The approaches employed by the Law Lords trying to rationalise 
parliamentary sovereignty under the condition of European law supremacy over the time 
have developed a pragmatic solution for the supremacy struggle, whilst a fully-fledged 
theoretical account is still not found. However, unlike the FCC judges, the constitutional 
judges in Britain have at least recognised a transformation of the core principle of the 
British constitution caused by constitutional developments, especially Britain’s 
membership in Europe.  
 
 
‘Macarthys Ltd vs Smith No 2’ 1980 
 
                                                       
43 If a law conflicts with an earlier one, the later act takes precedence and the conflicting 
provisions of the prior act are repealed. 
44 Macarthys Ltd v Smith (No.2) [1980] EWCA Civ 7, [1981] QB 180. 
45 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 1) [1989] UKHL 1 (18 
May 1989). 
46 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1990] UKHL 13 (11 
October 1990) – the whole Factortame litigation is by now up to No 7. 
47 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin). 
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In Macarthys, the Court of Appeal was presented the problem that a UK statute was 
inconsistent with Community law but subsequent to the ECA 1972.48 Normally, as 
implied by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and implied repeal, the subsequent 
statute would have repealed the former ECA 1972. This would have meant to disregard 
the supremacy of EC law that was recognised in the ECA 1972. The Law Lords, 
however, found a solution for that conflict. Lord Justice Denning identified UK law 
itself – not European treaty law or the case law of the ECJ – as the reason for the 
primacy of EC law:  
 
‚That priority is given by our own law. It is given by the European Communities Act 1972 itself. 
Community law is now part of our law and, whenever there is any inconsistency, Community 
law has priority. It is not supplanting English law. It is part of our law which overrides any 
other part which is inconsistent with it.’49 
 
The problems for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty itself are not yet addressed 
by the Law Lords. Nevertheless, the importance of Macarthys is that Lord Justice 
Denning developed a principle of construction – assuming that no parliament would 
intend to legislate inconsistently with Community law unless explicitly stating so. That 
means that the ordinary rules of Parliament cannot bind its successor and implied repeal 
would no longer be applied in cases of conflict between UK law and European law 
(Allan, 1983: 32). Therefore Macarthys has found a way to somehow get around the 
conceptual challenge for indivisible and unitary parliamentary sovereignty, because the 
principle of construction – presuming that no UK parliament would issue legislation 
inconsistent with European law without having good reasons to do so – avoids the 
situation of conflict from the outset. However, this principle of construction has limited 
scope as interpretation cannot stretch the original wording of legal provisions to the 
infinite. Accordingly, a conflict rule that is capable of resolving conflict – not avoid it – 
would soon become necessary. 
 
 
‘Factortame I’ 1989 and ‘Factortame II’ 1990 
 
                                                       
48 For a detailed outline of the salient facts of the case see Allan 1983. 
49 Macarthys Ltd vs Smith (No 2) [1980] ECA Civ 7, [1981] QB 180. 
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In the Factortame I50 case, the Law Lords issued an interlocutory injunction against a 
provision of a UK statute contrary to EC law. However, only in Factortame II the 
problem of parliamentary sovereignty is addressed. Here, the Lords reason that the 
voluntary accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities was the 
reason for the supremacy of European law. According to Lord Justice Bridge of 
Harwich, by joining Europe the parliament also acknowledged the supremacy of EC law 
as established by the ECJ:  
 
‚Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it encacted the 
European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary.’51 
 
According to this House of Lords decision, the 1972 Parliament restricted its own 
sovereignty by joining the EC. This alludes to the question that is extensively and 
controversially discussed in the literature on British constitutional theory: What is the 
nature of sovereignty and is a sovereign parliament capable to restrain its own 
sovereignty? There are two prominent theoretical approaches to that question. 
According to Wade (1955), parliament’s sovereignty is continuing, according to 
Jennings (1959), it is self-embracing. The first means, that parliament cannot determine 
the manner or form of future legislation and therefore cannot bind its successors in any 
way. The latter postulates that parliament can indeed control future legislation. An 
important proposition from that approach is that courts are only to apply statutes enacted 
according to the current law-making procedures (Allan, 1983: 22). Both approaches,52 
however, appear somehow paradoxical: If parliament could not limit its own 
sovereignty, than it was already limited in that aspect (Goldsworthy, 2006: 255). One 
suggestion to escape this fallacy was introduced by Allen (1983) who identifies an 
‘underlying fallacy’ in both approaches as they would erroneously assume an ultimate 
principle at the core of every legal order, although there was no such determinate but 
‘simply indeterminate’ principle. That would mean that the question of ultimate 
sovereignty could not be answered as a mere matter of law but contains some degree of 
                                                       
50 see fn 4.1.2. 
51 See fn 45. 
52 Variations of the theory, that limitations on parliamentary sovereignty have been imposed 
by the parliament itself (not by the judges as common law constitutionalism) are the self-
embracing theory, the constituent power theory (constitution amending authority of 
parliament), the abdication theory and the hard cases theory (Goldsworthy, 2006: 261 ff.) 
Another alternative theory framework is limitations imposed by change in official 
consensus; variations here are the legal revolution theory and the consensual change theory 
(Goldsworthy, 2006: 268 ff.). The usefulness of these is not to be evaluated here, but maybe 
subject to further examination. 
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‘inherent elasticity’ (Allan, 1983: 29). However, regardless of how the paradoxical issue 
is eventually resolved or not – what is more important here is that the Law Lords in 
Factortame have gone further than the simple rule of construction that was developed in 
Macarthys. They rather ground European law supremacy in the voluntary submission of 
parliament to the principles of European law and thus in a voluntary act of parliamentary 
self-restriction. Although this qualifies as a practical rule of conflict resolution more 
than does a rule of construction, the Law Lords have yet not theoretically rationalised 
the supremacy of European law (Elliot, 2004: 549).  
 
 
‘Thoburn vs Sunderland City Council’ 2002 
 
In Thoburn,53 the Law Lords finally develop a systematic account for EU law supremacy 
that aims at reconciliation with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Here, they 
argue that the supremacy of European law has been established by the means of UK law. 
These means were a modification of the traditional notion of parliamentary sovereignty 
by common law which has led to the distinction between ordinary and constitutional 
statues in UK public law. Using the words of Lord Justice Laws:  
 
‚The common law has in recent years allowed, or rather created, exceptions to the doctrine of 
implied repeal: a doctrine which was always the common law’s own creature. There are now 
classes or types of legislative provisions which cannot be repealed by mere implication. These 
instances are given, and can only be given, by our own courts, to which the scope and nature of 
Parliamentary sovereignty are ultimately confined. (...). By this means, as I shall seek to explain, 
the courts have found their way through the impasse seemingly created by two supremacies, the 
supremacy of European law and the supremacy of Parliament.’54 
 
Lord Justice Laws justifies the special status of European law not by the ECA 1972, but 
by the common law that has established constitutional statutes that cannot be impliedly 
repealed – simply by the Parliament issuing subsequent legislating – and also have 
elevated status and thus cannot be subjected to simple majority in parliament (Elliot, 
2002: 368 f.). In other words: common law – one of the pillars in British legal tradition – 
has created limits for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. These limits manifest in 
                                                       
53 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (2002) EWHC 195 (Admin) (18 February 2002). 
54 See fn 53. 
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two different types of legal norms: statutory provisions which can be repealed impliedly, 
and constitutional provisions which are not subject to implied repeal. European 
secondary law belongs to the latter and thus cannot be impliedly repealed. This approach 
locates the challenge for parliamentary sovereignty in an intra-systemic source: the 
British common law. Such internal challenge may appear less dangerous and preferable 
over challenges evolving from external sources such as a European legal order. 
However, by admitting to the fact that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is under 
challenge – whether by internal or external sources – the Law Lords recognise that 
parliamentary sovereignty in the classical sense has been transformed. Whether their 
introduction of the common law approach is a ‘convincing judicial rationalization of the 
status of EU law within the UK constitution’ (Elliot, 2004: 551) that provides a sound 
and conclusive theoretical account for accommodating the sovereignty challenges 
emerging from Europe, remains disputable. However, the fact alone that the 
constitutional judges recognise a transition of the classical notion of indivisible and 
unitary sovereignty is remarkable. Unlike the German FCC, the British Law Lords 
appear less jealous when it comes to defending the territory of traditional sovereignty 
notions – which seems ever more surprising in a country notoriously infamous for Euro-
scepticism.  
 
It can be concluded that the Law Lords have developed practical solutions for the 
conflict between parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of European law. In 
Macarthys they established a principle of construction that avoids conflicts between 
norms by ‘harmonising’ them beforehand. In Factortame the Law Lords assumed a 
voluntary self-restriction of parliament to subscribe to the primacy of European law. 
These are pragmatic approaches for accommodating parliamentary sovereignty with the 
principles of European law. However, the Law Lords have long postponed to address 
this issue in a conceptual-dogmatic way. Accordingly, it was only in Thoburn that a 
systematic account for European law supremacy was provided. Here, the Law Lords 
rationalised the challenge for parliamentary sovereignty as an intra-systemic evolution 
originating in British common law that has led to the establishment of two types of law: 
statutory and constitutional law. European secondary law belongs to the latter and is 
therefore exempted from parliamentary sovereignty’s doctrine of implied repeal. Hence, 
the constitutional judges in Britain acknowledge the fact that parliamentary sovereignty 
has been transformed, mainly through Britain’s membership in the EU alongside other 
recent constitutional developments.  
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From this follows that the classical notion of parliamentary sovereignty is no longer 
adequate to understand the architecture of constitutional sovereignty in Europe and the 
United Kingdom. In its Westphalian sense of being indivisible and unitary ‘sovereignty 
no longer provides an adequate expression of the nature of political power relations’ 
within the British constitution in Europe since the structures of exclusive and supreme 
political authority have been transformed. From the classical perspective, there is an 
increasing gap between ‘legal authority’ and ‘actual political authority’ to achieve policy 
objectives (Loughlin, 2000: 145 ff.). That means, that there is no longer only one single 
authority but many sources of authority that are dispersed across several levels and 
entitled to policy-making. There has been a shift in British constitutionalism and 
therefore the parliament now operates under altered circumstances that restrict the scope 
of its authority. Those limitations, however, are not marginal side factors of a ‘natural’ 
constitutional advancement but fundamentally transforming the character of the British 
constitution (Loftus, 2003: 23, 31ff.). Britain’s membership in the EU, devolution, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the greater activism of courts in judicial review are 
indicators of the transformation of the political constitution towards a legal one 
(Loughlin, 2000: 4; Loftus, 2003: 4; Murkens, 2009: 435). This shift, sometimes 
labelled as ‘judicialization’ or ‘constitutionalization’ of politics or even as a ‘liberal-
legal attack on politics’ seeking to enclose it in the ‘straitjacket of law’ (Loughlin, 
2000), means the most ‘fundamental realignments of the constitutional order since the 
end of the 17th century’ (Murkens, 2009: 435). Although practical solutions have been 
found to accommodate parliamentary sovereignty with the European challenges, the 
extents of their theoretical and dogmatic rationalisation and incorporation into a 
consistent concept of British constitutionalism is still disputable. Although some 
scholars regard it as a sufficient solution that ‘elegantly reconciles the legal sovereignty 
of Parliament with what may be termed the pragmatic supremacy of EU law’ (Elliot, 
2004: 551), it can be doubted that the premises and propositions of this common law 
approach are capable of providing a precise account for European law supremacy. On 
the contrary, it needs to be acknowledged that the challenges emerging from the 
European constitution seem fundamentally different from those by common law 
developments and the incorporation of domestic human rights litigation.  
 
The approaches that have been developed by constitutional judges in Germany and the 
United Kingdom in order to answer the question about the final arbiter in case of a 
conflict between European and Member State constitutional law have been perceived as 
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‘an intellectual teaser to which different answers have been given.’ As the ECJ and the 
Member States courts have worked it out in different ways, this seemingly theoretical 
problem could ‘lead to a major bust-up and dissolution.’ The fundamental theoretical 
basis of this question has so far been ‘side-stepped’ by the courts and may in fact remain 
‘a matter without final decision, with conflicting tendencies in the judgments of State 
courts and the ECJ, but with an avoidance of any outright collision’ (Schiemann, 2007: 
486). That is why, quite disappointingly, the adjudication of the German and the British 
constitutional courts do not provide for an alternative account of constitutional 
sovereignty in the European Union. They only provide merely practical solutions for 
accepting European law supremacy but eventually fail to conclusively address the actual 
challenges to sovereignty at stake. That is why in the following the concerns of the 
constitutional courts will be taken into account with regard to the practicality of a new 
and revised sovereignty concept that needs to overcome the assumptions of unitary and 
indivisible sovereignty.  
 
 
4.2  A multidimensional concept of constitutional 
sovereignty in the European Union 
 
‚The basic rule of international legal sovereignty, recognising juridically independent territorial 
entitites, no longer applies in Europe. The EU has no territory separate from that of its 
members, and its memberas are not juridically independent (...) The European Union has 
curtailed the Westphalian/ Vatellian sovereignty of its members and altered the structure of their 
domestic political institutions’ (Krasner, 2001b: 245).  
 
The concept of sovereignty that will be introduced in the following is based on the 
assertion that the architecture of political authority in Europe can be understood in both 
constitutional and sovereignty terms. As explained previously, constitutionalism as a 
concept has explanatory value for the configuration of political authority in the 
European Union. In contrast to others (Chalmers, 2000: 180), it will not be argued that 
the constitution as the framework for sovereignty has lost its hegemonic organisational 
force. Most scholars see related concepts, such as the state, challenged but not the 
concept of constitutionalism itself. Yet ‘constitutionalist rethoric has itself become part 
of the problem.’ Loughlin criticises some scholars for they have ‘too readily abandoned 
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state theory in favour of adherence to a free-standing constitutionalism, and this has left 
them without anchorage in the open seas ahead. The contemporary challenges to 
constitutional doctrine require a return to state-based concepts.’ Thus Loughlin argues in 
favour of re-invoking the science of the state (Loughlin, 2009: 2). Albeit, it can be held 
against this position that states have lost control over certain policy areas such as 
financial markets, environmental policies, trade, resources management, climate change, 
refugees, international crime and terrorism, digital media, information and 
communication technologies etc. That means the conditions for the preservation of 
security, welfare, peace and freedom are changed (Pernice, 2008b: 3). Accordingly, the 
state cannot be the (only) point of reference for constitutionalism anymore but must be 
revised towards a framework beyond the nation state. Here, and similar to nation state-
based approaches, constitutionalism as an analytical framework (for instance to evaluate 
whether a specific polity is constitutional or not) is not only a checklist approach whose 
boxes of specific constitutional features can be ticked and scholars can argue how many 
ticked boxes classify as constitutional or not. It is also a normative legitimising 
framework for political power – when deprived of this normative substance it seems 
questionable what its explanatory value for polities beyond the nation state framework 
could be. On the other hand, too demanding normative criteria (such as demos and 
statehood etc) could preclude the opportunity to gain explanatory value from the transfer 
of constitutionalism to supranational polities.  
However, unlike other international organisations, such as the United Nations, the 
European Union can be reasonably described as constitutional since it establishes 
supranational legislative and administrative bodies whose acts are directly applicable to 
individuals. Respectively, an effective system of fundamental rights protection against 
these acts has been developed which is not to be found in other international human 
rights regimes which impose obligations only on the contracting parties in order to 
protect individuals against the actions of national authorities but not against actions of 
the regime itself. Accordingly, it does not seem justified to extend the term constitution 
or constitutionalism to international organisations or regimes that do not resemble 
differentiated patterns of legislative, executive and judicial powers and their allocation 
to separate institutions, nor a system of fundamental rights protection against these 
powers, nor any involvement of the people affected in any democratic form (Pernice, 
2008b: 8). The European constitution is thus distinctive from international organisations 
or regimes since the European Union has autonomous political authority in many policy 
areas. Furthermore, the development of judicial remedies against its own legal acts 
  
  181 
distinguishes the European Union from classical international organisations (Mayer, 
2003b: 13). As elaborated earlier, the material EU constitution has initiated a 
constitutionalisation process by which an integrated legal order has been established 
within a specific territory. By this constitutionalisation (which itself was triggered by 
increased transnational activity, regulation and thus litigation), the European nation 
states have been transformed into Member States and had to re-define their sovereignty 
by sharing it both in the vertical and horizontal dimension. With regard to this process, 
especially since the ECJ has used the founding treaties to promote an integrated 
multilevel legal order in Europe, the EU can be described as a constitutionalised polity 
(Fabbrini, 2008: 460). 
However, considering the challenges emerging from European constitutionalism to the 
concept of constitutional sovereignty it is evident that careful conceptual adjustment is 
required:  
 
‚Consequently, the most useful way of assessing the prospects of post-national constitutionalism 
is to undertake a reciprocal readjustment of existing constitutional practices beyond the state on 
the one hand, and conventional constitutional expectations on the other’ (Isiksel, 2012: 105). 
 
Pernice even more strongly suggests that  
 
‚constitutionalism is the correct and only possible answer to the present challenges of 
globalisation, provided that the concept of constitution is adjusted to the needs of the 
international multi-layered or multilevel system of governance’ (Pernice, 2008b: 3). 
 
According to Loughlin, the challenges imposed by globalisation and transnationalisation 
on the classical understanding of sovereignty and constitutionalism have been well 
perceived in the scholarly debate. However, there has not been a true paradigm shift – 
scholars yet tend to postulate lots of ‘post-isms’ instead of establishing a conceptual 
framework that transcends the classical assumptions of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty in European constitutionalism. In this thesis, however, it has been argued 
that the European constitution cannot be modelled as a zero-sum game between 
European and Member States sovereignty. It does not mean either a loss or a gain of 
sovereignty, but creates new forms and opportunities of sovereignty. It is therefore 
necessary to modify the classical assumptions of sovereignty and constitutionalism 
instead of denying the constitutional character of this new form of transnational 
constitutional law as this would mean to lose adequate analytical means to understand 
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this new type of law. It has become clear that the Member States no longer possess ‘full’ 
sovereignty in the classical sense. The notion of ‘pooled,’ ‘divided’ or commonly 
exercised sovereignty is rather widely accepted and there already are a few new 
concepts to re-assess sovereignty in the European Union, such as open statehood (Hobe 
1997), late sovereignty (Walker 2003), and governance beyond the state (MacCormick 
1999). A re-interpretation of sovereignty is necessary and useful in order to understand 
the European constitutional order not as a vertically integrated, hierarchical system of 
independent and fully autonomous Member States and European legal orders. There is 
rather a need for a theoretical approach that accounts for national and European law 
constituting ‘complementary sets of legal norms and values’ (Kwiecien, 2005: 1484). 
That means in particular that when it comes to the question of applying the concept of 
sovereignty to the legal and political architecture of the EU, the question about the (in-) 
divisibility of sovereignty is the core question (Nuernberger, 2010: 17). 
 
 
4.2.1  Plural or global constitutionalism in Europe? 
 
When developing a new concept of sovereignty that incorporates revised assumptions 
about indivisible and unitary sovereignty, we have to ascertain where it is located within 
the overall debate about constitutionalism and sovereignty beyond the nation state. As 
outlined previously, many of the classical approaches to re-assess sovereignty beyond 
the nation state suffer from a ‘condition of studied indeterminacy’ leading to a notion of 
the European constitution as two opposing ‘sets of interlocking and interacting legal 
systems that have the potential to answer the same question in mutually contradictory 
ways’ (Schiemann, 2007: 486). Other perspectives, especially in the German debate, 
suggest to distinguish between ‚sovereign rights’ and ‚sovereignty,’ where the first are 
the form in which the latter are exercised and can, unlike sovereignty, be attributed to 
international organizations likewise (de Witte, 1995: 172). However, this point of view 
seems to resemble the pre-Westphalian, feudal structure of political authority that by no 
means is similar to the architecture of political authority in the European Union. In the 
literature, especially two approaches seem to offer alternative accounts for constitutional 
sovereignty in Europe that leave behind the classical Westphalian assumptions of 
constitutionalism and sovereignty. Firstly, there is a remarkable number of ‘pluralist’ 
accounts that re-frame the relationship between legal orders in a non-hierarchical way, 
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such as ‘legal pluralism’ (Buchanan 2009, Barber 2006), ‘constitutional pluralism’ 
(Walker 2002), ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (Kumm 2005), and ‘multi-level 
constitutionalism’ (Pernice 2002), just to mention the most prominent. These pluralist 
approaches are the antithesis to, secondly, ‘global’ or ‘world’ constitutionalism (Peters 
2009; Peters/ Armingeon 2009) that follow a rather monist Kelsenian model. Due to the 
scope of this thesis these approaches cannot be elaborated in detail here, however, the 
basic characteristics of plural and global constitutionalist approaches will be outlined in 
the following in order to illustrate where and for what reasons the revised concept of 
sovereignty of this thesis stands in the debate. 
 
 
Legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism 
 
Legal pluralists observe a plurality of legal regimes which means that in a specific 
jurisdiction there are more than one sources of law; thus fragmentation is the core thesis 
of legal pluralists. Fragmentation means that policy areas are no longer governed by 
‘general’ law but by specialist systems, each of which has its own principles and 
institutions. Those systems are characterised by functional specialisation or functional 
differentiation (Viellechner, 2012: 609f.). However, legal pluralists often suggest to 
regard legal pluralism not as a well-adopted legal theory but as a suggestion for a 
‘metaphoric shift’ towards imagining legal forms not in constitutionalist but pluralist 
terms and to reflect about the implications of such paradigmatic shift (Buchanan, 2009: 
34). Furthermore, the concept of legal pluralism is also designed as an antithesis to 
constitutionalist approaches that base the idea of law on a founding act of a political 
community whose existence is presumed and called into presence at the same time 
through the constitution. Such founding act of a community (be it a nation state or an 
international community) as the point of reference for law causes a paradox that is 
extended from the nation state to international constitutionalism by constitutionalist 
approaches (Buchanan, 2009: 28f.). Buchanan criticises that (only) constitutionalist 
approaches are based on the paradox that the sovereign subject of law is presumed to 
exist prior to the moment when it is constituted by law, and that this moment of 
constitution also causes a moment of exclusion (of others from this constituted political 
community). However, this paradox and moment of exclusion seem not only inherent in 
constitutionalist but all political communities. The establishment of a community is 
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necessarily leading to the exclusion of others, otherwise the community’s jurisdiction 
would be universal and thus not legitimate or legal. Furthermore, the paradox is only 
problematic if constitutionalism is necessarily associated with an act of foundation, 
which does not seem historically nor conceptually sound but a mere fiction. Law and 
politics are always in a mutually constitutive relation that is always paradoxical in a way 
that both presuppose the other before they are constituted (Buchanan, 2009: 29). 
Nevertheless, when addressing this paradox constitutionalist approaches were often 
caught in a normative trap in a way that explaining transnational polities in terms of 
constitutionalism often alludes to a deficient nature of transnational constitutionalism 
when the normative standards of the nation state framework are applied (Buchanan, 
2009: 30f.). Furthermore, due to their concern about hierarchy constitutionalist 
approaches could also not really account for plurality. Although Buchanan 
acknowledges that constitutional pluralism seeks to accommodate plurality within a 
constitutionalist framework (Buchanan, 2009: 32), she criticises the way in which 
constitutionalist approaches often imply  
 
‚both a hierarchy and a trajectory of transnational legalities, in which some emerging legal 
forms are imagined as amore complete (constitution-like) than others. This trajectory, which 
might be said to parallel to the developmental hierarchy of states in the Westphalian order, has 
the effect of privileging certain legal forms, such as judicial norm generation, over others’ 
(Buchanan, 2009: 39). 
 
However, it seems perfectly appropriate to privilege juridical forms as this is required by 
the very idea of law: to provide for collectively binding force, utmost clarity and 
democratic legitimacy. If other forms of norm production would be included then law 
would be equalised to other social norms and thus would lose its distinctive status as 
both a technique of and a limit to government since now any norm could be a legal 
norm. Only by privileging legal forms it is possible to distinguish highly integrated 
polities, such as the EU, as constitutional and insofar distinctive from less integrated 
(international) regimes such as the WTO.  
Legal pluralism as opposed to constitutionalism includes a few ‘points of departure’ 
from traditional constitutionalist thought: first, law is no longer thought to be necessarily 
formal and identified with state action; second, it does not identify law with ‘posited 
rules, distinct and territorially defined’; and third, it does not construe law and politics or 
society as dichotomously (Buchanan, 2009: 35). Problematic herby is that it dilutes the 
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idea of law as ‘clearly delineated and identifiable’ and envisages a ‘plethora of often 
competing normative frameworks’ wherein law is only one of many and equally valid 
type of norms. It recognises other forms of ‚law’ that are ‘less legal’ and includes ‘a 
much wider range of formal and informal, institutional and discursive mechanisms’ 
(Buchanan, 2009: 35). This undermines the idea of law as the only collectively binding 
normative force that has been authorised by legitimate political authority and thus takes 
primacy over competing normative frameworks such as religious and moral norms that 
are not authoritatively binding on the subjects within a political community. In more 
drastic terms: If everything is law then nothing is law – hence it can be questioned 
whether legal pluralism is after all ‘legal’ since it actually does not have an idea of law 
whatsoever distinctive from other normative frameworks. However, so far law is the 
only technique or form to realise and communicate the outcomes of the political process 
in a collectively binding form. As there seems no alternative in near sight, law continues 
to be the dominant form to manifest legitimate and legal political authority and therefore 
maintains its privileged and elevated status.  
A pluralist model of legal systems requires multiple sources of law and the possibility of 
inconsistency between legal rules to resolve norm conflicts. The overlap and 
interlocking between the European and Member States legal orders can be described as 
pluralist as each legal order remains distinct but will be faced with inconsistent rules of 
validity (Barber, 2006: 308, 327). However, in contrast to the argument made by legal 
pluralists that this inconsistency and ambiguity should be welcomed, here it is argued 
that while inconsistency might be systemic, for normative reasons inherent in the very 
idea of law – clarity, predictability and even application of law – it is necessary to 
provide for a consistent rule of conflict resolution. Regardless of the political perks of 
inconsistency – be it an expression of the political ‘tacit agreement to disagree’ or 
‘constitutional self-defence’ of the legal actors involved – it has dangerous implications 
for the very idea of law that cannot be left unresolved but must be addressed. Although 
it may be impossible to reconcile the competing claims about validity by sound legal 
theorizing, however, they can be addressed by legal reasoning based on normative 
assertions. These are about the functions and requirements of law and go beyond mere 
pragmatic reasoning in a way that they are based on genuinely legal accounts. In other 
words: they may not originate in dogmatic legal theorizing but in normative and 
functional reasoning inherent in the idea of law and are therefore of genuine legal 
character instead of merely pragmatic nature. That means, the contradictory rules of 
validity and supremacy must be accommodated for the sake of law and its normative 
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principles. Also for practical jurisprudential reasons and related claims about rule of law 
it seems preferable that a consistent rule for conflict resolution is in operation (for 
instance a supremacy rule as functional rule instead of a validity rule as will be shown 
later). 
 
Constitutional pluralism as the most prominent pluralist concept mainly opposes the 
monistic idea that there can be only one claim to political authority:  
 
‚Constitutional pluralism, in contrast, recognises that the European order inaugurated by the 
Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional confines of international law and now 
makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that these claims exist alongside the 
continuing claims of states. The relationship between the orders, that is to say, is now horizontal 
rather than vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical’ (Walker, 2002: 337). 
 
Or in other words:  
 
‚Constitutional pluralism refers to a plurality of constitutional sources of authority and 
competing claims to jurisdictional supremacy by autonomous, interacting, and overlapping 
public (state and supranational) legal orders, whose relationship must be also characterized as 
heterarchical and which creates a potential for constitutional conflicts that have to be solved in 
a non-hierarchical manner’ (Cohen, 2012: 70). 
 
Constitutional pluralism takes a  stance on constitutionalism that is different from legal 
pluralism. Instead of regarding constitutionalism as a quest for hierarchy it is seen as a 
variable position of how different types of polities establish political authority and how 
they interact with each other. Therefore constitutionalism is not only a property of 
polities but also a medium of interconnection between different claims of authority 
(Walker, 2002: 340). The criteria to identify constitutionalism (beyond the nation state) 
are two basic constitutive criteria: the development of an explicit constitutional 
discourse and the claim for authority and sovereignty. There are also three governance 
criteria: jurisdictional scope, interpretive autonomy and an institutional structure to 
govern the polity. Lastly, there are two societal criteria: the specification of criteria of 
membership in the polity and the procedures of articulating membership within the 
polity (Walker, 2002: 342f.). 
However, even constitutional pluralists themselves admit that there are structural weak-
points in the concept of constitutional pluralism: First, pluralism may mutate into a new 
form of constitutional singularity or monism, driven by its tendency towards hierarchy 
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and unity in the constitutional logic. Second, constitutional pluralism turns out to be 
constitutional plurality in a way that is not distinct from the classical Westphalian model 
but a variety of norms that are constitutional and belonging to the same hierarchical 
legal system. In this classical sense, ‘there is simply no conceptual scope for any 
heterarchical legal relations, that operate between distinct constitutional singularities, to 
possess their own properly and distinctly constitutional character’ (Walker, 2002: 19) If 
constitutional pluralism should be substantially more than constitutional plurality, a 
constitutional code needs to be provided that operates the heterarchical relationships 
between the constitutional orders and that does not necessarily emanate from one 
singular order. Third, the possibility of imagining constitutional pluralism constituted by 
heterarchical relationships between various legal orders may be due to the fact that these 
legal entities do not claim to have constitutional character (Walker, 2002: 18ff.).  
 
Despite its weaknesses, the idea of (constitutional and legal) pluralism seems appealing 
at first sight, since it gives maximum effect to different legal systems as they are not 
brought into a hierarchical order by subordinating one to another based on systemic or 
case-by-case rules of conflict. The resolution of conflicts between inconsistent rules of 
validity is not something that is of particular focus in these concepts. However, such 
conflict rules seem crucial for making constitutional plurality operative and thus are 
essential in order to turn plurality into real pluralism. Both theoretical accounts, legal 
and constitutional pluralism, leave such cases of conflict essentially irreconcilable which 
undermines a fundamental normative idea of law: that it provides for consistent, 
predictable and uniformly applied rules (of conflict resolution). With regard to European 
law that means that in case of a conflict between a legal provision of a Member State 
and a European norm a rule of conflict solution is required that is the same in every 
Member State and that produces the same result in every Member State, regardless of 
which judge or which court or which legal tradition is involved. Normative values of 
law, such as rule of law or ‘Rechtsstaat’, require law to be evenly applied throughout its 
jurisdiction and to produce predictable results of conflict resolution – otherwise law 
might as well lose its character as law. Accordingly, within the jurisdiction of European 
law there cannot be principal plurality of legal norms in a way that there is no consistent 
rule available for conflict resolution, but which is left only to case-by-case reasoning 
based on mere circumstances and the discretion of the ruling judge. A plurality of 
equally valid legal norms that cannot be coherently nor consistently accommodated with 
each other implies the impossibility of conflict resolution. That is why concepts of legal 
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or constitutional pluralism are problematic and impractical as they do not account for the 
necessity of a rule of conflict. Such rule of conflict remains impossible in strictly 
pluralist approaches as they cannot provide for systemic rules but merely arbitrary 
accounts for conflict resolution – which is ultimately incompatible with the very idea of 
law requiring even application, clarity, consistency and predictability. Additionally, in 
the European Union there seems no true plurality of several constitutional orders but 
rather one, multilevel constitutional order that consists of several interlocking and 
‘geared’ layers - European and Member State legal orders - that constitute an overall and 
coherent European legal order. Instead of isolated plurality we rather find institutional 
‘bridging mechanisms’ which ensure constitutional connection so that ‘there is close 
structural linkage between national and supranational sites of authority’ (Walker, 2002: 
22). Consequently, there is no strict plurality of singular legal orders in Europe but 
mutual correspondence between several legal layers that make up the overarching, 
multilevel European constitutional legal order. 
 
 
‘World’ or ‘global’ constitutionalism 
 
The antithesis to plural legal regimes is the concept of global or world constitutionalism 
that seeks to explain the European constitution and its configuration of political 
authority in terms of a global and monistic development of constitutionalism. Here, 
global constitutionalism is not only a descriptive account but a normative theory 
suggesting a specific solution to the absence of clear order and relationships between 
different legal systems (Volk, 2012: 553). Global constitutionalism therefore can also be 
an academic or political agenda that advocates and applies constitutionalist principles in 
the international legal sphere (Peters, 2009: 397) - while there is a considerable degree 
of ‘conceptual confusion’ in the field (Peters/ Armingeon, 2009: 386). Broadly speaking, 
global constitutionalism is a framework to understand in constitutional terms the 
proliferation, overlapping and interconnection of diverse legal orders at subnational, 
supranational, international and transnational levels. Unlike societal constitutionalism 
leading to a world society, global constitutionalism emphazises the capability to shape 
global governance in legal-political, especially constitutionalist, though not 
internationalist terms (Volk, 2012: 554). As a concept global constitutionalism 
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association with a constitution as a document but with constitutionalism as a prism or 
scholarly lens through which the outer world is observed. Second, it is a concept of 
assimilation - assimilating constitutionalism into and adapting it to new contexts beyond 
the nation state as its historical point of reference; third, it is a concept of compensation 
as global constitutional structures increasingly compensate for the loss of regulatory 
capacity on the national level. Fourth, it is a concept of condensation for in the process 
of translation (domestic constitutionalism into beyond nation states) the normative 
essence of constitutionalism, democracy and rule of law, is kept despite of changing 
circumstances (Viellechner, 2012: 603ff.). With regard to international relations and 
organisations, constitutionalization in this perspective means the institutionalisation of 
international norms – that is the process of emergence, creation and identification of 
constitution-like elements. The constitutional elements in this process are the following 
three: first, global constitutionalisation is a continuous and lasting process, not an ad-hoc 
event; second, there must be some formal dimension outlining procedural and 
institutional norms to serve the rule of law; third, there must be a substantive dimension 
ensuring fairness and security. This approach seems to identify global constitutionalism 
or constitutionalisation wherever there is formal constitutionalisation, understood as the 
institutionalisation of procedures for inter-state relations, substantive 
constitutionalisation, understood as the institutionalisation of human rights provisions, 
and the institutionalisation of formal and substantial norms (Milewicz, 2009: 416, 434). 
However, this only refers to the institutionalisation of certain norms – which could also 
be described in terms that are already well-captured in international relations theory such 
as regime etc. Therefore the concept of global constitutionalism is blurring the 
conceptual lines between regimes etc. and equalises those with constitutionalism – 
although the latter actually requires a certain intensity of political integration. 
Constitutionalism and constitutionalisation require some intensity and density of 
political integration, not just a process of institutionalisation. What distinguishes 
constitutionalisation is the intensity and scope of its process of institutionalisation which 
might not be present yet at the international level. So there cannot be an international 
constitution identified just by ‘scaling down’ a state constitution to functional 
equivalents, especially of organisational nature, that we can find plenty in the 
international arena. However, the argument can also be reversed as ‘an international or 
global constitution cannot be gained by simply scaling up a typical state constitution. 
We must be aware of the problems of translation’ (Peters/ Armingeon, 2009: 387). 
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World constitutionalism claims that it is not based on the traditional concept of 
international law as law between states only, and that it does not simply equate the 
community of states with the community of citizens. It also does not imply that all the 
conditions for actual constitutionalism on a global level are met. However, it 
acknowledges that international law is capable of innovation beyond the mere regulation 
of inter-state affairs in a way that both states and their citizens are accounted for as 
subjects in the concept. The acknowledgment of such innovative potential of 
international law is in principle to be appreciated. However, today’s international 
community is not one of people or citizens but one of states and classical international 
law instruments and organisations. Accordingly, the term constitutionalism does not 
(yet) apply to the global level (Pernice, 2008b: 12, 20). Consequently, it does not seem 
appropriate to employ a concept whose conditions are not yet established in this specific 
context. As argued before, constitutionalism does not only mean that certain legal norms 
(of national or international law) provide for constitutive and organisational functions. It 
also and necessarily means that constitutional norms reflect a fundamental normative 
basis or values of the community ruled by this legal order. This is precisely what 
distinguishes constitutional orders from mere functional equivalents. So far international 
legal orders seem not capable of providing for such normative basis shared by all the 
contracting parties. That eventually means that the concept of world constitutionalism 
waters down the concept of constitutionalism in a way that it equates constitutionalism 
with its functional equivalents and therefore could potentially apply constitutionalism to 
all sorts of legal or regulatory regimes. Finally, it can even be questioned whether 
international organisations that are alleged subjects of global constitutionalism even 
display the merely functional requirements of the constitutional terminology. For 
instance, the WTO does not at all establish any political authority entitled to make 
political decisions binding on all its members (Giegerich, 2009: 43). It can rather be 
argued that the global, international legal order is not anywhere near transforming into a 
world constitution. There certainly has been a move from international norms that have 
been regulating only bi-lateral state-to-state relationships towards multi-lateral 
cooperation. However, the intensity of this cannot be ranked as constitutionalisation on a 
global level – only regionally or sectorally there are constitutional regimes to be found. 
In other words: ‘(e)nhancing the effectiveness of international law alone does not 
transform it into an international constitution but rather into an effective international 
legal order’ (Volk, 2012: 559ff.). 
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Additionally, global constitutionalists assign international courts and tribunals with a 
key role in the constitutionalisation process; thus such approaches promote a legal and 
judicial version of constitutionalism. Accordingly, global constitutionalism embraces a 
liberal paradigm (or bias) of law and politics and is in danger to bias constitutions to be 
administered only by a few transnational judicial and legal elites and thus the 
juridification and de-politicisation of politics (Volk, 2012: 559ff.). It can be questioned 
whether such juridification of international politics, including new normative standards, 
actually means the same as constitutionalisation (Giegerich, 2009: 42). That is why it 
seems reasonable to conclude that ‘there is no international constitutionalism in the 
normative sense today’ (Giegerich, 2009: 59). 
 
Taking all the above into consideration, it can be concluded that world constitutionalism 
seeks to apply concepts that have developed in a domestic context to levels beyond the 
state and thus seeks to identify a hierarchically structured legal order beyond the nation 
state. Legal pluralism, however, breaks with the domestic tradition and purports a 
disorder of legal orders that are in a heterarchical, un-connected relationship. However, 
there is a significant convergence of both approaches, most ostensibly in approaches of 
‘constitutional pluralism’ (Viellechner, 2012: 601f.). This thesis rejects both legal 
pluralism, since it undermines the principles of legal clarity and predictability that are 
most essential for the idea of law itself, and world constitutionalism as it is neither 
empirically evident nor analytically adequate. So the concept developed in this thesis 
tends more to the constitutional pluralist side. However, it regards a consistent rule of 
conflict resolution as something inherently necessary in such concept – unfortunately 
this has not been sufficiently and systematically considered by most concepts of 
constitutional pluralism. Constitutional pluralism conceptually neglects rules for 
resolving conflicts between contradictory norms and their validity, probably because 
such rules may smell like a ‘quest for hierarchy’ which seems not desirable in the 
debate. However, here such rule for conflict resolution is considered as a conceptual 
essential, that is required by normative and functional accounts inherent in the very idea 
of law, in order to make constitutional pluralism work in constitutional practice within 
the Europe.  
 
 
4.2.2  Multidimensional sovereignty: a complementary 
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structure of political authority in Europe 
 
‚Constitutional complexity is indebted to some scholarly views on the European Union, namely 
multilevel constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism’ (Martinico, 2011: 90). 
 
The challenges to the sovereignty concept that have emerged from European 
transnationalisation and constitutionalization have provoked a debate among scholars 
and practitioners about the question whether the concept of sovereignty is still 
meaningful and has explanatory value for the architecture of political authority in 
Europe. Some authors regard constitutional sovereignty to be lost and therefore a ‘post-
sovereign’ (MacCormick 1996) or ‘post-constitutional’ (Somek, 2007) era. Here it is 
argued that European law was neither international nor constitutional law but a ‘mixture 
of the absence of both’ and thus somehow ‘post-constitutional’ (Somek, 2007: 1131). 
Furthermore, classical accounts of indivisible and unitary sovereignty are invoked and 
diagnose its demise in the European context. For example, according to Loughlin 
sovereignty was an ‘absolutist concept, expressing the autonomy of the political sphere. 
It cannot be divided without being destroyed’ (Loughlin, 2009: 23). Others see the risk 
of falling behind medieval times in a way that a concept of divisible sovereignty risks to 
reduce sovereignty to sovereignty rights or a set of sovereignty rights and thus to draw 
back on a diffuse medieval concept of sovereignty (Nuernberger 2010: 22). In more 
dramatic terms:  
 
‚What we see in the Union is a process whereby Member States have each agreed not to act on 
their own in some fields but rather to act together. This is often called a ‚pooling’ of soverignty. 
I don’t like the phrase. It is a politician’s trick for pouring new wine into old bottles and 
appearing to reconcile the irreconcilable’ (Schiemann, 2007: 485). 
 
However, as argued before, it does not seem convincing to entirely abandon the concept 
of constitutional sovereignty merely because one of its classical elements has been 
modified. Most authors agree that sovereignty is not entirely lost but continues to exist 
in a different form. First of all, it can be argued against abandoning the concept of 
sovereignty that this concept has been used and developed for several centuries, hence it 
seems be capable to explain and analyse political and legal authority even in changing 
circumstances. Sovereignty has always been a ‘fluid concept, adapting over the course 
of history to a changing social context and new modes of governance, from the absolute 
sovereignty of a monarch to the idea that sovereignty is vested in the people’ (Albi/ van 
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Elsuwege, 2004: 755f.). Sovereignty is a concept by which we try to understand the 
configuration of political authority, nothing more and nothing less. Only very strong 
evidence of sovereignty being outdated could justify the denial of the concept at all. 
Furthermore, the concept keeps being used by practitioners whose assertions should not 
be entirely ignored by political and constitutional theory. So it could be held that the 
reason to maintain a theoretical concept is not the fact whether it provides an 
explanation, but rather how adequate this explanation is in order to understand political 
reality surrounding us (Nuernberger, 2010: 7f.; Halliday, 1994: 78)  
 
‚Thus, sovereignty cannot simply be wished away, since it has been foundational to the 
differentiation of modern political life into a domestic and international sphere. Without the 
concept of sovereignty, the way in which modern politics is conducted would become hard to 
comprehend, let alone justify’ (Bartelson, 2011: 86). 
 
That means although traditionally the concept of sovereignty was used to understand a 
one-dimensional and monolithic structure of nation-state political authority, it has yet 
sufficient analytical scope to grasp more complex and multi-dimensional configurations 
of political authority such as the European Union. However, to unpack sovereignty 
especially with regard to its European dimension is a challenging and difficult quest 
(Walker, 1998: 356; Marquardt, 1994: 631). Consequently, within the European Union 
constitution, sovereignty as a concept is not to be abandoned but its assumptions of 
indivisible and unitary sovereignty are to be revised. Especially the Maastricht decision 
of the German FCC and the following wave of literature have shown the need for a 
conceptual revision. Hereby the FCC has been particularly criticised for drawing on 19th 
century notions of sovereignty and applying them to the supranational EU. Here, many 
policy areas have been internationalised, policy-making has shifted from the national to 
the transnational level and supreme authority is dispersed between various entities on the 
international, supranational and national level. Territorial boundaries have been overlaid 
by functional distributions of competences between such entities. That is why the efforts 
to re-think sovereignty beyond the nation-state have opened the ‘Pandora’s box of 
questions regarding the very nature of law, the sources of law’s legitimacy, and the 
relationship between legal and political authority’ (Buchanan, 2009: 22) (Pernice, 2009: 
375f.; Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 743, 756).  
From this follows that the conceptual problem of sovereignty is not beyond conceptual 
and theoretical solution as suggested by Walker. According to him, conflicting claims to 
ultimate legal sovereignty are merely social facts whose validity and realisation depends 
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on their articulation by actors in the system – accordingly it can be argued that if it was 
not in the interest of these actors to enforce these claims, then there could be a basis for 
accommodating conflicting claims for sovereign authority. Regarding the conflicting, 
though equally plausible claims as ‘sociological rather than logical, and so (...) amenable 
to solution’ (Walker, 1998: 383) seems to fall short of the conceptual capacities of the 
sovereignty concept. Sovereignty is more than a social fact and has both constitutive and 
normative impacts for the establishment and exercise of political power (as argued in 
Chapter 2). To argue that sovereignty and thus the question about the final arbiter are 
diffused somewhere in the multilevel architecture of the EU is not acceptable as the 
consistent exertion of a final arbiter is a prerequisite for resolving cases of conflict and is 
further required by principles of rule of law and legal certainty (Nuernberger, 2010: 23). 
It is rather the form of the constitution and exertion of this authority, and thus 
sovereignty, that has changed. It means that the sovereignty problem is difficult to 
address for the well-known paths of legal and constitutional thought can no longer be 
followed alone. It can be argued that ‘the very notion of indivisibility is a main obstacle 
to redefinitions of sovereignty that hopefully could make better sense of those numerous 
instances in which sovereignty has been de facto divided within or between polities’ 
(Bartelson, 2011: 85). Thus sovereignty in the European constitution is still 
constitutional, but yet to be understood in multi-source, complementary and multi-level 
instead of indivisible and unitary terms. The EU is a qualitatively new form of political 
community and polity. Here, co-operation and argumentative dialogues are essential to 
political authority and authoritative decision-making is exerted as collective action that 
is not deriving from a single, unitary political authority (Neyer, 2002: 13). Accordingly, 
‘absolute or unitary sovereignty is entirely absent from the legal and political setting of 
the European Community. Neither politically nor legally is any Member State in 
possession of ultimate power over its own internal affairs.’ However, sovereignty is far 
from being lost since the potential of collective action within the framework of the 
European Union is much higher than of individual action. Sovereignty has not been lost, 
but divided and (re-) combined internally and thus enhanced externally. The first step 
towards a satisfactory theory of law and politics is therefore to leave behind the 
dominant paradigm of the classical sovereign state and (constitutional) law 
paradigmatically tied to it (MacCormick, 1995: 101f.). The EU has indeed transcended 
the Westphalian state other than simply replicating it in some super-state as a new resort 
of unitary and indivisible sovereignty. It has rather created new ways of imagining and 
realising political order, based on a pluralistic rather than monolithic architecture of 
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political power and authority (Schiemann, 2007: 487). It is consequently the conceptual 
assumptions of indivisible and unitary sovereignty that must be revised. An accurate 
terminological concept for the character of the European Union does not deny its 
international law features but entails a more specific concept of its innovative and 
distinct features. It comprises both its international and constitutional character (de 
Witte, 2012: 51). In the following such concept will be developed. It is a concept of 
multidimensional constitutional sovereignty in the European legal-political order; hereby 
‘multidimensional’ means firstly, that multiple sources of authority constitute a 
complementary (non-indivisible) structure of political authority, and secondly, that 
multiple levels of authority constitute a multilevel (non-unitary) structure of 
constitutional authority in Europe. 
 
Multiple sources of authority in Europe account for European sovereignty to be 
multidimensional in a way that the European constitution is a complementary structure 
consisting of national and European constitution(s) (Mayer, 2010: 428f.). That means 
both the European and the national constitutions can only be fully comprehended by 
understanding them as a European constitutional system composed of complementary 
constitutional layers (Pernice, 2001: 7). This idea of a complementary structure of 
constitutional authority is borrowed from Pernice’s concept of the ‘post-national’ 
constitution. Pernice (2004) suggests a ‘post-national concept of the constitution’ that 
transcends the traditional nation state-based concept of the constitution. Here, the point 
of reference for the constitution is no longer the state but also polities beyond the 
(nation) state. This does not necessarily mean that statehood is on its demise but that it is 
open for other sources of political authority. Linking the concept of the constitution with 
statehood does not only seem a historical coincidence in Western Europe but seemingly 
a very German, state-centred approach that is neither necessarily found in other EU 
Member States nor conceptually presupposed by the functions of a constitution. The 
function of modern constitutions is to constitute public power, the institutions through 
which it is exercised, their competences and limits, and the criteria for the legitimicy of 
political power. Understood this way the constitution establishes a state – inasmuch as it 
could establish a political authority beyond the state. Therefore in a functional sense 
there is no substantial difference between the constitution establishing and legitimising 
public power on a state or non-state level. Consequently, the concept of the constitution 
is open for complementary, multilevel structures of political authority and integration 
beyond the capacities of nation states and thus a ‘post-national’ concept (Pernice, 2004: 
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9f.; Pernice, 2001: 6f.). In this way post-nationalism describes a situation where the 
framework for law and politics is no longer the territorial borders of the nation state 
(Chalmers, 2000: 178). The post-national concept of the constitution refers to the legal 
foundation of government in general, including supranational authority that may be 
complementary to national constitutions. Understood this way, the European 
constitution has been in the making since the 1950s and has been a process rather than a 
static foundational act (Pernice, 2002b: 3). However, the ‘post-national’ element seems 
problematic in some ways, in particular because it is a functional concept. As such the 
‘post-national’ constitution is about the constitution of public power – through the 
constitutional process a polity, with its institutions and citizens, is created. This concept 
allows for an understanding of a constitution without statehood (Pernice, 2007: 5). 
However, this is problematic as ticking the boxes for constitutional functions alone is 
not sufficient for a ‘constitution’ since constitutionalism requires more than merely 
constitutive and organisational equivalents for political power exercise (see chapter 1). It 
is furthermore problematic because of its misleading normative assertions. According to 
Pernice (2007, 2008a, 2008b), the post-national concept of the constitution is based on 
the European citizens as the subjects of the constitution. That means it was not the states 
transferring sovereign powers to the Union nor the national constitutions validating 
European law, but the European citizens constituting public power on the European 
level through the means of treaty law. The validity of European law would emanate 
from the treaty that was concluded according to the provisions of national constitutional 
law by national institutions representing the citizens of Europe (Pernice, 2007: 6f.). 
According to Pernice, the concept of multilevel constitutionalism therefore provides for 
a different perspective that was not focussing on an institutional analysis of the process 
but on the perspective of the individual where national institutions act as European 
agents of the people (Pernice, 2008b: 14). Pernice regards the constitutional layers  
 
‚each one established by, and with the sole aim to serve the interest of those who are at the 
source of each level’s respective legitimacy: The individual citizens, with their double identity – 
national and European (...) it results in a new kind of separation of powers, more precisely, in a 
vertical system of checks and balances between national and European authorities stabilising 
the composed constitutional system to the benefit of the freedoms and interests of the citizens’ 
(Pernice, 2008a: 4). 
 
From such individual perspective would rise awareness that citizens were responsible 
for both national and European policies and their basis of legitimacy as well as that the 
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European constitution had a direct impact on national constitutions and that the new 
European role of domestic actors needs special consideration (Pernice, 2008b: 15). 
However, the allegation of citizens of the European Member States as the sovereign 
authority in the European constitution seems a bit idealistic and originating in normative 
ideas that neither reflect the current state of affairs in the EU nor are based on any 
evidence. They may not even appear to be desirable from a normative point of view as 
this would require standards of liberal democracy as found in nation states but neither 
functionally nor logically sufficient on the European level. 
 
The complementary structure of political authority in Europe is also reflected in the 
relationship between the authority ‘layers’. Here, the European constitutional framework 
is exercising competences that have been transferred by the Member States, however, by 
doing so it has attained a considerable degree of autonomy so that now it can assert 
some policies even against the will of the Member States. That means it is the autonomy 
of the EU legal order that is mainly accounting for its ability to develop own policies, 
not the transfer of powers from the Member States (Cannizzaro, 2007: 776, 780). 
However, the EU is neither usurping nation state functions nor can it be expected to. It 
rather complements the nation state as they are no longer able to achieve policy goals 
beyond the reach of domestic policy-making. That is why several levels of action are 
required. The implementation of European law through different layers, European and 
national agencies, is a feature of the complementary structure of the constitutional 
compound in Europe (Pernice, 2007: 24f.; Pernice, 2008a: 4). Within this multilevel 
constitutional structure, the idea of complexity comes into play as it draws on the idea 
that the European constitution is a product of the dialectic or dynamics between the 
national and supranational legal levels and whose configuration depends on the 
exchange between the two systems. Unlike constitutional pluralism complexity does not 
suggest a normative proposal for neutralising constitutional conflicts or reducing 
complexity as such (Martinico, 2011: 90f.). However, when a constitutional conflict is at 
stake there must be a rule of conflict that is capable of providing a consistent solution, 
thus complexity needs to be reduced for the sake of rule of law. Since in the European 
complementary legal order legal sources are shared by both the national and 
supranational levels, autonomy or independence of one legal level is hard to extract. The 
greatest challenge therefore seems to grasp and frame this intertwined and 
interdependent structural complexity (Martinico, 2011: 74). Instead of being sui generis 
and thus beyond conceptual grasp  
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‚(t)he European Constitution is thus conceived as a monstrum compositum, composed of 
constitutional principles developed at the European level and complemented by (common) 
national constitutional principles. In this sense, one could conclude that in such a context 
national laws as well as European law partake in defining the European constitutional law’ 
(Martinico, 2011: 75). 
 
The interlocking of cross-level constitutional authorities is indicated by direct effect and 
direct applicability of regulations; compulsory transposition of directives and its judicial 
enforcement; unmediated implementation of supranational administration; and the 
preliminary reference procedure (Cohen, 2012: 72). Especially the two pillars of the 
European constitutional framework, the principles of supremacy and direct effect, are 
the basis of a legal order that lacks means of coercive force, but achieves compliance 
through the active involvement of judicial and administrative authorities in the Member 
States. The establishment of these doctrines meant a transition from an international law 
organisation into an ‘entity acting in its own right’ (Cannizzaro, 2007: 776). 
Consequently, the authority of ultimate and final decision in the European Union 
architecture has been dispersed. According to the principle of conferral, policy areas that 
have not been transferred to the EU remain subject to the authority of Member States; in 
areas of exclusive EU competences and shared competences where the EU has taken 
action and thus obstructs Member State action, ultimate authority has been transferred to 
the European level. Thus it can be argued that neither the EU nor the Member States 
have ultimate and final authority, but political and legal authority (and thus competence-
competence) are dispersed across multiple levels (Nuernberger, 2010: 14). From this 
follows that the Member States of the EU no longer possess Westphalian-like but 
multidimensional constitutional sovereignty. The states are now characterised by 
transnationally integrated, globalised economies, by multilevel governance and by 
identities no longer exclusively tied to the nation state (Sorensen, 1999: 602). In the 
literature, the labels that are widely used to characterise this new configuration of 
sovereignty in a multilevel polity seem inaccurate as they fail to address the transformed 
character of sovereignty. They range from ‘post-modern’ to ‘late modern’ - meaning 
simply that states in Europe depend on common action to achieve their policy goals 
(Sorensen, 1999: 602; Wallace, 1999: 506). Others are rather pessimistic and regard 
sovereignty as totally ceased. According to this point of view, the sovereignty challenge 
mainly affects the states’ capacity to act and thus undermines the autonomy of the 
political. Any new paradigms of governance without government would lead to the 
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‘destruction’ of the autonomy of the political and thus the end of sovereignty (Loughlin 
in Walker, 2003: 83f.). However, this somehow fatalistic approach does not seem 
convincing as it neglects the authority dimension of sovereignty and focuses merely on 
aspects of actual control. Albeit, sovereignty necessarily entails authority. Accordingly, 
a total loss of sovereignty would mean that within a polity’s territory authority and 
jurisdiction would be exercised by an entity other than the competent authorities. This is 
clearly not the case in Europe. Here, the new challenges – as well as past challenges – 
will not abolish constitutional sovereignty. Rather new forms of authority structures and 
new forms of exercising sovereignty and achieving policy goals have evolved and will 
continue to evolve. However, they will not undermine sovereignty itself but change it in 
both form and substance – that is why the assumptions of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty have to be revised instead of abandoning the sovereignty concept at all. 
Quite the contrary: ‘(s)overeignty’s resilience is, if nothing else, a reflection of its 
tolerance for alternatives’ (Krasner, 2001b: 248). That is why the concept of 
multidimensional European constitutional sovereignty allows for divisible and non-
unitary sovereignty – meaning that there is a plurality of sources and institutions of 
political authority. The multi-dimensional configuration of authority in the European 
Union corresponds with the idea of a plurality of legal orders and thus a plurality of 
claims to legal sovereignty. The pluralist point of view does not consider one claim (for 
instance ECS or NCS) more authentic than the other but equally plausible in their own 
terms. This element of constitutional pluralism seems adequate as it implies multiple 
levels of constitutional authority (no longer only one) both as an explanatory and 
normative framework (Boli, 2001: 70; Krasner, 2001b: 245ff.; Walker, 1998: 361f.; 
Walker in Walker, 2003: 4).  
 
Consequently, autonomy and independence are not preconditions for a transnational 
legal order to possess constitutional sovereignty. Although the notion of European law 
being separate has been promoted by the ECJ and is somehow a condition for EU law 
supremacy, European law has ceased to be separate from national legal orders as a result 
of the ECJ’s jurisprudence (Harden, 1994: 611). The supranational character of EU law 
(supremacy, direct effect, qualified majority voting etc.) has established a certain degree 
of independence of the European legal order. However, European law is not fully 
autonomous from national law – it cannot be since it draws on national legal orders in 
both its effect and validity. Thus national law is an integral constitutive part of the multi-
level European legal order. The EU is a highly integrated supranational organisation and 
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its membership entails far-reaching effects on sovereignty. Being ‚geared’ with national 
law is therefore one of the constitutive features of European law, not a sovereignty 
‘insufficiency.’ It is a new form of sovereignty, a new multi-level architecture of a legal 
order where classical assumptions of indivisible and unitary sovereignty no longer apply 
(Albi/ van Elsuwege, 2004: 742, 750). European constitutionalism is a transformative 
additional layer that overlays the original public international law foundation (Weiler/ 
Trachtman, 1997: 357) as well as the national constitutional law foundation. Therefore, 
‘it does not seem plausible to maintain independence, that means possessing indivisible 
and unitary political authority, of a legal order as a conceptual feature of sovereignty as 
this legal order essentially depends on basic functions of another legal order’ (Weyland, 
2002: 35). 
 
 
4.2.3  Multidimensional sovereignty: a multilevel structure of 
constitutional authority 
 
The second aspect of multidimensional sovereignty concerns the multilevel architecture 
of political authority in the European constitution. That means, there are not only 
multiple sources of authority, but they are also dispersed across different constitutional 
levels: the Member States and the European Union. Sovereignty in Europe is thus 
distributed among various levels. This internal dispersal over several levels, however, 
does not affect the external legal or political sovereignty of Member States in a way that 
it was lost or diminished. In the European Union we are rather facing politics beyond the 
sovereign state: ‘Old conceptions of state sovereignty and of the absolutism of the nation 
state are now radically challengeable. This does not abolish either states or nations as 
political and cultural communities’ (MacCormick, 1996: 561f.). Europe’s constitutional 
order is both complementary and multilevel. And because it complements the 
constitutions of the Member States it is not self-sufficient. Therefore, in order to get a 
complete picture of the European multilevel system not only the European institutions 
and procedures must be taken into account but also the national authorities and the role 
they play in European decision-making (Pernice, 2008a: 24). This architecture is best 
understood in terms of a ‚compound of constitutions’ (‘Verfassungsverbund’). This 
concept has been most prominently introduced by Ingolf Pernice and suggests that 
‘(f)rom the perspective of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ the EU and its Member States 
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can be conceptualised as one consistent system, composed of two complementary levels 
of government’ (Pernice, 2008a: 4). Here the European constitution is a complementary 
structure comprising of both national and European constitutions that establish political 
authority at several levels of constitutional law. Multilevel constitutionalism understood 
this way refers to the constitution as a ‘process of progressive allocation, division, 
organisation of powers at different levels of competence and action, a process finally 
driven by the citizens concerned and through the procedures more or less clearly defined 
by the national constitutions involved’ (Pernice, 2008b: 14). In this sense the European 
legal architecture is very much different from the dual and hierarchical constitutional 
model in federal states. Furthermore, the establishment of the system of European 
governance has evolved by ‘natural growth’ over the decades and due to different 
incentives, needs and events embedded in a certain historical-political context. It has not 
followed a prescribed model of finality. Therefore it would be difficult to describe it as a 
coherent constitutional system in classical terms. It can be rather described as a  
 
‘hybrid form of ‘postnational constitutionalism’ without parallel or precedent in the modern 
world; a unique mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions and actors that is more 
than an international legal order but does not quite fit any accepted category of governance’ 
(Shore, 2006: 716).  
 
Or in Pernice’s words:  
 
‚In the light of multilevel constitutionalism, national constitutions and the European primary 
law which (...) can already be considered as a constitution today, together form one material 
legal entity: Its national and European components are complemeantary, closely interwoven and 
interdependent, and so are the actors of the EU legislative system’ (Pernice, 2008a: 31). 
 
Assuming such constitutional compound structure where national and European legal 
provisions are complementary, the European constitution exists through the intertwined 
levels of national and European constitutional law. The two levels constitute a 
substantial, functional and institutional unity of the European constitution (Mayer, 2004: 
9; Pernice, 2004: 5, 19f.; Pernice, 2007: 3; Pernice/ Kanitz, 2004: 19). This concept of 
the constitution is based on a notion of a constitution in a broader, more functional sense 
(Pernice, 2004: 5). Thus the EU constitution is much more fragmented and 
heterogeneous than a nation state constitution since the EU is not a polity just beyond 
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the Member States but incorporating them as one level of the polity. The European 
states are characterised by ceded constitutional independence/ Westphalian sovereignty, 
modified sovereign equality, compromised economic autonomy, security managed 
through alliance, open internal borders, external borders managed by a common regime, 
and yielded monetary sovereignty due to a single currency. Individual rights and 
freedoms are the base of the transnational constitutional legal order of the European 
Union. These rights are acknowledged to derive from the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, international obligations common to the Member States, especially the 
ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECHR, and the case law of the ECJ. Consequently, 
any constitutional transformation of Europe always means a constitutional 
transformation of the Member States. The European polity is something new and has not 
been designed as a preservation or reflection of the accomplishments of nation states and 
their constitutions, but has multiple levels and sources and cannot be grasped by a 
traditional state- and territoriality-based concept of a single-level constitution. (Crowe, 
2008: 176, 189; Ladeur, 2008: 156f.; Maduro, 2005: 340; Mayer, 2003: 50; Wallace, 
1999: 518; Preuss, 1999: 420f.; Piris, 1999: 584). 
According to Pernice, the main feature of the European multilevel constitutional system 
is that the citizens of the Member States are the source of legitimacy of both the national 
and the European level. Here again, any revision of the treaties means also an implicit 
revision of the national constitutions. However, the first assertion seems disputable as 
has been outlined previously. Nevertheless, the second is accurate because in an 
interlocking ‘geared’ structure of multiple levels each revision of one level affects the 
other. Furthermore, there are two autonomous legal systems in operation that 
substantially form a unity – the European legal order is thus a composed but yet 
coherent legal system. This requires a unity of law (as opposed to constitutional 
pluralism) within the system which is ensured by a rule of conflict and respective 
procedures which can guarantee that in similar legal cases the system delivers similar 
and consistent, legally binding solutions (Pernice, 2008b: 15f.). This demonstrates why 
the multidimensional concept of sovereignty is not pluralist in strict terms - in fact it 
envisages the necessity of a conflict rule that ultimately accommodates constitutional 
conflict in a consistent manner. However, it is acknowledged (as in constitutional 
pluralism) that there is no ‘natural’ hierarchy of norms between European and national 
law. The supremacy of European law is therefore a functional principle following from 
the principle rule of law and equality before the law. The supremacy principle does not 
govern validity but the application of norms (and effet utile of European law). 
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Additionally, multilevel structure means that legislative, executive and judicial powers 
are not only attributed to different institutions at each level but also that different 
functions are conferred to different levels. Furthermore, their European role and the 
loyalty of national courts are the essential devices for realising the direct effect of 
European law. That is also why democratic legitimacy of European legislative acts first 
of all depends on functioning democracy and electoral systems in the Member States. 
Here, the ECJ and national courts play a fundamental role as safeguards. And since the 
legislative, administrative and judicial implementation of European law depends on the 
national authorities, the respect of the common values, fundamental rights and 
principles, especially the rule of law, is a condition for the functioning of the entire 
system and is ensured by homogeneity clauses on both the European and the national 
level (eg Art 23 German Basic Law). The balance between national autonomy and 
European homogeneity is finally reflected in the fact that the EU has no power of 
coercive force but depends on the cooperation of national authorities (Pernice, 2008b: 
15f.). This horizontal dimension of multilevel constitutionalism limits the constitutional 
autonomy of Member States and establishes a common European law shared by all 
Member States. In a nutshell it can be concluded that in the European constitutional 
compound public power is originally and autonomously constituted. However, the 
establishment of a European constitution is not a single foundational act but a 
continuous process. Here, the national and European constitutional levels are intertwined 
into a substantial unity. Whether European citizens are the democratic source of 
European public power and thus legitimise the European political order (Pernice, 1999: 
3ff.) can be doubted and is furthermore not of greatest importance for the question about 
the architecture of sovereignty in Europe. 
 
Furthermore, the multilevel constitutional authority in Europe means the absence of 
strict hierarchy and enforcement procedures by coercive force. Multilevel systems of 
governance and polities are not just systems of interactive co-operation but an 
autonomous form of polity: a heterarchical form of political power relationships (Neyer, 
2002: 15). The multilevel legal order and legal practice in Europe is guided and 
structured by constitutional terms, even in the absence of hierarchical relationships 
usually associated with constitutionalism (Kumm, 2005: 40). According to the concept 
of multilevel constitutionalism, there is no hierarchy or competition between the 
European and the national constitutions but ‘a functional distribution of powers and a 
need for co-operation of all those vested with public authority’ (Pernice, 2002b: 11). 
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According to Roeben (2004), the legal-political architecture of the EU is rather 
characterised by a system of ‘inverse hierarchy’ where the nation states are placed both 
at the lowest and at the highest level of a hierarchical system, and the Union in the 
middle. At the highest level, the Member States determine the actions of the European 
level through the heads of states and intergovernmental action, whilst at the periphery 
the Member States are affected by the EU’s action:  
 
‚There are thus two separate yet parallel constitutional processes operating. It is the specific 
interaction between centre and periphery in both processes that meets the demands of the 
institutions of a liberal democracy (...) this interaction of centre and periphery thus transcends 
the constitutional nation state’ (Roeben, 2004: 346). 
 
Roeben’s conceptualisation of absent clear hierarchy (and clarity is a defining feature of 
hierarchy) as ‘inverse hierarchy’ does not seem fully accurate. It seems rather 
appropriate to regard Europe as a community of law rather than a community based on 
force. That means ‘(t)he relationship of European and national law, though, is not based 
on hierarchy between the European and the national level but rather pluralistic and 
cooperative’ (Pernice, 2010: 13f.). The absence of hierarchy and enforcement capacity is 
a particular property of the European legal system. This feature, again, is very different 
from federal systems (Pernice, 2008a: 22). The European political-legal order is based 
on the ‘voluntary respect of the law’ by its Member States instead of physical 
enforcement. This principle is most obvious in the relationship between the ECJ and 
national courts: both have no power to declare null and void a provision or judgement of 
the other; national courts are bound to follow the judgements of the ECJ, however, the 
European courts cannot set aside a judgement of a national court. The ECJ is not a court 
of higher instance but ‘a co-operative partner, giving advice on the interpretation of 
Community law and, in case of doubts, on the validity of a provision thereof – all this in 
the framework of the judicial dialogue’ (Pernice, 2008a: 22). This means that the 
relationship between national and European courts is none of hierarchy but of co-
operation based on judicial dialogue (Pernice, 2007: 27). Since in a complementary 
constitutional system there is no hierarchical structure of norms, supremacy is one of 
application not of validity. The principle of European law supremacy does not suggest a 
hierarchy of norms but governs the application of a specific norm in cases of conflict 
(Mayer, 2004: 10; Mayer, 2010: 428f.). The subordination of national under EU law 
cannot be explained in terms of a hierarchical relationship between federal and state or 
constitutional and statutory law (Habermas, 2012: 341). The substance of the supremacy 
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rule of European law accounts for this special, non-hierarchical relationship between 
European and national law. Although the literature has criticised the language of 
‘supremacy’ for its hierarchical connotations and suggested to replace it by ‘primacy’,55 
the doctrine of supremacy as a positive principle of European law has indeed accounted 
for those concerns. It does not affect the validity of legal provisions at the Member State 
level and is therefore not a principle of hierarchy among different legal norms and 
systems. It rather governs the application of legal provisions in cases where there is a 
conflict between provisions of different legal systems. Supremacy is a rule that ensures 
the consistency between European and national political authority in a multi-level 
system where neither European nor national law are derivative law but original and 
autonomous and thus cannot brought into a strictly hierarchical order.  
Furthermore, the supremacy of European law must also account for the principle of 
equality before the law that requires an even and equal application of European law 
throughout all Member States. That is why in cases of conflict the common norm has to 
trump the particular norm. Here again, European law supremacy is a functional, not a 
hierarchical principle (Pernice, 2007: 23). That national constitutional courts claim to be 
in principle competent to review European acts can be understood not as a threat to 
European authority but as an ‘emergency remedy’ that ensures the existence of the entire 
system and emanates from the voluntary acceptance of the European architecture where 
supranational and national authorities are interdependent and closely interwoven 
(Pernice, 2002b: 11). That means that ‘(a)n intelligent primacy principle takes the 
concerns of the Member states seriously and accommodates them, but without 
undermining the integrity of the European legal order and the European Court of Justice’ 
                                                       
55 In the literature (Avbelj 20011) it has been debated if the principle of supremacy actually 
means ‘supremacy’ or ‘primacy.’ The difference between those is seen in their range of 
operation. Supremacy is regarded as an intra-systemic feature of European legal acts 
operating within the legal orders of the Member States and thus concerning the validity of 
law. Supremacy thus only operates within the respective legal order but does not extend 
beyond it. Hence, relationships between distinctive legal orders are not governed by 
supremacy. Each legal order had its own internal hierarchy with the supreme legal 
provisions on top, but there was no hierarchy between the multiple legal orders in Europe, 
there is no overarching hierarchical pyramid of all European legal orders. Their relationship 
was rather heterarchical and ruled by the principle of primacy. According to Mayer, 
primacy implies a non-hierarchical relationship between norms, whereas supremacy implies 
a hierarchical one (Mayer, 2010: 431). Supremacy implies the idea of hierarchy whereas 
primacy implies primacy in application (not validity) (Mayer, 2006: 3). Primacy is a trans-
systemic principle governing the relationships between autonomous legal orders and thus 
the sovereign levels in the European legal architecture. Accordingly, primacy was a feature 
of European law and operates as a rule of conflict governing the scope and application of 
legal provisions, it thus requires conflicting national law to be disapplied and hence ensures 
the effect and uniform application of European law across all Member States (Avbelj, 2011: 
750f.). 
 206 
(Mayer, 2006: 9). Thus a useful principle of primacy/ rule of conflict needs to 
accommodate both the functional requirements of European law and the constitutional 
identity of Member States. Through the interaction and dialogues between EU judges 
and national judges, cases of hard conflict have been mostly settled or avoided in 
pragmatic way, thus EU law has enjoyed supremacy without a respective clause 
(Cannizzaro, 2007: 779) until the Treaty of Lisbon. This particular supremacy 
construction and its unique features are an expression of multidimensional sovereignty:  
 
‚The inclination of the national courts to accept the supremacy of Community law in pratice, 
while reserving their ultimate power to intervene if the Community clearly oversteps the limits of 
the powers bestowed upon it by the respective national constitution, has thus created an unusual 
situation. The competence of the central entity to settle low-intensity conflicts between EU law 
and national law is assigned to the ECJ, whereas the courts of the Member States maintain their 
ultimate competence to settle conflicts involving sensitive issues of sovereignty. In a sense, then, 
the European order is unitary at its base (...) but it is pluralist at its top because it lacks a 
generally recognised supreme authority for settling issues of a fundamental character. To put it 
differently, the European order can be described as constitutional up to a certain level; but from 
that point upwards, it is still wedded to its internationalist origins’ (Cannizzaro, 2007: 780). 
 
Consequently, in a multilevel constitutional structure such as the European Union 
constitution  
 
‚it is clear that absolute or unitary sovereignty is entirely absent form the legal and political 
setting of the European Community. Neither politically nor legally is any (M)ember (S)tate in 
possession of ultimate power over its own internal affairs (...) So the (S)tates are no longer fully 
sovereign states externally, nor can any of their internal organs be considered to enjoy present 
internal sovereignty under law; nor have they any unimpaired political sovereignty. The 
community on the other hand is plainly not a state. Nor does it possess sovereignty as a kind of 
Federation or Confederation. It is neither legally nor politically independent of its members’ 
(MacCormick, 1999: 132). 
 
The European constitutional process is not a zero-sum game in a way that a gain on the 
European constitutional level would lead to a loss (of sovereignty, validity etc) on the 
national constitutional level. It rather means the establishment of a complementary and 
multilevel structure that entails a re-configuration of political authority (Pernice, 1999: 
6). MacCormick suggests that the term ‘divided sovereignty’ is appropriate to grasp this 
state of affairs in Europe, where sovereignty is far from being lost but newly 
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configurated by division and re-combination beyond the sovereign state (MacCormick, 
1999: 133). However, as has been shown sovereignty is not only divided but also non-
unitary, consequently sovereignty is now much more than just ‘divided’: it is 
multidimensional in a way that it entails complementary and multiple sources of 
authority that are dispersed across multiple levels of constitutional authority. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it has been shown that the challenges to sovereignty emerging from the 
European constitution have provoked a series of constitutional adjudication in Member 
States such as Germany and the United Kingdom. Here, the constitutional judges have 
tried to accommodate the new architecture of political sovereignty in the European 
Union with their notions of national constitutional sovereignty. While the German FCC 
has jealously defended national constitutional supremacy, the British Law Lords have 
willingly accepted European law supremacy on pragmatic grounds. However, both 
constitutional courts base their reasoning on traditional notions of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty. Thus they fail to address the actual problem at stake and therefore to 
resolve the constitutional conflict in the long run. They are only offering temporary 
strategies that rather conceal than solve the problem. As a consequence, when reflecting 
upon a new and revised concept of sovereignty in the European Union the approaches 
offered by the highest courts in the Member States do not seem helpful. That is why a 
new concept of multidimensional sovereignty has been developed that leaves behind the 
assumption of indivisible and unitary sovereignty but instead offers an approach that 
incorporates the new architecture of European sovereignty as emerging from multiple 
sources and dispersed across multiple levels in the multilevel European constitution. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis it has been shown that the debate on European constitutionalism is a very 
rich one, not at last due to the diversity of constitutional traditions in Western European 
nation states where constitutionalism had evolved as a framework of constituting, 
organising and limiting formerly absolute political power. The debate on the meaning of 
the term ‘European constitution’ and how it relates to nation state constitutions and the 
understanding of constitutional sovereignty is controversial, characterised by a great 
variety of normative assertions, conceptual assumptions and final conclusions. This 
thesis has aimed to make a useful contribution in a way that it has addressed two major 
problems within the field of European constitutional theory: first, the problem of a clear 
and concise terminology of the ‘European constitution.’  
In the European context ‘constitutionalism’ is used in different ways, though in general 
there is little doubt that European constitutionalism exists in one or the other form. 
Especially the constitutionalisation thesis, that was introduced by the European Court of 
Justice in the early 1960s, has created legal and political facts that have been absorbed in 
one or the other way by practitioners and the academic community. In this study 
constitutionalism has been used as both an explanatory framework and object of inquiry 
in a way that it has served as analytical ‘glasses’ to analyse the European political and 
legal order. At the same time, however, this analytical framework has also been the 
object of study as the framework itself has been examined for its applicability in the 
European context. As a result it has been argued that the constitutional meanings of 
fundamental laws, principles of liberal democracy and the subjection of politics to law 
are well established at the European level. Territoriality as a spatial principle of 
organising political power can also be found, but is no longer the exclusive principle of 
organising political spaces. Furthermore, polity and territory in Europe are not congruent 
as the European legal-political order comprises multiple levels of governance with 
different functional and spatial scopes. Lastly, statehood as a constitutional meaning has 
not been established in the European polity. However, it has been explained that even in 
Western European nation states statehood has been a historical contingency rather than a 
necessary or sufficient condition of constitutionalism. That is why statehood is only a 
contingent meaning of nation state constitutionalism and cannot be treated as an 
analytical feature of (European) constitutionalism. According to this conceptual 
framework of the European constitution, Europe’s constitution can be specifically 
defined as the primary law of the European Union, the jurisprudence of the ECJ, partly 
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the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as recognised 
by the EU primary law, and finally the constitutional orders of the Member States since 
the interactions between Member State legal actors and European institutions create a 
multi-level constitution.  
The second problem addressed by this thesis is the question about the challenges that 
have emerged from the European constitution to the traditional understanding of 
constitutional sovereignty. However, before those challenges can be analysed it is 
necessary to have a thorough understanding of the term ‘sovereignty’, particularly its 
meaning as ‘constitutional’ sovereignty, its conceptual features and scope and how these 
are operating in constitutional practice. Such understanding is a precondition as to 
precisely identify the challenges that arise from the European constitution and what 
particular feature of sovereignty they exactly challenge.  
The ‘classical’ conceptualisation of sovereignty has been closely related to the 
development of the Westphalian Order in Europe that replaced personalised feudal rule 
by exclusive political authority over a specific territory – sovereignty is thus understood 
as a claim to ultimate and supreme political authority, essentially understood as 
legitimate political authority. Such authority requires some level of political power in 
order to assert its ability to enforce its authority – that is why sovereignty is a relational 
concept that links competence (authority) with capacity (power). Consequently, it cannot 
be reduced to a legal status without any actual efficacy. In modern European states 
sovereignty has been institutionalised by the means of constitutions and constitutional 
law. Thus sovereignty is also a legal institution and therefore the tension between law 
and politics is inherent in the concept of sovereignty. This tension emanates from law 
being both the foundation of politics and the medium through which this foundation is 
exerted.  
The classical concept of sovereignty entails particularly two assumptions that are 
challenged by European integration: indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Indivisible 
means that there can be only one source of supreme political authority; unitary means 
that this ultimate authority is vested in only one institution and cannot be dispersed. 
Unlike the ‘real’ challenges emerging from European constitutionalism, popular 
conceptual fallacies do not impose an ‘imminent threat’ to the concept of sovereignty 
but reflect plain misconceptions. Such common fallacies are conceiving of authorities 
other than political as a threat to sovereignty. However, what these non-political 
authorities lack are both the competence and capacity to make collectively binding 
decisions – thus they cannot be a threat to effective sovereign authority. Furthermore, 
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the language of ‘shared’ sovereignty is misleading as it suggests that different 
shareholders of sovereignty would mean that sovereignty had been lost. Another 
conceptual fallacy is conflating authority with power and control. Authority has to rely 
on actual power to ensure its enforcement. However, authority can be asserted without 
coercion; thus authority and power or control are not the same. Also, sovereignty cannot 
be reduced to a legal status only as this would mean to omit effectiveness and capacity 
of authority that are essential to sovereignty. Diffusing different concepts of popular 
sovereignty is a widespread  fallacy that is caused by mixing up normative claims with 
principles of positive constitutional law and its particular methods of interpretation. 
Finally, it has been argued that framing sovereignty as a zero-sum game where 
international legal sovereignty is exerted on the expense of Westphalian sovereignty is a 
delusive approach. 
How the classical notion of Westphalian constitutional sovereignty is operating in 
practice has been explained by the two exemplary cases of Germany and the United 
Kingdom that employ very different traditions of vesting institutions with highest 
political authority. The two cases have illustrated that the conceptual features of 
indivisible and unitary sovereignty can occur in very different shapes and forms: while 
in Germany there is constitutional sovereignty, in the United Kingdom we find 
parliamentary sovereignty. That means, different institutions entail the claim to highest 
political authority – in Germany this is the constitution, in the United Kingdom the 
Parliament. Although sovereignty is vested in different institutions, the conceptual 
features of indivisible and unitary sovereignty are yet governing the operation of these 
institutions. Therefore classical sovereignty can appear in different forms, but yet draw 
on the assumptions of indivisible and unitary sovereignty.  
 
After all this conceptual and practical elaboration, finally, the second problem of the 
European challenges to the concept of sovereignty was analysed. Here it has been 
explained how exactly the two conceptual assumptions of classical sovereignty have 
been undermined by the legal-political architecture of the European Union. Regrettably, 
most studies on the challenges of European constitutionalism treat sovereignty as an a 
priori truth instead of an object of critical examination. That is why we are presented 
with approaches to sovereignty and its challenges that fall short of the legal-political 
complexity of the European Union structure. This thesis, however, has argued that the 
two main competing approaches that account for the sovereignty relationships between 
the European Union and its Member States indeed misrepresent the institutional and 
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normative way in which sovereignty operates in the European Union. The first approach, 
National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) regards European authority as delegated 
authority from the Member States and thus the Member States as the ‘Masters of the 
Treaties.’ It thereby draws on an indivisible notion of sovereignty in a way that political 
authority is ultimately and exclusively located on the nation state level. According to the 
second approach, European Constitutional Supremacy (ECS), the European Union polity 
constitutes its own authority which is supreme over Member States authority. This 
approach draws on exactly the same idea in a way that it just replaces the nation state 
level by the supranational level. Both accounts fail to grasp the specifically multi-
dimensional configuration of authority in the architecture of the European Union polity 
that is not vested in one level but in both the Member State and the European level. This 
authority fallacy extends to the question about European law validity. There is no doubt 
that the validity of European law is grounded in the ratification or adoption of the 
Treaties according to national constitutional procedures. This does not preclude, 
however, the European legal order from constituting a distinct legal order. Within that 
distinct legal order, the criteria for the recognition of validity have become internal to 
this legal order. The validity of European law is hence governed by criteria of both its 
sub-systems: the European and the domestic legal orders. European legal provisions are 
acknowledged as valid and applicable in relevant situations by reference to a state’s 
internal (constitutional) criteria of validity. The claims of the two different camps, 
postulating ultimate legal authority either for the European or the Member State level, 
however, do not seem convincing. Both fall short of the possibility that European law 
has emancipated from its original foundation – it is obvious that European law is now a 
more differentiated, institutionalised and advanced legal order than general international 
law. The characteristics of European law, namely European norms with direct effect and 
conferring rights and obligations on both citizens and Member States and establishing 
procedures to ensure these rights and obligations through collaboration between the ECJ 
and member states courts, distinguish European law from classical international law. 
Thus the classical dichotomy between international and constitutional law approaches 
seems inadequate when it comes to the European legal order. The European constitution 
is in fact a coherent constitutional system consisting of several layers of constitutional 
law. Understood this way, the supremacy principle does not ascribe hierarchy to norms 
of the different layers but is a rather non-hierarchical principle to ensure consistency 
between the layers.  
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However, in practice Member States and European courts have expressed different 
views on the relationship between the different constitutional layers and on how this 
affects the standing of national constitutional law, especially in cases of conflicts 
between European and Member States legal norms. The question about ‘last instance’ is 
the main line of the constitutional conflict that has raised alongside the framework of a 
dualistic approach as employed in both countries. The jurisprudence of these 
constitutional conflicts in Germany and the United Kingdom has developed pragmatic 
and practical solutions. Though having established a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between 
state sovereignty and the European Union in a pragmatic way, doctrinal and theoretical 
conflicts have still not been settled. In both countries the constitutional judges have tried 
to accommodate the new architecture of political sovereignty in the European Union 
with their notions of national constitutional sovereignty. While the German FCC has 
jealously defended national constitutional supremacy, the British Law Lords have been 
willingly accepting European law supremacy on pragmatic grounds. However, both 
constitutional courts base their reasoning on traditional notions of indivisible and unitary 
sovereignty. Thus they fail to address the actual problem at stake and therefore to 
resolve the constitutional conflict in the long run. They have developed only temporary 
strategies that rather conceal than solve the problem. As a consequence, their approaches 
do not seem helpful for developing a new concept of sovereignty that accurately reflects 
the peculiar architecture of political sovereignty in the European constitution. 
In this thesis such new concept of ‘multidimensional’ sovereignty has been developed 
and leaves behind the assumptions of indivisible and unitary sovereignty. Unlike 
classical sovereignty it accounts for multiple sources, multiple levels and for a non-
hierarchical relationship of political authorities in the European polity. This concept is 
indeed capable of describing and analysing the actual configuration of constitutional 
sovereignty in the European Union – by conceiving of its particular characteristics not as 
a distorted mirror reflection of nation state sovereignty but as genuinely European 
features of multilevel constitutionalism. Consequently, the multidimensional concept 
makes a valuable contribution to the debate on European constitutional theory as it 
introduces a sound concept of the European constitution and its underlying notion of 
sovereignty that is adequate for the unique multilevel architecture of political authority 
in the European polity. 
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